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INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 1982, a striking exchange occurred between senior officials
from the United States and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). A class of
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investors had sued China in U.S. federal court for failing to pay interest on bonds
that the Imperial Chinese Government issued in 1911 to fund the construction of
the Hukuang Railway.1 The court received no response, so it entered a default
judgment, paving the way for the attachment of over $41 million in PRC assets.2
Upon learning of this development, Chinas paramount leader Deng Xiaoping
asked U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz to order the court to remove the
threat to the assets, but Shultz refused.3 Such an order, Shultz explained, would
be impossible due to the separation of powers.4 Confused, Deng asked, What is
the separation of powers?5 Shultz dispatched State Department Legal Adviser
Davis Robinson to Beijing to explain.6
Fast forward now to 2013 and consider a veritable photo negative of
Dengs ignorance. In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari and ordered supplemental briefing on whether a nexus to U.S.
territory should be required for an actionable claim under the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS),7 which confers jurisdiction over any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.8 To aid the Courts deliberation, legal advisers from the foreign
ministries of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands co-filed an amicus brief
with an American lawyer, arguing for a narrow reading of ATS authority.9 This
filing demonstrated not only an awareness of the existence and function of the
U.S. Supreme Court and amicus briefs, but also detailed knowledge of a specific
statute and associated case law.10 If Deng was a novice at American government,
the British and the Dutch seemed to be experts.
These disparate episodes and many others like them raise common
questions about foreign knowledge of U.S. foreign relations lawthe field of
domestic law that governs how [the United States] interacts with the rest of the
world.11 Does it matter whether foreign governments understand U.S. foreign
relations law? Do they understand it in fact, or do they operate in conditions of
acoustic separation12 from the community of American legal actors who study,
design, and apply this law, resulting in foreign misperception or ignorance? If

1.
See Jackson v. Peoples Repub. of China, 550 F. Supp. 869, 870-73 (N.D. Ala. 1982)
(describing the lawsuit).
2.
Id. at 874, 877.
3.
MICHAEL P. SCHARF & PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES OF CRISIS:
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER 44 (2010) (statement
by former Legal Adviser Davis R. Robinson).
4.
Id.
5.
Id. (paraphrasing Secretary Shultz).
6.
Id.
7.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 565 U.S. 961 (2011).
8.
28 U.S.C. § 1350.
9.
Brief of the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
The Kingdom of the Netherlands as Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondents, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013) (No. 10-1491), 2012 WL 405480.
10. Id. at *29-33.
11. Curtis A. Bradley, What is Foreign Relations Law?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 3 (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2019).
12. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal
Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 634-35 (1984).
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foreign epistemic conditions vary cross-nationally or by issue, what accounts for
that variation? And what, if anything, should U.S. foreign relations law do to
shape the quality and pervasiveness of foreign knowledge?
For the most part, the U.S. government has not taken these questions
seriously. The U.S. intelligence community generally does not seek to ascertain
or account for foreign knowledge of U.S. foreign relations law in generating
intelligence products for policymakers.13 To the extent that U.S. officials touch
upon questions of foreign knowledge in open sources, they do so only by way of
assumptions. Those assumptions, moreover, are usually unacknowledged and
very markedly without explanation, much less a proffer of evidentiary support.
Consider three examples, each involving a legal authority of longstanding and
recurring significance.
First, in a series of enactments since 1975, Congress has established
procedures for the expedited adoption of certain types of international trade
agreements.14 These procedures, which are currently available under so-called
Trade Promotion Authority (TPA),15 require Congress to vote on approval of a
qualifying agreement on an expedited basis and without the possibility of
amendment.16 In doing so, the procedures aim to reduce the likelihood of
congressional tampering with [a presidentially negotiated] deal and hence to
reassure Americas negotiating partners that the deal will not unravel.17 Yet the
expectation of foreign reassurance depends on an assumption of foreign legal
knowledge: If U.S. partners understand that federal law bars Congress from
amending a deal negotiated under TPA,18 they can rest assured that the prospect
of U.S. ratification hinges primarily on the degree of congressional support for
the text that emerges from international negotiations, and TPA will achieve its
purpose. But if those partners are unaware of TPA or misinformed about its
effect, they might miscalculate the chances of ratification by assuming the
possibility of congressional revision, and TPA will fail to deliver the reassurance
that its authors envisioned. However likely foreign sophistication might seem,
TPAs legislative history contains no evidence that Congress vetted that critical
premise.19
Second, in the 1968 case of Zschernig v. Miller,20 the Supreme Court
reviewed an Oregon probate statute that precluded nonresident aliens from
inheriting any part of an estate unless they enjoyed a right under the law of their
13. Telephone Interview with Joseph W. Gartin, Former Chief Learning Officer, U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency (Dec. 10, 2020).
14. See generally IAN F. FERGUSSON & CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43491,
TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA): FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2018) (discussing the history
and features of TPA).
15. Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 11426, Title I, 129 Stat. 320.
16. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(d)(g).
17. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42
INTL ORG. 427, 448 (1988).
18. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(d).
19. See generally LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974: P.L. 93-618 (1974).
20. 389 U.S. 429; see also Am. Ins. Assn v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 419-20 (2003) (declining
to overrule Zschernig and applying the framework set forth in Justice Harlans Zschernig concurrence).
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own country to receive estate proceeds without confiscation.21 Zschernig held
the statute unconstitutional as applied because Oregon courts had used it to assail
the law of communist countriesa practice that could very well impair the
effective exercise of the Nations foreign policy.22 Yet the likelihood of such an
adverse effect depended, at least in part, on the pervasiveness of foreign
ignorance: If communist regimes were uninformed about American federalism,
they might have mistakenly attributed the incendiary critiques of Oregon courts
to the federal government and retaliated against the United States as a whole. In
this scenario, Zschernig is relatively easy to justify in practical terms, because it
reduced the likelihood of state actions that might interfere with U.S. diplomatic
relations. But if communist regimes correctly perceived that the fifty states are
substantially independent from Washington and do not speak for the United
States, those regimes were unlikely to mistakenly attribute the actions of Oregon
courts to the federal government and, all else equal, less likely to retaliate against
the United States.23 In this scenario, Zschernig is harder to justify because it took
power away from Oregon to mitigate a questionable risk of national blowback.
The premise of foreign ignorance here contrasts starkly with the assumption of
foreign sophistication in the context of TPA, but the Court cited no supporting
evidence.24
Third, Congress overrode President Richard Nixons veto to enact the War
Powers Resolution (WPR) in 1973.25 The WPR seeks to regulate the Presidents
ability to use military force by, among other things, requiring him to report to
Congress within forty-eight hours of introducing U.S. armed forces into
hostilities.26 It also generally requires the President to terminate any use of
those forces within sixty days after introducing them into hostilities unless
Congress declares war, authorizes the use of force, extends the sixty-day period
by law, or is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack on the
United States.27 In vetoing this legislation, Nixon argued that it would undermine
the U.S. ability to reassure allies and deter enemies by signaling to foreign
audiences that the Presidents domestic legal authority to engage in military
action could easily expire after a short period of time.28 Like TPA but unlike
Zschernig, this position rests on an assumption of foreign sophisticationan
assumption that foreign governments will study the WPR and consider it in
21. OR. REV. STAT. § 111.070 (1957) (repealed 1969).
22. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 435-40.
23. Consistent with this possibility, the Department of Justice explained in an amicus brief that
the U.S. government does not contend that the application of [the Oregon statute] to the facts of this case
constitutes an undue interference with the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States. Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae, Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), 1967 WL 113577, at *15
n.10.
24. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 430-41.
25. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973).
26. Id. § 4(a).
27. Id. § 5(b).
28. See 119 CONG. REC. 34,990 (1973) (reprinting a copy of the Presidents veto message,
which argued that the WPR would seriously undermine this Nations ability to act decisively and
convincingly in times of international crisis and that, as a result, the confidence of our allies in our
ability to assist them could be diminished and the respect of our adversaries for our deterrence posture
could decline).
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predicting the actions of the President.29 Unfortunately, it is hard to know
whether that position is justified, in part because, as Matthew Waxman explains,
there remains a dearth of good historical evidence as to how foreign leaders
interpret political maneuvers within Congress regarding threatened force.30
Scholars, meanwhile, have echoed or simply ignored official assumptions
about foreign knowledge. This is true in political science, where foreign
knowledge of U.S. law is at best presupposed in game-theoretic accounts of
international relations,31 and in legal academia, where a number of commentators
have assumed foreign sophistication in arguing that the United States can use
foreign relations law to transmit signals of national intentions to foreign
governments.32 Some, for instance, have posited that the President can
underscore to foreign partners the reliability of a U.S. commitment to an
international agreement by ratifying the agreement as an Article II treaty, which

29. In the 1980s, the Reagan administration made a similar argument against congressional
restrictions on the presence of U.S. forces in Lebanon. See Steven R. Weisman, White House Warns a
War Powers Fight Hurts U.S. Interests, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1983 (quoting a senior White House official
for the proposition that any restrictions imposed by Congress on the American commitment of troops
are certainly read and understood beyond the shadow of a doubt by the Syrians and the Soviets).
30. Matthew C. Waxman, The Power to Threaten War, 123 YALE L.J. 1626, 1674 (2014).
31. See, e.g., THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 28 (1960) ([I]f the
executive branch negotiates under legislative authority, with its position constrained by law, and it is
evident that Congress will not be reconvened to change the law within the necessary time period, then the
executive branch has a firm position that is visible to its negotiating partners.); James D. Fearon,
Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 577
(1994) (hypothesizing that a threatened use of force from the leader of a democracy will tend to be more
credible to a foreign adversary because elected leaders cannot back down without suffering significant
domestic political costs, and thus assuming that an adversary will correctly identify a threat as emanating
from the leader of a democratic government, perceive that leader as holding municipal legal authority to
decide whether to follow through on the threat, and understand the municipal election laws that condition
the risk of electoral punishment for backing down); see also Waxman, supra note 30, at 1678 (explaining
that it is difficult . . . to find even passing references to questions of legal doctrine or reform in political
science scholarship on threats of force).
32. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, International Agreements: A Rational Choice
Approach, 44 VA. J. INTL L. 113, 124-25 (2003) (arguing that legislative participation [in treatymaking]
sends a credible signal about the seriousness with which the president views the treaty); Jide Nzelibe &
John Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, 115 YALE L.J. 2512, 2533 (2006) (suggesting that
congressional authorization for the use of force should be constitutionally required where the adversary
is a democracy, because a democratic government is likely to perceive such authorization correctly as a
signal of the seriousness of an American commitment to use force); J. Michael Reisman, War Powers:
The Operational Code of Competence, 83 AM. J. INTL L. 777, 783 (1989) (arguing that ambiguity in the
allocation of competence and the uncertain congressional role [with respect to the use of force] will sow
uncertainty among those who depend on U.S. effectiveness for security and that [s]ome reduction in
U.S. credibility and diplomatic effectiveness may result); John K. Setear, The Presidents Rational
Choice of a Treatys Preratification Pathway: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreement, or
Executive Agreement?, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S5, S5 (2002) (arguing that the president risks the hazards of
seeking legislative approval of international agreements in order to send other nations a costly, credible
signal of U.S. commitment to the obligations of the treaty); J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE
L.J. 27, 94 (1991) (A credible threat of the sort found in the declaration of war on Japan represents to
Americas enemy as well as to its own people that the United States is willing to subordinate to the war
effort all preferences for other public goods.); John Yoo, Rational Treaties: Article II, CongressionalExecutive Agreements, and International Bargaining, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3-4, 36 (2011) (justifying
the co-existence of alternative procedures for the adoption of international agreements on the ground that
each procedure sends a different type of signal to foreign partners); see also Waxman, supra note 30, at
1675 (discussing the potential impact of foreign understandings of the separation of war powers on the
Presidents ability to deter adversaries).
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requires the advice and consent of two-thirds of Senators present,33 instead of
ratifying it as a sole executive agreement, which requires no legislative
authorization.34 The significance of such a signal, however, depends on the
unsubstantiated premise that foreign governments understand pertinent federal
law. The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
asserts that all [foreign] states may be presumed to know that the President of
the United States cannot make a treaty without the consent of the Senate,35 but
the Restatement offers no support for that assertion.36
All of this, I argue, is problematic. While it is likely true that assumptions
of foreign knowledge or ignorance are warranted with respect to some
governments on some issues, analysts cannot sensibly draw final conclusions
about the practical merits of many aspects of U.S. foreign relations law without
first ascertaining the nature and extent of foreign governmental knowledge of
that law. In other words, the absence of meta-knowledgeU.S. knowledge of
foreign knowledgeis a precarious state of affairs. Those who neglect foreign
epistemic conditions or take them for granted risk overconfidence in the laws
functional strengths and weaknesses, along with government actions and legal
reforms that are suboptimal and even adverse to U.S. interests.37
To elaborate and address this risk, this Article develops an everted
approach to U.S. foreign relations law. Arguments in the field typically proceed
from the inside out, in the sense that they focus on internal (domestic)
authorities to justify legal conclusions with significant external (international)
implications. The text and structure of the Constitution, judicial precedent,
legislative intent, assessments of institutional competency, and historical
practice thus dominate legal discourse on the adoption of trade agreements, the
role of the fifty states in foreign affairs, war powers, and the process of treatymaking, among numerous other topics.38 In contrast, I argue that American legal
actors should also approach U.S. foreign relations law from the outside in, by
recognizing the importance of the global epistemic environment in which U.S.
foreign relations law operates, by developing meta-knowledge of this field, and
by using that knowledge to improve the laws design and implementation. If

33.
34.

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
See STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32528, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
AGREEMENTS: THEIR EFFECT UPON U.S. LAW 7-8 (2018) (explaining sole executive agreements). For
examples of this kind of signaling argument, see Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 32, at 124-25; Setear,
supra note 32, at S5.
35. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 311
cmt. c (Am. L. Inst. 1987).
36. See id.
37. For other recent critiques of traditional functionalist reasoning in U.S. foreign relations law,
see, e.g., Elad D. Gil, Totemic Functionalism in Foreign Affairs Law, 10 HARV. NATL SEC. J. 316 (2019)
(arguing that judges accord excessive deference to the executive branch in foreign affairs cases under the
guise of functionalism); Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations
Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1935-49 (2015) (arguing that common functionalist justifications for a
distinctive approach to foreign relations law are unpersuasive).
38. See, e.g., CURTIS A. BRADLEY, ASHLEY S. DEEKS & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 39-41 (7th ed. 2020) (describing originalist, practice-based,
structural, prudential, and judicial precedent-based arguments as the kinds that are most relevant to
foreign relations law).
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traditional, inside-out reasoning is parochial in orientation, outside-in is globally
empathic, encouraging American analysts to draw insights about the laws utility
by placing themselves in the position of the foreign governments that must
anticipate and respond to U.S. actions in international affairs.39 From an
American perspective, this is comparative law in reverse.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I clarifies the stakes of metaknowledge. The longstanding dominance of inside-out analysis has discouraged
domestic legal actors from examining the nature and extent of foreign knowledge
on U.S. foreign relations law, but there are several reasons to conclude that the
presence or absence of such knowledge matters a great deal. As I explain, foreign
knowledge can affect foreign compliance with U.S. foreign relations law, global
perceptions of the content of international law, global perceptions of U.S.
compliance with international law, foreign relations laws ability to transmit
signals that shape foreign perceptions of U.S. intentions, and the risk of
miscalculation and even conflict in U.S. bilateral relations. The failure to take
foreign knowledge seriously is thus a significant weakness. Without metaknowledge, American courts, officials in the political branches, and scholars
simply cannot know whether many areas of the law are optimally designed and
applied to advance national interests.
The next two parts commence a long-term project in the development of
meta-knowledge. Part II contends that the condition of foreign knowledge is
nonobvious. Reviewing nearly eighty years of semiannual reports to Congress
under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA),40 I provide evidence that
foreign governments have retained U.S. legal counsel on matters involving U.S.
foreign relations law to varying extents over the postwar period, both
individually and collectively. Along with a series of country-specific illustrations
and theoretical arguments, the FARA evidence suggests cross-national, issuebased, and historical variation in the degree of foreign governmental engagement
with and fluency in U.S. law. From this perspective, blanket assumptions of the
sort that undergird TPA, Zschernig, and Nixons veto of the WPR, among other
examples, are unlikely to reflect conditions on the ground.
Part III produces meta-knowledge by offering an immersive case study on
Japanese understandings of U.S. foreign relations law. Drawing on four months
of field research in Japan, where I collected scholarly publications from the

39. In focusing on foreign governments, I bracket questions about knowledge of U.S. foreign
relations law among foreign publics, for two reasons. First, foreign public knowledge is less likely to carry
direct consequences for U.S. foreign relations, especially when those relations involve undemocratic states
that can act with comparatively little regard for popular preferences. See generally JESSICA L.P. WEEKS,
DICTATORS AT WAR AND PEACE (2014) (examining domestic influences on foreign policy decisions in
authoritarian regimes). Second, the condition of foreign public knowledge is less interesting in the sense
that it seems less likely to vary. That is, aside from discrete pockets of knowledge within foreign academic
communities and among foreign corporate actors, it seems highly probable that foreign publics generally
lack knowledge of U.S. foreign relations law. Cf., e.g., Alex Spillius, British Anti-Americanism Based
on
Misconceptions,
THE
TELEGRAPH
(Aug.
17,
2008),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/2575395/British-anti-Americanismbased-on-misconceptions.html (reporting poll results showing that [m]ore than 50 percent [of British
residents] presumed that polygamy was legal in the US, when it is illegal in all 50 states).
40. Pub. L. 75-583, 52 Stat. 631 (1938) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621).
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National Diet Library, examined newspaper archives, obtained records under
Japans freedom-of-information act,41 and interviewed nearly fifty scholars and
government officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the
Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI),42 the case study reveals the
various pathways by which the Japanese government tends to acquire relevant
forms of knowledge and illuminates the nature and extent of Japans
sophistication. The case study provides a model for efforts to understand
epistemic conditions in other countries, carries significant implications for U.S.Japan relations, and suggests hypotheses for empirical research.
Part IV concludes by laying out an agenda for the implementation of the
outside-in approach. This agenda consists of academic studies and official
policies to cultivate meta-knowledge, a systematic re-evaluation of foreign
relations laws functional merits in light of outside-in dynamics, and legal and
policy measures to calibrate the selective transmission of legal information to
foreign governments based on national interests. Such efforts are likely to
enhance U.S. foreign relations laws ability to promote positive outcomes for the
United States in areas ranging from war powers and human rights to international
trade.
As a final note of introduction, this Article obviously focuses on the foreign
relations law of the United States, but every country has an analogous body of
domestic law that governs interactions with the rest of the world.43 In that sense,
the arguments set forth below are fundamentally universal in their relevance. It
will be up to foreign scholars and officials to adapt the outside-in approach to
the laws and interests of their own jurisdictions.
I. THE STAKES OF META-KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
Many aspects of federal and state law promote the diffusion of U.S. legal
knowledge,44 but it is generally assumed that the effective operation of the U.S.
legal system depends only on epistemic conditions among the American polity
and those present within the United States: Government officials must know U.S.
law to create, interpret, and apply it. Citizens must understand the law to evaluate
reforms and make informed choices in elections. And businesses operating in the

41. Gyōseikikan no Hoyūsuru Jōhō no Kōkai ni Kansuru Hōritsu, Law No. 42 of 1999 (Japan).
42. Prior to conducting the interviews, I received an exemption determination from the
Marquette University Institutional Review Board (IRB Protocol ID 1806024937). Letter from Jessica
Rice, IRB Manager, Off. of Rsch. Compliance, Marquette Univ., to Ryan Scoville, Professor of Law,
Marquette Univ., 1 (July 10, 2018) (on file with author).
43. See generally THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW,
supra note 11 (introducing a field of comparative foreign relations law and examining aspects of the
foreign relations law of several countries).
44. See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (An
elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality
is notice reasonably calculated . . . to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action.); 1 U.S.C.
§ 202 (providing for the publication of the U.S. Code); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)
(explaining that stare decisis promotes the . . . predictable . . . development of legal principles); United
States v. Vasarajs, 908 F.2d 443, 448 (9th Cir. 1990) (Despite the fact that most citizens do not keep
abreast of every statutory development, that statutes are published and available to the public in the first
place means that citizens can fairly be charged with constructive notice of the laws that bind them.).
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United States must know the law to comply with regulatory requirements. This
assumption has resulted in a substantial literature on the domestic condition of
U.S. legal knowledge45 and in public and private programs to ensure the
successful national diffusion of pertinent resources and expertise.46 Its corollary
is a tendency to ignore the significance of foreign sophistication on U.S. law.47
Such an orientation is reasonable as a general matter. After all, most of
U.S. law has no external application48 and is of little to no immediate concern to
most of the world beyond U.S. borders. But as this Part argues, the tendency to
ignore foreign epistemic conditions is counterproductive in the domain of U.S.
foreign relations law, where the quality and pervasiveness of foreign knowledge
can exert material influence over five distinct phenomena: (1) the likelihood of
foreign governmental compliance with pertinent aspects of this law; (2) global
perceptions of the content of international law; (3) global perceptions of U.S.
compliance with international law; (4) foreign relations laws ability to signal
national intentions; and (5) the risk of miscalculation in U.S. bilateral relations.
The importance of meta-knowledge directly follows. To elaborate this
point, I posit that conditions of foreign knowledge and U.S. meta-knowledge
interact to form any of four epistemic dyads on any given issue in a bilateral
relationship. First, the U.S. government might know that the foreign government

45. See generally CHRISTOPHER DREISBACH, CONSTITUTIONAL LITERACY: A TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY IMPERATIVE (2016) (discussing knowledge of the U.S. Constitution in the United States).
46. See, e.g., The Legal Literacy Initiative, LIBRS. WITHOUT BORDERS (last visited Mar. 11,
2020), https://www.librarieswithoutborders.us/legal-literacy-initiative (describing an initiative to curate
and deliver digital legal materials directly to [U.S.] communities, meeting people where they are and
providing them with the digital skills to access the resources that answer their questions).
47. This tendency is apparent in several strands of legal scholarship. First, while there are a
number of important works on legal epistemology, none of them address foreign knowledge of domestic
law. See, e.g., Dan-Cohen, supra note 12; Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer Elhauge, Knowledge About Legal
Sanctions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 261 (1993). Second, American scholarship on comparative law examines
foreign law rather than foreign understandings of American law. See Edward J. Eberle, The Method and
Role of Comparative Law, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 451, 452 (2009) (The essence of
comparative law is the act of comparing the law of one country to that of another. Most frequently, the
basis for comparison is a foreign law juxtaposed against the measure of ones own law.). Finally, a
number of scholars have considered the significance of certain features of the international environment
in which U.S. foreign relations law operates, but those features do not include foreign epistemic
conditions. See generally JOHN YOO & JULIAN KU, TAMING GLOBALIZATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION, AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER (2012) (analyzing globalizations implications for
U.S. foreign relations law); Daniel Abebe, The Global Determinants of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 49
STAN. J. INTL L. 1 (2013) (arguing that the degree to which domestic law constrains the President in
foreign affairs should depend in part on the contemporary structure of international politics); Daniel
Abebe, Great Power Politics and the Structure of Foreign Relations Law, 10 CHI. J. INTL L. 125 (2009)
(hypothesizing that judicial deference to the executive increases when international politics place strong
constraints on the state and decreases when international politics impose weak constraints); Ashley Deeks,
Checks and Balances from Abroad, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 65, 67 (2016) (arguing that foreign actors can use
activities such as litigation and public criticism to affect the power within a single branch or the allocation
of power among the three branches of the US government, particularly in the area of intelligence
activity); Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649
(2002) (arguing that longstanding features of the constitutional law of foreign relations should be
reexamined in light of the advent of globalization); see also Waxman, supra note 30, at 1675 n.186
(suggesting that scholars have paid insufficient attention to questions about foreign knowledge of the
separation of war powers).
48. See, e.g., RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Eur. Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016) (Absent clearly
expressed congressional intent to the contrary, federal laws will be construed to have only domestic
application.).
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is knowledgeable about pertinent aspects of U.S. foreign relations law. Second,
the U.S. government might know that the foreign government is ignorant about
this law. Third, the U.S. government might be unaware of the fact that the foreign
government is knowledgeable. And finally, the U.S. government might be
unaware of the foreign governments ignorance. To borrow from former
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. foreign relations law will be either
a known known, a known unknown, an unknown known, or an unknown
unknown,49 as shown in Table 1.
Table 1: The Four Epistemic Dyads of U.S. Foreign Relations Law

The following Sections develop a theory on how these dyads affect the U.S.
governments ability to advance national interests in relation to each of the five
phenomena set forth above. According to this theory, meta-knowledge will
enhance the U.S. governments ability to (A) enforce U.S. foreign relations law;
(B) harmonize U.S. and foreign perspectives regarding the content of
international law; (C) manage the U.S. reputation for compliance with
international law; (D) use foreign relations law to signal national intentions; and
(E) appreciate and adjust to strategic risks.
A. Effective Enforcement
Certain areas of U.S. foreign relations law impose obligations specifically
on foreign governments. In some cases, these obligations accompany access to
privileges or benefits that emanate from the United States, such as a diplomatic
presence in Washington.50 In other cases, the obligations exist as requirements
49. CNN, Rumsfeld / Knowns, YOUTUBE (Feb. 12, 2002), https://www.youtube.com/watch
?v=REWeBzGuzCc.
50. See, e.g., Foreign Missions Amendments Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-164, title VI, §§ 602,
603, 97 Stat. 1042, 1042-43 (mandating that the head of each foreign mission to the United States prepare
and transmit to the Secretary of State a report on the insurance coverage of mission members); Foreign
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to abide by and remediate violations of substantive federal or state laws of
general application, such as the common law of torts.51
Many of these laws aim to shape the actions of foreign governments in
relation to the United States itself. For instance, in order to purchase or lease
defense articles under the Arms Export Control Act, a foreign country must agree
to maintain the articles security, not to transfer them to third parties, and not to
use them for unapproved purposes without the Presidents consent.52 Countries
that violate this requirement may lose their eligibility for credits, cash sales, and
arms deliveries.53 Similarly, in order to operate in the United States, many agents
of foreign governments must register with the Attorney General under the
Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).54 Those who fail to do so can be fined,
imprisoned for as long as ten years, and removed from the United States.55
Other laws aim to hold foreign governments accountable under
international law. In perhaps the best-known example, federal courts for several
decades used their jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) to impose civil
liability against foreign officials responsible for international crimes such as
genocide and crimes against humanity.56 Federal courts have also held foreign
officials liable under the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), which
authorizes actions for money damages against those who violate international
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-204, title I, § 128(a), 101 Stat.
1343 (A foreign mission may not allow any unaffiliated alien the use of any premise of that mission
which is inviolable under United States law . . . for any purpose which is incompatible with its status as a
foreign mission, including use as a residence.).
51. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (As to any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign state
is not entitled to immunity under section 1605 or 1607 of this chapter, the foreign state shall be liable in
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances; but a foreign
state except for an agency or instrumentality thereof shall not be liable for punitive damages[.]); Rimkus
v. Islamic Repub. of Iran, 575 F. Supp. 2d 181, 196-99 (D.D.C. 2008) (explaining that Section 1606
enables plaintiffs to sue foreign sovereigns on substantive causes of action that are available against
private individuals under federal, state, or international law, and holding that plaintiffs were entitled to
compensatory damages against Iran on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
52. 22 U.S.C. § 2753(a).
53. 22 U.S.C. § 2753(c)(1).
54. 22 U.S.C. § 612(a); see also 50 U.S.C. § 851 ([E]very person who has knowledge of, or
has received instruction or assignment in, the espionage, counter-espionage, or sabotage service or tactics
of a government of a foreign country or of a foreign political party, shall register with the Attorney
General[.]).
55. 22 U.S.C. § 618(a)(2); 18 U.S.C. § 951(a).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1350; see, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (reversing the
district courts dismissal of ATS claims, among others); Renewed Judgment at 1, Kadic v. Karadzic, 93CV-01163 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2020) (renewing the entry of default judgment against the defendant and
thereby awarding tens of millions of dollars in compensatory and punitive damages under the ATS for
genocide, crimes against humanity, and other offenses). Federal courts began adjudicating these kinds of
claims in 1980, when the Second Circuit upheld the exercise of ATS jurisdiction over a claim involving
a Paraguayan government officials torture of a Paraguayan national in Paraguay. See Filartiga v. PenaIrala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court, however, has imposed strict limits on ATS
jurisdiction in recent years. See, e.g., Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931 (2021) (holding that an
actionable claim under the ATS requires plaintiffs to establish that conduct relevant to the focus of the
statute occurred within the United States). As a result, few if any ATS claims against foreign officials are
likely to succeed going forward. See William S. Dodge, The Surprisingly Broad Implications of Nestlé
USA, Inc. v. Doe for Human Rights Litigation and Extraterritoriality, JUST SECURITY (June 18, 2021),
https://www.justsecurity.org/77012/the-surprisingly-broad-implications-of-nestle-usa-inc-v-doe-forhuman-rights-litigation-and-extraterritoriality/ (suggesting that it is hard to see how traditional ATS
cases against individual defendants can continue, given the Courts decision in Nestlé).
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norms against torture and extrajudicial killing.57
The condition of foreign knowledge in these areas is significant because it
determines the efficacy of U.S. legal requirements. In many cases, knowledge is
likely to facilitate compliance.58 All else equal, foreign recipients of U.S. defense
articles who hope to maintain good relations with the United States should be
more likely to honor a U.S. prohibition against unauthorized retransfer if aware
of it, and foreign officials should be less likely to engage in torture if cognizant
that U.S. law provides a private right of action against those who commit
torture.59 Knowledge might contribute to compliance in these cases by reducing
normative uncertainty and enabling deterrence.60
In other cases, legal knowledge could facilitate noncompliance by making
it easier for foreign governments to identify and exploit doctrinal loopholes and
enforcement gaps.61 All else equal, adherence to U.S. restrictions on the
retransfer of U.S. defense articles should be less likely if foreign recipients learn
that the United States does not strictly enforce its regulations on arms exports,62
and foreign officials should be less likely to honor an international prohibition
against torture if aware that ATS plaintiffs rarely succeed in collecting money
judgments.63 Whether foreign knowledge facilitates noncompliance rather than
compliance in any given context may depend on factors such as the condition of
the bilateral relationship in question and the interests of the foreign government.
Meta-knowledge would thus help the U.S. government identify compliance
risks and appropriate strategies to strengthen the efficacy of relevant legal
requirements. In the known-known dyad, where the United States knows that a
foreign government understands those requirements, U.S. officials will
appreciate that any noncompliance occurs for reasons other than foreign

57. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992); see, e.g., Judgment at 1, Warfaa v. Ali, 05-CV701 (E.D. Va. May 21, 2019) (entering judgment on a jury verdict of compensatory and punitive damages
under the TVPA against a colonel in the Somali National Army).
58. Cf., e.g., Susan L. Ostermann, Regulatory Pragmatism, Legal Knowledge and Compliance
with Law in Areas of State Weakness, 53 L. & SOCY REV. 1132 (2019) (finding that compliance with
environmental laws in India and Nepal correlated positively with knowledge about those laws among
local populations).
59. Cf. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1989: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Immigration and Refugee Affairs of the S. Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 18 (1990) (testimony
of David P. Stewart, Assistant Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State) (explaining that the purposes of
the Torture Victim Protection Act are to deter torture and extrajudicial killing, to punish those who
engage in abhorrent acts, and to provide a means of compensating their victims).
60. Cf., e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural
Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 174-76 (2004) (identifying legal knowledge as a
precondition to deterrence in criminal law).
61. Cf., e.g., Steven Klepper, Mark Mazur & Daniel Nagin, Expert Intermediaries and Legal
Compliance: The Case of Tax Preparers, 34 J.L. & ECON. 205, 228 (1991) (finding that expert advice on
tax-return preparation encourages the underreporting or nonreporting of income in areas of legal
ambiguity).
62. Cf. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, (U) AUDIT
OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIRECTORATE OF DEFENSE TRADE CONTROLS EXPORT LICENSING
PROCESSES (Feb. 2019), https://www.stateoig.gov/system/files/aud-si-19-07.pdf (reporting that DDTC
does not consistently adhere to internal controls for arms exports).
63. Cf. Cortelyou C. Kenney, Measuring Transnational Human Rights, 84 FORDHAM L. REV.
1053, 1067-85 (2015) (reporting that few plaintiffs have been able to collect on their ATS judgments).
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ignorancenamely, lack of foreign capacity or will to comply.64 These officials
will know that efforts to enhance foreign compliance should focus not on the
simple provision of legal information but rather on measures that presuppose
legal sophistication, such as penalty enhancements for stronger deterrence.65 In
the context of known-unknown, where the United States knows that a foreign
government is uninformed about pertinent U.S. legal obligations, U.S. officials
will know that foreign ignorance may very well result in noncompliance.66 These
officials will understand that enhancements in penalties or other remedies against
unlawful acts will do little to bolster deterrence and that efforts to cultivate
foreign knowledge are necessary to improve compliance.67 In contrast, officials
will be ill-equipped to identify appropriate enforcement strategies in the absence
of meta-knowledge.
B. Harmonization in International Law
Some areas of international law incorporate elements of foreign relations
law into international laws formal doctrinal architecture. In doing so,
international law empowers foreign relations law to dictate the outcome of
international legal analysis.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties offers an illustration.
Article 46 provides that a state may not challenge the validity of its own consent
to a treaty on the ground that the consent was expressed in violation of a
provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties . . . unless
that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of
fundamental importance.68 Because Article 46 establishes that failure to
comply with [municipal] constitutional provisions may at times vitiate consent
given in due form by an organ or agent ostensibly competent to give it,69 foreign
governments cannot apply the Article to evaluate the validity of U.S. consent
without also applying pertinent aspects of U.S. constitutional law, including the
separation of powers with respect to treaty negotiation and adoption.70 For
64. Cf., e.g., Robinson & Darley, supra note 60, at 174-76 (identifying legal knowledge,
capacity to comply, and the will to comply as prerequisites to deterrence).
65. Cf., e.g., ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 13-15, 197-201 (1995) (discussing
limits in scientific, technical, bureaucratic, and financial capacity as reasons for noncompliance with treaty
obligations and arguing that technical assistance and capacity building are important tools for improving
compliance).
66. Cf., e.g., Robinson & Darley, supra note 60, at 174-76 (identifying legal knowledge as a
prerequisite to deterrence in criminal law).
67. Cf., e.g., Ostermann, supra note 58 (reporting evidence that legal knowledge correlates
positively with compliance).
68. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 46.1, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (emphasis added). The United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention but
nevertheless accepts that many of [its] provisions constitute customary international law and bind the
United States as such. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEPT OF STATE, https://20092017.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2020).
69. Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, 2 Y.B. INTL L. COMMN 241-42
(1966). For background on Article 46, see Hannah Woolaver, From Joining to Leaving: Domestic Laws
Role in the International Legal Validity of Treaty Withdrawal, 30 EUR. J. INTL L. 73, 84-93 (2019).
70. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE US CONSTITUTION 175-211 (2d ed. 1996)
(summarizing the powers of the President and Congress with respect to Article II treaties).
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example, if Congress were to contest the validity of U.S. consent to a treaty on
the view that the President violated the Appointments Clause by designating the
U.S. negotiators without first obtaining the Senates advice and consent,71
foreign partners would be unable to ascertain the validity of the treaty under
international law without interpreting the Appointments Clause itself.72
Similarly, in mutual defense treaties with Australia, Japan, New Zealand,
the Philippines, South Korea, and members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), the United States pledges to meet an armed attack against
the treaty partner(s) in a designated geographic area in accordance with U.S.
constitutional processes pertaining to the use of force.73 In this way, the
separation of war powers conditions U.S. obligations under international law to
engage in collective self-defense in a variety of contexts. If the Constitution were
to require congressional authorization for the use of force in defense of Japan in
a particular case,74 for example, international law in the form of the U.S.-Japan
security treaty that incorporates U.S. constitutional provisions and processes75
could oblige the United States to engage in that use of force only in the event of
such authorization.76 U.S. allies (and enemies) must therefore understand the
separation of war powers in order to appreciate the nature of U.S. treaty
obligations.77

71. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that the President shall nominate, and by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors and other public Ministers).
Congresss argument in this hypothetical would accord with the original meaning of the Appointments
Clause, which appears to have required the Senates advice and consent for the appointment of treaty
negotiators. See generally Ryan M. Scoville, Ad Hoc Diplomats, 68 DUKE L.J. 907 (2019) (collecting
evidence on this point).
72. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 68, art. 46.1.
73. Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines art.
IV, Aug. 30, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3947; Security Treaty Between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand
art. IV, Sept. 1, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3423; Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic
of Korea art. III, Oct. 1, 1953, 5 U.S.T. 2360; Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the
United States and Japan art. V, Jan. 19, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 1632; North Atlantic Treaty art. 11, Apr. 4, 1949,
63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
74. See, e.g., April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chemical-Weapons Facilities, 42 Op. O.L.C.
1, 1, 11 (May 2018) (suggesting that the President cannot use force offensively without congressional
authorization if the anticipated nature, scope, and duration of the conflict would rise to the level of a
war in the constitutional sense).
75. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan, supra note
73, art. V.
76. Over the years, the executive branch has taken different positions on the effect of a mutual
defense treaty on the need for congressional authorization to use force. Compare Presidential Power to
Use the Armed Forces Abroad Without Statutory Authorization, 4A U.S. Op. O.L.C. 185, 186 n.5 (1980)
(stating that treaties may not modify the basic allocation of powers in our constitutional scheme and
that mutual defense treaties are generally not self-executing regarding the internal processes of the
signatory powers) with Overview of the War Powers Resolution, 8 U.S. Op. O.L.C. 271, 274 (1984)
(stating that the President has constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief to direct United States
Armed Forces into combat without specific authorization from Congress . . . [t]o carry out the terms of
security commitments contained in treaties).
77. Knowledge of the U.S. Constitution has also been necessary for foreign governments to
understand U.S. obligations under a significant number of treaties that do not involve mutual defense. See,
e.g., U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights [ICCPR], 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-01 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (subjecting the Senates advice and
consent to the ICCPR to the reservation that Article 20 [of the treaty] does not authorize or require
legislation or other action by the United States that would restrict the right of free speech and association
protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States); Treaty of Friendship, Reciprocal
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Other links are more subtle. Settled doctrine holds that customary
international law (CIL) arises from a general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.78 This doctrine does not
explicitly reference foreign relations law, but the two are nevertheless connected
insofar as the foreign relations laws of national governments dictate or comprise
the various state practices that might qualify as general and consistent.79 Analysts
cannot reach informed conclusions about the CIL status of universal jurisdiction,
secondary sanctions, or corporate liability for violations of internationally
recognized human rights, for example, without considering municipal legal
authorities on those topics, all of which count as foreign relations law.80 Of
course, U.S. law constitutes only a part of the global practice that may or may
not qualify as general and consistent on any given issue, but the United States
has been the worlds primary maker of and participant in the state practice that
has formed CIL since the mid-twentieth century.81 For better or worse, this
influence has buttressed CILs practical connection to U.S. foreign relations law.
The condition of foreign knowledge in these areas of linkage is
consequential because it affects foreign perceptions of the content of
international law. Where international law incorporates U.S. foreign relations
law and foreign understanding of U.S. law is sophisticated, foreign governments
will be more likely, all else equal, to agree with the United States on the meaning
and effect of international law. Where the two bodies of law are connected but

Establishments, Commerce, and Extradition Between the United States and Switzerland art. I, Nov. 25,
1850 (The citizens of the United States of America and the citizens of Switzerland shall be admitted and
treated upon a footing of reciprocal equality in the two countries, where such admission and treatment
shall not conflict with the Constitutional or legal provisions as well Federal as State and Cantonal of the
contracting parties.).
78. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra
note 35, § 102(2).
79. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 83 (6th ed., 2008) (States municipal laws
may in certain circumstances form the basis of customary rules.).
80. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as
defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be
imprisoned for life.); Exec. Order No. 13810, 82 Fed. Reg. 44705, 44706-07 (Sept. 20, 2017) (imposing
sanctions on foreign financial institutions that knowingly conducted or facilitated any significant
transaction with sanctioned individuals or in connection with trade with North Korea); Jesner v. Arab
Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1407 (2018) (holding that common law causes of action based on ATS
jurisdiction do not apply to foreign corporations). These authorities fall comfortably within a widely
accepted definition of foreign relations law. See Bradley, supra note 11, at 3 (defining foreign relations
law as municipal law that governs how [a] nation interacts with the rest of the world).
81. Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824,
1853-54 (1998); see also KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 78-79 (2d ed.
1993) (suggesting that major powers exert the greatest influence over the content of CIL, in part because
other states pay more heed to the opinion of those powers than to that of minor states); INTERNATIONAL
LAW ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GENERAL) INTERNATIONAL LAW 26
(2000) (observing that the more important participants in international affairs play a particularly
significant role in the process of creating CIL). To be sure, the growing multipolarity of contemporary
international relations raises the distinct possibility that the United States will in the future exert less
influence over CIL than it has in the past. See generally William W. Burke-White, Power Shifts in
International Law: Structural Realignment and Substantive Pluralism, 56 HARV. INTL L.J. 1 (2015)
(discussing this shift and its implications). But U.S. practice seems likely to continue to exert significant
even if less than dispositiveinfluence. See, e.g., Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Twenty-First Century Will Not
Be a Post-American World, 56 INTL STUD. Q. 215 (2012). In that sense, U.S. foreign relations law is
likely to remain as an important ingredient for assessments of CIL in many areas.
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foreign understanding of U.S. law is limited or incorrect, foreign governments
could very well reach conclusions about international law that diverge from those
of the United States, with potentially adverse consequences for U.S. bilateral
relationships.82
Meta-knowledge would thus help the United States to understand and act
to correct foreign perceptions of certain areas of international law, thereby
reducing some of the cross-national differences of perspective that have given
rise to the field of comparative international law.83 In the known-known dyad,
the United States will be well-positioned to anticipate foreign views on questions
of international law that hinge on foreign relations law, and U.S. and foreign
perspectives will be more likely to align. In the known-unknown dyad, metaknowledge will enable the United States not only to identify foreign
misunderstandings of U.S. foreign relations law that might foster idiosyncratic
views of international law, but also to correct those misunderstandings and thus
contribute to the harmonization of national perspectives. Such corrections might
take place directly, through candid conversations with foreign interlocutors or
the presentation of diplomatic démarches, or they might occur indirectly and
over time, through the operation of programs that generate greater exposure to
U.S. law among foreign officials and legal experts.84 In contrast, the United
States will be ill-equipped to anticipate foreign views and correct
misunderstandings without meta-knowledge, allowing cross-national
differences of perspective to persist.
C. Reputation Management
U.S. foreign relations law often serves as the vehicle by which the United
States honors or flouts international legal obligations. This occurs because
international law imposes obligations primarily on sovereign states,85 and
because the United States is a juridical entity that often acts by means of domestic
legal measures.
Consider two contrasting examples. First, the United States ratified the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997 and thus undertook an
obligation to prohibit natural and legal persons under its jurisdiction from

82. International law and foreign relations law are not always connected. Indeed, some rules of
international law explicitly deny the relevance of foreign relations law to international legal analysis. See,
e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 68, art. 27 (providing that a party may not
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty). In disputes
that hinge on the application of these rules to the United States, foreign governments can reach persuasive
conclusions without any understanding of U.S. foreign relations law.
83. See, e.g., Anthea Roberts, Crimea and the South China Sea: Connections and Disconnects
Among Chinese, Russian, and Western International Lawyers, in COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW
116-28 (Anthea Roberts et al. eds., 2018) (discussing differences between Western and Chinese
perspectives on the law of the sea, and between Western and Russian perspectives on the legality of
Russias annexation of Crimea).
84. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2452(a)(2)(i) (authorizing the financing of visits and interchanges
between the United States and other countries of leaders, experts in fields of specialized knowledge or
skill, and other influential or distinguished persons).
85. See, e.g., Case of the S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
10, at 18 (Sept. 1927) (International law governs relations between independent States.).

2022]

U.S. Foreign Relations Law from the Outside In

17

using, developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling, or retaining chemical
weapons.86 Congress then enacted a form of foreign relations lawthe Chemical
Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 199887to fulfill this obligation
under the treaty. Second, the United States acceded to the Protocol to the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees88 in 1968 and thus agreed not to
impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence [in the United
States], on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or
freedom was threatened . . . , enter or are present in [U.S.] territory without
authorization.89 Some contend that recent administrations have violated this
obligation by using what amounts to yet another instantiation of foreign relations
lawi.e., the Immigration and Nationality Act and accompanying
regulations90to punish asylum seekers along the southern border with
gratuitous detention91 and even criminal prosecution.92
In these kinds of cases, foreign knowledge is consequential because it
shapes the reputational effects of U.S. action. Where U.S. foreign relations law
faithfully implements international law and foreign governments know that it
does, the United States stands to bolster its reputation for compliance with
international obligations.93 Where U.S. foreign relations law implements
international law and foreign governments are ignorant of that fact, the United
States is less likely to obtain the reputational benefits that compliance is often
said to generate.94 Where U.S. law fails to implement international legal
obligations and foreign governments know it, the United States could very well
suffer reputational harm for noncompliance.95 And where U.S. law fails to

86. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction arts. I, VII(1)(a), opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 10321, 1974 U.N.T.S. 317.
87. 18 U.S.C. § 229; see also Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 848 (2014) (explaining how
the statute implements the treaty).
88. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
89. See id. at art. 1(1) (The States Parties to the present Protocol undertake to apply articles 2
to 34 inclusive of the Convention to refugees as hereinafter defined.); Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees art. 31(1), opened for signature July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
90. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be
arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.);
8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(8) (providing that any officer authorized to issue a warrant of arrest may, in the
officers discretion, release a noncriminal alien upon proof that release would not pose a danger to
property or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding).
91. See, e.g., LARA DOMÍNGUEZ, ADRIENNE LEE & ELIZABETH LEISERSON, ALLARD K.
LOWENSTEIN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, YALE LAW SCHOOL, U.S. DETENTION AND
REMOVAL OF ASYLUM SEEKERS: AN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ANALYSIS 18-20 (June 20,
2016),
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/schell/human_rights_first_-_immigration_
detention_-_final_-_20160620_for_publication.pdf.
92. See Evan J. Criddle, The Case Against Prosecuting Refugees, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 717
(2020) (arguing that prosecuting refugees violates U.S. obligations under the Protocol to the Refugee
Convention).
93. See ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY 71-85 (2008) (arguing that a states compliance with international law generates reputational
effects in international society).
94. Cf. id. at 85-91 (arguing that compliance creates reputational benefits under an assumption
of complete information).
95. Cf. id. at 71-85 (suggesting that noncompliance leads to reputational injury).
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implement international obligations and foreign governments are unaware, the
United States is more likely to escape reputational harm despite the
noncompliance.96
Meta-knowledge would thus inform U.S. assessments of the reputational
benefits and costs of compliance and noncompliance, respectively. In the knownknown and known-unknown dyads, U.S. officials can be reasonably confident
about whether and how foreign governments will perceive pertinent U.S. legal
actions. But in the other two dyads, this confidence will give way to uncertainty
and perhaps even miscalculation. In the unknown-known dyad, U.S. officials
might mistakenly assume the absence of foreign knowledge and thus
underestimate the reputational harm of noncompliance. In the unknownunknown dyad, these officials might mistakenly assume the presence of foreign
knowledge and thus overestimate the reputational harm of noncompliance.
D. Effective Signaling
U.S. officials sometimes act on the premise that they can use U.S. foreign
relations law to transmit signals of national intentions to foreign governments.
On this view, the law can operate as a sort of official semaphore through which
the United States shapes foreign perceptions of current U.S. policies or actions,
along with foreign expectations concerning future actions.
Signaling considerations have influenced official deliberations over
whether to pursue legislation authorizing the use of military force for decades.97
In one of the more recent examples, the Obama administration submitted to
Congress a draft authorization for the use of military force (AUMF) against the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).98 This legislation would have
approved the use of the Armed Forces of the United States as the President
determines to be necessary and appropriate against ISIL or associated persons or
forces.99 But the AUMF also would have expired after three years and enabled
only those actions that did not amount to enduring offensive ground combat

96. This logic may at times play a role in decisions to classify and thereby withhold from the
public domain not only evidence of official acts that are illegal under international law, but also evidence
of the domestic legal authority that facilitates such acts. See, e.g., Steven Aftergood, OLC Torture Memos
Declassified,
FEDN
OF
AM.
SCIENTISTS
(Apr.
17,
2009),
https://fas.org/blogs/
secrecy/2009/04/olc_torture_memos/ (describing four George W. Bush-era Office of Legal Counsel
opinions on torture as among the most fiercely protected classified records of recent years.).
97. See FREDRIK LOGEVALL, EMBERS OF WAR: THE FALL OF AN EMPIRE AND THE MAKING OF
AMERICAS VIETNAM 467-68 (2012) (explaining that former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sought
congressional authorization for the use of air and naval power in Indochina in 1954 on the view that
passage of such a resolution might deter Chinese expansionism and in doing so render the use of force
unnecessary); Matthew Waxman, Eisenhower and War Powers, LAWFARE (Sept. 18, 2020, 8:01 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/eisenhower-and-war-powers (discussing the deterrent value of
congressional resolutions pertaining to the use of force in Formosa and the Middle East in the 1950s).
98. See Letter from Barack Obama, President of the United States (Feb. 11, 2015) (available at
Off. of the Press Secy, Letter from the President  Authorization for the Use of United States Armed
Forces in connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, WHITE HOUSE,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/11/letter-president-authorization-useUnited-states-armed-forces-connection (linking to Draft AUMF, available at https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/aumf_02112015.pdf).
99. Id.
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operations.100 These restrictions led Senator James Inhofe, among others, to
reject the Presidents proposal on the ground that it would telegraph the wrong
message.101 According to Inhofe, a broader and more flexible authorization
would have been preferable because it would have sen[t] a clear signal of our
resolve to partners and allies that we will support them until ISIL is defeated.102
The Presidents proposal thus failed in Congress.103
Similar considerations appear to influence treaty-making. Settled
constitutional law holds that the President can conclude international agreements
in the form of Article II treaties, which require the advice and consent of twothirds of Senators present; congressional-executive agreements, which require
the approval of simple majorities of both houses of Congress; and sole executive
agreements, which require no legislative approval.104 Given that all of these
forms constitute a treaty for purposes of international law,105 and given that it
is often extremely difficult for the President to secure the Senates advice and
consent,106 some have found it puzzling that Presidents ever pursue Article II
treaties in place of executive agreements.107 The reported answer to this puzzle
is that Presidents sometimes prefer the Article II route on the view that the
willingness and ability to secure the Senates endorsement underscores to foreign
counterparts the reliability of the U.S. commitment.108
Finally, signaling considerations loom large in judicial invocations of the

100. Id.
101. Inhofes Response to the Presidents AUMF, JAMES F. INHOFE: U.S. SENATOR FOR
OKLAHOMA (Feb. 11, 2015), https://www.inhofe.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/inhofes-responseto-the-presidents-aumf; see also Amber Phillips, President Obamas Push for Military Authorization to
Fight ISIS Wont Go Anywhere in Congress. Heres Why., WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/12/07/3-reasons-congress-wont-authorize-obamas-use-offorce-against-the-islamic-state/ (explaining that Congress was unlikely to adopt President Obamas
proposed AUMF, in part because Republicans believed that imposing limits on presidential authority in
time or scope would essentially be telegraphing Americas plans to the enemy.).
102. Inhofes Response to the Presidents AUMF, supra note 101. In contrast, some scholars have
suggested that an AUMF should be viewed as constitutionally unnecessary for military operations against
terrorist organizations. See Nzelibe & Yoo, supra note 32, at 2533-34. One of the stated assumptions
behind this position is that terrorist organizations are unlikely to correctly perceive an AUMF as a signal
of the seriousness with which the United States is contemplating the use of force. Id.
103. Scott Wong, GOP: Obama War Request is Dead, THE HILL (Apr. 13, 2015), https://thehill.
com/policy/defense/238619-gop-obama-war-request-is-dead.
104. See Daniel Bodansky & Peter Spiro, Executive Agreements Plus, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNATL
L. 885, 892-93 (2016) (summarizing these forms).
105. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 68, art. 2(1)(a) (Treaty means
an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law,
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular
designation.).
106. See Curtis Bradley, Oona Hathaway & Jack Goldsmith, The Death of Article II Treaties?,
LAWFARE (Dec. 13, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/death-article-ii-treaties (explaining
that the Senate has been a barrier to all but the most uncontroversial Article II treaties and that it is
difficult, if not impossible, to get two-thirds of the Senate to agree on anything, much less a treaty.).
107. See, e.g., Lisa A. Martin, The President and International Commitments: Treaties as
Signaling Devices, 35 PRES. STUD. Q. 440, 440 (2005).
108. Id. at 453-61. A number of legal scholars have also embraced this logic. See supra note 32
(citing sources). But see Curtis A. Bradley, Article II Treaties and Signaling Theory, in THE
RESTATEMENT AND BEYOND: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 123
(Paul B. Stephan & Sarah A. Cleveland eds., 2020) (questioning the signaling theory of Article II treaty
utilization).
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one voice doctrine, which invalidates state or federal legislation that is likely
(in the eyes of a reviewing court) to cause foreign governments to perceive
established features of U.S. foreign relations law or lawful aspects of U.S.
foreign policy as incoherent.109 The 2015 case of Zivotofsky v. Kerry offers an
illustration.110 There, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a
federal statute that required the Secretary of State to record Israel as the
country of birth on the passports of certain Jerusalem-born U.S. citizens.111
Neither Congress nor the President understood this statute as effecting a formal
change in U.S. recognition policy,112 which for decades maintained neutrality on
Jerusalems status,113 but President George W. Bush and President Barack
Obama both refused to implement the statute out of concern that it interfered
with their authority over recognition.114 The Court in Zivotofsky agreed, holding
that the power to recognize foreign borders rests exclusively with the President
and that the statute infringed this power by requiring the President to make
diplomatic representations that were inconsistent with the official position of
neutrality.115 Among other things, this conclusion relied on the logic of signaling:
After discussing evidence of official criticism and public protest against the
passport statute in Palestine,116 the Court explained that the United States must
speak . . . with one voicei.e., emit one signalon recognition in order to
avoid foreign confusion.117
The condition of foreign knowledge is significant because it determines
whether these kinds of considerations are persuasive. It is consequential whether
an AUMF sends the right message to foreign partners and adversaries only if
they are sufficiently knowledgeable about U.S. law to ascertain whether an
AUMF has been adopted, understand its contents, and draw appropriate
conclusions about its political significance in light of the procedural
requirements of bicameralism and presentment.118 If any of those conditions
fails, the signal that an authorization produces may very well fail to shape the
perceptions of foreign audiences as intended. Likewise, the question of whether
109. See Am. Ins. Assn v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 (2003) (invalidating a state statute in
part because it compromised the Presidents capacity to speak for the United States with one voice in
dealing with other governments to resolve insurance claims against European companies arising out of
World War II).
110. 576 U.S. 1 (2015).
111. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, § 214(d), 116
Stat. 1350, 1366 (2002).
112. Brief for Members of the United States House of Representatives as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioner at 22, Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1 (2015) (No. 13-628), 2014 WL 3660504, at *5; Brief
for the United States Senate as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 20-21, Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576
U.S. 1 (2015) (No. 13-628), 2014 WL 3767419, at *20-21; Transcript of Oral Argument at 25, 35,
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1 (2015) (No. 13-628).
113. Statement by the President Announcing Recognition of the State of Israel, PUBLIC PAPERS
OF THE PRESIDENTS: HARRY S. TRUMAN, 1948, at 258 (1964). But see Mark Landler, Trump Recognizes
Jerusalem as Israels Capital and Orders U.S. Embassy to Move, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2017) (reporting
that the Trump administration abandoned the neutrality policy).
114. Zivotofsky, 576 U.S. at 6-8.
115. Id. at 29.
116. Id. at 8.
117. Id. at 14 (quoting Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 424) (internal quotations omitted).
118. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (establishing these requirements).
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the President should ever use the Article II treaty process to signal to foreign
governments the reliability of a U.S. guarantee matters only if those governments
understand the domestic law that makes it both relatively difficult to ratify an
Article II treaty and relatively easy to ratify an executive agreement.119 Without
foreign knowledge of the domestic-law forms of international commitment, any
differences in the international signals that they emit are of little consequence.
And Zivotofsky is persuasive from a signaling perspective only if pertinent
foreign audiences were sufficiently informed about U.S. law to know that the
passport statute existed but also sufficiently uninformed to mistakenly conclude
that it terminated the policy of neutrality.120 To the extent that Palestine and other
foreign governments understood the statutes limited effect,121 they were able to
make sense of multiple voices, and Zivotofskys one-voice reasoning lacked force
in the context of that case.
Meta-knowledge would thus help officials to determine whether signaling
arguments are persuasive. In the known-known dyad, officials can assess with
confidence that relevant foreign audiences will draw appropriate inferences from
U.S. legal developments. Equipped with this knowledge, officials will know that
they can use the law to shape foreign perceptions in desired ways and that foreign
confusion of the sort that might require one voice is relatively unlikely. In the
known-unknown dyad, officials will know that they cannot use the law as a
signaling device and that one voice may be necessary to mitigate the risk of
foreign confusion. In either case, meta-knowledge will ensure that official
actions are informed by the epistemic environment in which the law operates.
In contrast, the absence of meta-knowledge risks the under- or over-use of
the law as a signaling device, along with the under- or over-use of the one-voice
doctrine as a solution to the risk of foreign confusion. In the unknown-known
dyad, U.S. officials might mistakenly conclude that a legal measure would fail
to inform foreign perceptions as desired and thus decline to pursue it even though
it could have succeeded. For their part, courts might mistakenly perceive that one
voice is necessary to avert foreign confusion and thus unnecessarily centralize
power over foreign affairs by invalidating state or federal legislation.122 In the
119. See Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 104, at 892-93 (describing this law).
120. Cf. Zivotofsky, 576 U.S. at 71-74 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ([The passport statute] has nothing
to do with recognition.); supra note 112 (citing evidence that Congress and the President understood the
statute as leaving the neutrality policy in place).
121. The Court explained that the Palestine Liberation Organization Executive Committee, the
Fatah Central Committee, and the Palestinian Authority Cabinet had all issued statements claiming that
the Act undermines the role of the U.S. as a sponsor of the peace process. Zivotofsky, 576 U.S. at 8
(citing Joint Appendix at 231, Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1 (2014) (No. 13-628), 2014 WL 3541505).
Yet a careful reading of the underlying evidence reveals little support for the idea that the Palestinian
government objected specifically due to a mistaken impression that the Act had changed U.S. recognition
policy. See Joint Appendix at 228-29 (excerpting a State Department cable that described Palestinian
reactions). Indeed, a second cable not cited in Zivotofsky states only that media and public in the Middle
East believed that the Act had changed the policy. Id. at 224. The Palestinian government certainly
objected, but it seems plausible that it did so for other reasons, such as opposition even to purely symbolic
U.S. support for Israel.
122. Cf. Daniel Abebe, One Voice or Many? The Political Question Doctrine and Acoustic
Dissonance in Foreign Affairs, 7 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 234, 242-45 (2013) (explaining how the one-voice
doctrine centraliz[es] . . . foreign affairs decision making in the federal government vis-à-vis the states
and centraliz[e]s . . . foreign affairs decision making in the President vis-à-vis Congress.).
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unknown-unknown dyad, the risk is that officials will mistakenly believe a
foreign government to be well-informed about U.S. law. Here officials might
pursue a legal measure even though the epistemic prerequisites for effective
signaling are absent, and courts might permit a multiplicity of voices even though
one voice may be necessary to avoid foreign confusion.
E. Awareness of Strategic Risk
Finally, it is at least plausible that foreign relations law helps drive U.S.
action in international affairs. In other words, it is at least plausible that the law
is not merely epiphenomenal of domestic politics or other forces that shape U.S.
action vis-à-vis foreign governments, but rather carries independent causal
significance.123
The theoretical foundation for this view comes from the liberal school of
international relations theory, which posits that the state is not an actor but a
representative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture,
construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors who possess
variegated preferences with regard to foreign affairs and compete with one
another through domestic political and legal institutions to secure state support
for those preferences.124 From this perspective, foreign relations law is causally
significant because it is not neutralby allocating power internally, it
inescapably privileges the distinctive preferences of some domestic groups over
others in ways that, in effect, constitute the preferences of the state itself.125
The interplay between U.S.-Iran relations and the law of war powers offers
an example. In 2015, the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council,
Germany, and Iran announced an agreement whereby Iran would submit to
intrusive inspections and abandon certain resources and technologies that it had
acquired in pursuit of nuclear weapons in exchange for relief from nuclearrelated economic sanctions.126 In May 2018, however, President Trump
announced U.S. withdrawal from this agreement,127 and his administration
subsequently imposed a series of new economic sanctions in addition to
reinstating old sanctions.128 Iran responded by undertaking a variety of
123. See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, War and Constitutional Design 37 (undated) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://minervaextremelaw.haifa.ac.il/images/Ginsburg-2014-War_and_
Constitutional_Design.v11.pdf (finding that a legislative role in decisions about war tends to lead to
fewer conflicts.).
124. Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International
Politics, 51 INTL ORG. 513, 516-20 (1997).
125. See HELEN V. MILNER, INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND INFORMATION 99-128 (1997)
(How power is shared affects whose preferences are most likely to dominate policy making. Thus, the
institutional relationship between the executive and the legislature in democracies is of central importance
in understanding the domestic side of international cooperation.).
126. S.C. Res. 2231 (July 20, 2015).
127. Mark Landler, Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned, N.Y. TIMES (May 8,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html.
128. See Re-imposition of the sanctions on Iran that had been lifted or waived under the JCPOA,
U.S. DEPT OF TREASURY (Nov. 4, 2018), https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financialsanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/iran-sanctions/re-imposition-of-the-sanctionson-iran-that-had-been-lifted-or-waived-under-the-jcpoa (providing information on sanctions that have
been imposed on Iran since the end of U.S. participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action).
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provocative actionsincluding shooting down an American drone129 and
launching a missile strike on Saudi Arabia.130 In this context, some suggested
that there was a real risk of conflict.131
The basic features of the domestic law that would govern the initiation of
such a conflict are fairly well-settled. The Constitution reserves to Congress the
authority to declare War and thereby to decide whether to commit the Nation
to a sustained, full-scale conflict with Iran.132 In addition, Congress holds
exclusive power to authorize and appropriate funding for military operations,133
as well as to authorize the use of force without declaring war by enacting a statute
to that effect.134 The President, however, is far from powerless: the Constitution
grants him authority to direct troops in the field of battle135 and to use military
force without congressional approval in defense against an ongoing or imminent
attack.136 Through the War Powers Resolution, Congress generally accepted that
the President can introduce U.S. forces into hostilities without legislative
action for sixty to ninety days.137
From the perspective of liberal theory, it is likely that this body of law
played a material role in the construction of the risk of war between the United
States and Iran. In 2019, U.S. military action against Iran would have been hard
to imagine if the Constitution had granted exclusive authority over the use of
force to the House of Representatives, which was dominated at the time by
Democrats,138 many of whom were publicly skeptical of the Trump
administrations hawkish policy on Iran.139 But because the Constitution instead
129. Strait of Hormuz: US Confirms Drone Shot Down by Iran, BBC NEWS (June 20, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48700965.
130. Eric Schmitt, Farnaz Fassihi & David D. Kirkpatrick, Saudi Oil Attack Photos Implicate
Iran, U.S. Says; Trump Hints at Military Action, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/09/15/world/middleeast/iran-us-saudi-arabia-attack.html.
131. See, e.g., Nicholas Kristof, Trump Plays Chicken with Ayatollah, N.Y. TIMES (June 22,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/22/opinion/sunday/trump-iran-strikes.html (worrying that the
United States and Iran may now be on the brink of war).
132. April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chemical-Weapons Facilities, supra note 74, at 4.
133. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12,13 (providing that Congress has the power to raise and
support Armies and to provide and maintain a Navy); id. § 9, cl. 7 (No Money shall be drawn from
the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.).
134. See, e.g., Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224,
224 (2001) (authorizing the use of force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons).
135. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service
of the United States.); The President and the War Power: South Vietnam and the Cambodian Sanctuaries,
1 Supp. Op. O.L.C. 321, 334 (1970) (arguing that it would be unconstitutional for Congress to attempt
by detailed instructions as to the use of American forces already in the field to supersede the President as
Commander in Chief of the armed forces).
136. See Presidents Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists, 25 Op. O.L.C.
188, 212 (2001) (discussing the Presidents authority to use force without congressional authorization to
defend the nation against an attack).
137. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b).
138. Mid-Term Elections: Democrats Win House in Setback for Trump, BBC NEWS (Nov. 7,
2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-46120373.
139. Catie Edmondson & Nicholas Fandos, Senate Rejects Curb on Trumps Authority to Strike
Iran, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/28/us/politics/trump-iran-senate.
html.
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allocates substantial war powers to the President,140 the use of force against Iran
seemed quite plausible.141
Liberal theory thus suggests that only foreign governments that understand
the separation of war powers can identify whose preferences count as U.S.
preferences and, in turn, accurately assess the prospects for war (among other
events). At one extreme, if relevant Iranian officials perceived the U.S.
Constitution as allocating to the President exclusive authority over the decision
to use force, they might have mistakenly disregarded the preferences of Congress
in attempting to anticipate the nature and likelihood of an American attack. At
the other extreme, if those officials perceived the Constitution as allocating
exclusive authority to Congress, they might have mistakenly disregarded the
preferences of the President. In between, Iranian officials likely paid attention to
both the President and Congress if they correctly perceived the use of force as a
domain of shared authority. Given the configuration of Presidential and
congressional preferences in 2019,142 each of these scenarios would have yielded
a different Iranian expectationand degree of surpriseregarding the use or
nonuse of force by the United States.
Meta-knowledge would thus enable the United States to ascertain and
adjust to the perceptual features of its strategic environment. To continue with
the example of Iran: in known-known, U.S. officials will know that Iran
understands and gives appropriate weight to the separation of war powers in
seeking to anticipate U.S. action. In the known-unknown dyad, officials will
know that Iran lacks the legal expertise necessary to account for U.S. foreign
relations laws influence over the likelihood of conflict. In both contexts, metaknowledge will facilitate more accurate assessments of the risk of Iranian
surprise and enable the United States to appropriately calibrate its strategic
posture. In contrast, the absence of meta-knowledge is likely to interfere with the
U.S. ability to anticipate Iranian reactions. If U.S. foreign relations law
empowers domestic hawks but the United States operates in the unknown-known
dyad, for example, the United States may very well underestimate Irans
awareness of the objective risk of conflict. If the law empowers hawks but the
epistemic context is unknown-unknown, the United States may fail to appreciate
that Iran lacks awareness of the full extent of its jeopardy.
II. THE ENIGMA OF FOREIGN KNOWLEDGE
In addition to overlooking and thereby obscuring the stakes of metaknowledge of U.S. foreign relations law, the traditional inside-out paradigm has
implicitly discouraged the empirical investigation of foreign knowledge. Legal
scholars have not attempted such investigation.143 Political scientists have
140. See April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chemical-Weapons Facilities, supra note 74
(discussing the Justice Departments view on the scope of the Presidents authority to use military force
without congressional approval).
141. Demetri Sevastopulo, Trumps Maximum Pressure Iran Strategy Stokes War Fears, FIN.
TIMES (June 17, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/0dbe64a8-9051-11e9-b7ea-60e35ef678d2.
142. See supra note 138 (discussing the results of the 2018 mid-term elections).
143. See supra note 32 (citing works that have presupposed foreign knowledge without further
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examined the role of perception in international relations, but their work has
focused on perceptions of national military capabilities and intentions, rather
than perceptions of municipal law.144 Moreover, the U.S. intelligence
community generally does not seek to ascertain or account for foreign knowledge
of U.S. foreign relations law in generating intelligence products for
policymakers.145 Some officials in the State Department, the Defense
Department, and other components of the executive branch might organically
acquire impressions regarding the legal sophistication of their interlocutors,146
but the U.S. government does not systematically pursue meta-knowledge.147 In
short, rigorously sourced meta-knowledge generally does not exist.
This Part plants a seed of correction, arguing that the absence of empirical
research is a problem because the condition of foreign knowledge is not only
nonobvious, but quite plausibly contrary to the broad assumptions that undergird
TPA, Zschernig, and the WPR, among various other authorities.148 Specifically,
this Part uses theoretical insights, historical sources, and data collected from
eighty years of official reports to Congress under the Foreign Agents
Registration Act (FARA)149 to suggest that there are reasons to anticipate
substantialeven extremevariation in foreign sophistication regarding U.S.
foreign relations law. The plausibility of such variation underscores a need for
meta-knowledge in place of bare assumptions.
A. Indicia of Knowledge
To U.S. observers, it may seem likely that all foreign governments today
are familiar with at least the basic features of U.S. foreign relations law. How
could the German government not know the difference between an Article II
treaty and a sole executive agreement? How could North Korea not realize that
the power to initiate the use of force now rests primarily with the President? How
could relevant officials in Australia not understand U.S. doctrine on the
extraterritoriality of federal statutes?
Indeed, these sorts of assumptions are longstanding. The decision to issue
the Declaration of Independence made little sense unless the Framers assumed
that foreign governments would receive and understand the document.150 And it
investigation).
144. See generally, e.g., ROBERT JERVIS, PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS (1976).
145. Telephone Interview with Joseph W. Gartin, Former Chief Learning Officer, Central
Intelligence Agency (Dec. 10, 2020). Some intelligence analysts have a legal background, but they do not,
as a general matter, apply that background in their work. For example, there are no sub-categories of
analysts who are responsible for law-centric analysis. Nor do analysts receive formal training on the
relevance or the means of assessing foreign sophistication on U.S. law. The primary reason is lack of
demand for such meta-knowledge from policymakers. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Cf. supra pp. 3-5 (discussing the broad assumptions of foreign knowledge or ignorance that
undergird TPA, Zschernig, and the WPR).
149. 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621.
150. Cf. DAVID ARMITAGE, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A GLOBAL HISTORY 31
(2007) (The Declaration was the culmination of a series of documents designed by the Continental
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is well known that the Framers designed parts of the Constitution to signal to
foreign governments that the United States would be a responsible and
trustworthy nation.151 Such an effort was without practical effect unless the
Framers assumed that foreign governments would learn about and comprehend
the Constitutions relevant provisions. Among American scholars, assumptions
of foreign knowledge remain common today.152
Such assumptions are consistent with a variety of circumstantial evidence.
Since 1978, over forty governments have filed roughly seventy amicus briefs to
express positions on cases pending before the U.S. Supreme Court.153 In Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, for example, Argentina, Germany, the Netherlands,
and the United Kingdom filed briefs addressing whether the Court should impose
a territorial limit on claims that are actionable under the Alien Tort Statute.154
Foreign governments have also filed amicus briefs in numerous cases pending
before lower courts.155 The choice to retain counsel and weigh in on these cases
suggests at least a degree of knowledge of the underlying legal issues.
Other evidence of knowledge has surfaced outside the context of litigation.
In response to some states adoption of taxation methods that harmed British
corporations, the United Kingdom enacted legislation retaliating not against the
United States as a whole, but instead against the specific states that levied the
taxes.156 In doing so, the U.K. government displayed an awareness of federalism
under American law. The Soviet Union demonstrated knowledge of the
distinction between Article II treaties and congressional-executive agreements in
1979 by specifying the former as the preferred means of securing a ban on new
types of ballistic and cruise missiles.157 Shortly after the Supreme Court held in
Congress to shape the Opinions of Mankind across the British Empire (before July 1776) and then in
the wider world (by the Declaration itself).).
151. See David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American
Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932,
1002-05 (2010) (discussing how the grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courtswith their
constitutionally guaranteed independence from the legislative and executive brancheswas an important
signal to European powers of the willingness and capacity of the new nation to uphold its legal
obligations).
152. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 107, at 445 (suggesting that if the President enters into
executive agreements with foreign governments in order to evade legislative opposition, [o]ther states
would then see these agreements as a sign of lack of domestic support . . . and would therefore become
more reluctant to sign on).
153. Kristen E. Eichensehr, Foreign Sovereigns as Friends of the Court, 102 VA. L. REV. 289,
297-306 (2016).
154. Brief for the Government of the Argentine Republic as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013) (No. 10-1491), 2012 WL 2165334;
Brief of the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and The Kingdom
of the Netherlands as Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondents, supra note 9; Brief of the Federal
Republic of Germany as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013) (No. 10-1491), 2012 WL 379578.
155. See Spiro, supra note 47, at 684 n.131 (explaining that [a]micus participation by foreign
governments is becoming routine).
156. See Finance Act, 1985, pt. II, ch. I, § 54 & sched.13, P 5 (eliminating tax credits for
companies based in a province, state or other part of a territory outside the United Kingdom that adopts
the disfavored tax method), reenacted in Income and Corporations Taxes Act, 1988, pt. XVIII, ch. III,
§ 812 & sched.30, PP 20-21; see also Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV.
1223, 1265 (1999) (discussing the use of this legislation against California and other states).
157. See Don Oberdorfer, Incremental Step: Pact Far Short of Carters Initial Goal, WASH.
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United States v. Alvarez-Machain that the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty does
not preclude cross-border abductions,158 the Mexican government showed that it
understood the Courts decision by demanding a treaty amendment to close the
loophole that the Court had identified.159 And U.S. partners have at times insisted
that Washington convert executive agreements into Article II treaties in order to
signal a more serious commitment of aid or security.160 These instances suggest
that there have been, at a minimum, discrete pockets of knowledge within certain
foreign governments at certain moments in time.
We can also draw a reasonable inference of knowledge from the Foreign
Agent Registration Act (FARA), which generally requires every agent of a
foreign principal to register with the Department of Justice (DOJ) before
lobbying or engaging in other activities on the principals behalf.161 Since 1942,
DOJ has provided periodic reports to Congress on the total number of FARA
registrations.162 Because FARA defines foreign principal to include foreign
governments163 and defines agent of a foreign principal to include one who
within the United States represents the interests of [a] foreign principal before
any agency or official of the Government of the United States,164 the reports
have included registrations by American lawyers who represent foreign
governments. As shown in Figure 1, the registrations indicate that such
representation has been common for decades.165 In the 1960s, for example,
lawyers filed registrations for this kind of work over eight hundred times. The
registrations also indicate fluctuating levels of foreign governmental engagement
with the U.S. legal system over time, with a general trend toward more
engagement rather than less.166

POST, May 11, 1979 (reporting that former Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko rejected a U.S.
proposal to use a congressional-executive agreement rather than an Article II treaty to formalize the ban,
due to the allegedly inferior status of congressional-executive agreements).
158. 504 U.S. 655, 666 (1992).
159. Steven A. Holmes, U.S. Gives Mexico Abduction Pledge, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1993, at
A11.
160. See, e.g., Bernard Gwertzman, Turkey Pressing for More Arms Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21,
1986, at A3 (explaining that the Turkish government, upset at the failure of the United States to live up
to promises in an executive agreement, proposed a formal treaty under which Turkey would be
guaranteed as much aid as the largest American aid recipient gets, and that Turkey sought the treaty to
insure Senate endorsement of high aid levels); Stuart Auerbach, Pakistan Seeking U.S. Guarantees in
Formal Treaty, WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 1980), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/
1980/01/18/pakistan-seeking-us-guarantees-in-formal-treaty/49301e83-c3f7-4499-b32d-11b34a36be61/
(explaining that Pakistan sought to convert a 1959 defense agreement with the United States into an Article
II treaty because the latter would, in Pakistans view, serve as a clearer signal of long-term U.S.
commitment).
161. 22 U.S.C. § 612.
162. Id. § 621; see also FARA Reports to Congress, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.
gov/nsd-fara/fara-reports-congress (last visited Aug. 14, 2019) (providing links to the reports).
163. 22 U.S.C. § 611(b)(1).
164. Id. § 611(c)(1)(4).
165. I obtained the numbers in Figure 1 by tallying the number of legal-service registrations in
the FARA reports for each decade. See Ryan M. Scoville, FARA Data, https://ryanscoville.files.
wordpress.com/2021/05/new-fara-data-1.xlsx (compiling the underlying data).
166. Cf. Spiro, supra note 47, at 682-83 (suggesting that foreign countries are increasingly
sophisticated about internal U.S. governance structures).
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Figure 1: FARA Registrations for the Provision of a Covered Legal Service to
a Foreign Government

FARA reports are often vague about the services that American lawyers
have been providing, but a significant portion of those services appear to involve
foreign relations law. For instance, a 2017 report indicates that Cameroon hired
Squire Patton Boggs to provide counsel regarding the African Growth and
Opportunity Act,167 which enhances U.S. market access for Sub-Saharan African
countries that have established or are making progress toward a market-based
economy and the rule of law, among other benchmarks.168 A 2004 report shows
that Japan retained the law firm of Caplin & Drysdale to provide information on
U.S. tax treaties and counsel regarding the formulation of Japans policy for
negotiation of a revised Japan-U.S. tax treaty.169 And a 2002 report discloses
that Shaw Pittman contacted members of Congress, congressional staffers, and
U.S. Government officials to discuss issues such as the implementation of . . .
the North American Free Trade Agreement on behalf of the Mexican Ministry
of Commerce and Industrial Development.170 Although foreign governments
167. U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO THE CONGRESS OF THE
UNITED STATES ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT OF 1938, AS
AMENDED [hereinafter FARA REPORT], FOR THE SIX MONTHS ENDING JUNE 30, 2017, at 23,
https://www.justice.gov/nsd-fara/page/file/1021601/download.
168. 19 U.S.C. § 3703.
169. U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, FARA REPORT FOR THE SIX MONTHS ENDING JUNE 30, 2003, at
139, https://www.justice.gov/file/991546/download.
170. U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, FARA REPORT FOR THE SIX MONTHS ENDING JUNE 30, 2002, at
195, https://www.justice.gov/file/991501/download.

2022]

U.S. Foreign Relations Law from the Outside In

29

may not always understand or utilize the information that lawyers present to
them, it seems clear that foreign officials often seek and obtain information about
U.S. foreign relations law in the course of these interactions, resulting in at least
a degree of foreign knowledge in many cases.
Moreover, FARA reports are likely to vastly understate the total volume of
legal work that American lawyers have performed for foreign governments, for
two reasons. First, while concerns about foreign influence have grown since the
2016 presidential election and generated a number of high-profile FARA
prosecutions,171 DOJ for decades mostly ignored the statute.172 Lawyers who
were aware of this fact may have frequently declined to register on the view that
there was little risk in noncompliance.173
Second, by its terms, FARA does not cover many types of legal services.
The registration requirement generally applies to any lawyer who represents the
interests of [a foreign government] before any agency or official of the
Government of the United States,174 but it does not apply to those who provide
legal representation outside the United States,175 before state or local
governments,176 or in judicial proceedings, criminal or civil enforcement
inquiries, investigations, or proceedings, or agency proceedings required by
statute or regulation to be conducted on the record.177 Put another way, lawyers
who represent foreign governments must register under FARA only if their work
entails domestic and largely informal interaction with Congress or the executive
branch. The numbers in Figure 1 would almost certainly be much higher if DOJ
had a longstanding practice of vigorous enforcement and the statute covered all
forms of legal services.
B. Indicia of Ignorance
At the same time, there is reason to suspect that material deficiencies in
foreign knowledge are common. We can see this most easily by recognizing that
there are often shortcomings even in domestic knowledge of U.S. law. One
noteworthy example occurred in March 2015, during the height of international

171. See David Laufman, Paul Manafort Guilty Plea Highlights Increased Enforcement of
Foreign Agents Registration Act, LAWFARE (Sept. 14, 2018, 1:58 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
paul-manafort-guilty-plea-highlights-increased-enforcement-foreign-agents-registration-act (discussing
Manaforts guilty plea).
172. Katie Benner, Justice Dept. to Step Up Enforcement of Foreign Influence Laws, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/06/us/politics/fara-task-force-justice-department
.html.
173. Cf. Ken Silverstein, Ive Covered Foreign Lobbying for 20 Years and Im Amazed Manafort
Got Busted, POLITICO MAGAZINE (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/
story/2017/10/30/paul-manafort-indictment-foreign-lobbying-russia-probe-215764 (explaining that
only about half of foreign lobbyists bother[ed] filing under FARA in the early 1990s and that its surely
gotten worse since then).
174. 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1)(4).
175. See id. (defining agent of a foreign principal as one who within the United States
represents the interests of [a foreign government] before any agency or official of the Government of the
United States) (emphasis added).
176. Id.
177. 22 U.S.C. § 613(g).
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negotiations over the fate of the Iranian nuclear program.178 Hoping to
discourage Iran from entering an agreement with the Obama administration, over
forty Republican Senators wrote an open letter to explain to Iran [the U.S.]
constitutional system with regard to the adoption of international agreements.179
One part of this letter stated that although the President negotiates agreements,
Congress plays the significant role of ratifying them.180 That explanation,
however, was technically incorrect. While it is true that the President negotiates
and that Congress must at times consent to the result, it is the Presidentnot
Congresswho ratifies agreements.181 More generally, Congress has perceived
legal errors as sufficiently common among federal judges to warrant a multilayered system of appellate review,182 including review for plain error.183 If
U.S. officialsincluding those with extensive legal training and experience
are capable of misunderstanding U.S. law, surely their foreign counterparts are
as well.
Indeed, those counterparts will often encounter unique hurdles. Some will
face language barriers or lack the financial resources to retain American experts
on a regular basis. Others will be familiar with civil law rather than the common
law. Still others will serve under an authoritarian or other form of government
that is structurally dissimilar to that of the United States. To varying degrees,
these hurdles are likely to complicate efforts to understand U.S. law by rendering
it inaccessible or fostering mistaken impressions.184
Significant gaps in foreign understanding also seem likely if we simply
reverse the inquiry: How sophisticated is the U.S. government on the foreign
relations laws of foreign jurisdictions? Notwithstanding nascent academic
interest in the field of comparative foreign relations law,185 knowledge of foreign
relations law is limited among American scholars186 and may be even more so
178. See Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran, Arms Control Association, ARMS CONTROL
ASSOC., https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran (last visited
Dec. 2020) (highlighting key developments in the negotiations).
179. Letter from Senate Republicans to the Leaders of Iran, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/09/world/middleeast/document-the-letter-senaterepublicans-addressed-to-the-leaders-of-iran.html.
180. Id.
181. The Senates Role in Treaties, UNITED STATES SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/
artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Treaties.htm (last visited June 23, 2019); see also Jack Goldsmith,
The Error in the Senators Letter to the Leaders of Iran, LAWFARE (Mar. 9, 2015, 5:55 AM) (pointing out
the error).
182. See Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 379 (1995) (discussing the error-correction function of appellate courts).
183. See Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016) (discussing appellate
review for plain error under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b)).
184. Cf., e.g., JERVIS, supra note 144, at 283 (Often without realizing it, most decision-makers
draw on their knowledge of their own domestic political systems in their efforts to understand others.);
see also Report on the Law of Treaties by Mr. H. Lauterpacht, Special Rapporteur, 2 ILC YB. 90, 142
(1953) (discussing the serious inconvenience involved in official efforts to resolve questions about the
constitutional law of foreign states).
185. See generally THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW,
supra note 11.
186. See Curtis A. Bradley, Preface, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW, supra note 11, at ix (suggesting that there is much that we still do not know about
foreign relations laws and practices around the world); Oona A. Hathaway, A Comparative Foreign
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among senior officials. President Trump, for example, was initially unaware that
the laws of European countries require the United States to negotiate trade
agreements with the European Union rather than individual members such as
Germany.187 To accept the likelihood of deficiencies in foreign knowledge is to
recognize merely that some governments could very well suffer from
comparable forms of ignorance.
Finally, deficiencies in foreign knowledge seem likely from a legal
ontological perspective. Law is much more than the verbal formulations that
comprise legal doctrine. The rule that a federal court can exercise personal
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant only if the defendant has at least minimum
contacts with the forum, for example, provides little insight on the quality and
quantity of contacts that will suffice in practice.188 In addition, even where a
statement of law is determinate on its face, its application must always cohere
with a broader network of rules and meta-rules in order to generate a conclusion
that is persuasive even in a narrow, syllogistic sense. For instance, knowledge of
the text of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)which, among other
things, withholds immunity from judicial jurisdiction in cases involving a claim
for personal injury or death . . . occurring in the United States and caused by the
tortious act or omission of [a] foreign state189is of little use in predicting the
outcome of an immunity adjudication if the background rules of statutory
interpretation are unsettled or unknown.190
Moreover, even advanced doctrinal knowledge is rarely sufficient to
understand whether relevant decisionmakers are likely to view any given legal
conclusion as persuasive. As Karl Llewellyn once explained, analysts must also
possess an embedded sensibilitya situation sense191of legal merit. A
casual observer might interpret Congresss explicit power to declare War192 as
establishing that only Congress can authorize the use of force, but such an
assessment would be incorrect, not because it misapprehends the semantic
meaning of the words that comprise the Constitutions text, but instead because
it fails to appreciate that those words operate in a complex sociolegal milieu
featuring competing interpretive modalities, historical inertia, pragmatic
concerns, multiple sources of authority, and subtle hierarchies of legitimacy and

Relations Law Agenda, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra
note 11, at 84-86 (explaining that Western knowledge of the foreign relations law of countries in the
Global South is particularly limited).
187. Lucy Pasha-Robinson, Angela Merkel Had to Explain Fundamentals of EU Trade to
Donald Trump 11 Times, THE INDEPENDENT (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/americas/us-politics/angela-merkel-donald-trump-explain-eu-trade-11-times-germany-chancellorus-president-a7699591.html; see also Mark Jia, Illiberal Law in American Courts, 168 U. PA. L. REV.
1685, 1706-24 (2020) (discussing difficulties that American judges encounter in seeking to ascertain the
law of authoritarian states).
188. Intl Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
189. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5).
190. Cf. generally Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(2006) (discussing historical shifts in dominant views on statutory interpretation).
191. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 59-61, 121-57
(1960).
192. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
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influence.193 In Chad Oldfathers words, the task of identifying persuasive legal
conclusions in such a context requires long exposure to the fielda process of
acculturation through legal education and sustained professional immersion.194
The importance of situation sense is likely to complicate foreign efforts to
ascertain U.S. foreign relations law. Most foreign officials have not experienced
the sort of extensive socialization in U.S. legal culture that would enable them to
channel the argumentative sensibilities of the interpretive community that
focuses on U.S. foreign relations law.195 These officials almost certainly never
worked in U.S. government positions that require frequent application of such
law, and they generally do not maintain extensive contact with relevant
American scholars.196 Indeed, it is likely that many of these officials are
unfamiliar with foreign relations law, which generally is not recognized as a
discrete field of academic knowledge outside the United States and Europe.197
And insofar as national jurisdictions have their own legal cultures, with
distinctive hierarchies, native patterns of legal argumentation, and idiosyncratic
perceptions of persuasive merit,198 the situation sense of a foreign legal
community is unlikely to match that of its American counterpart. Foreign
governments are thus at risk of error even if they succeed in identifying the verbal
formulations that constitute the laws articulable substance.
It should come as no surprise, then, that evidence of foreign ignorance and
193. Cf. Curtis A. Bradley, What is Foreign Relations Law?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 11, at 19-20 (explaining that the public law of a
country may be substantially different in practice from what appears in its formal written law . . ., making
it difficult for outside observers to have an accurate sense of it).
194. Chad M. Oldfather, Aesthetic Judging, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 981, 990 (2018).
195. Cf. ANTHEA ROBERTS, IS INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL? 54, 63, 66-67 (2018)
(explaining that the number of internationally mobile students represents only 1.8 percent of all tertiary
enrolments or two in one hundred students globally, and reporting that foreign students travel to France
and the United Kingdom for legal studies far more often than to the United States); Vivian Grosswald
Curran, Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories of Comparison in U.S. Comparative Law, 46 AM.
J. COMP. L. 43, 51 (1998) ([A] valid examination of another legal culture requires immersion into the
political, historical, economic and linguistic contexts that molded the legal system, and in which the legal
system operates.).
196. The American Society of International Laws Interest Group on International Law in
Domestic Courts holds annual workshops to provide scholars with an opportunity to discuss emerging
research on U.S. foreign relations law. Since I first started attending these workshops in 2013, the
participants have been almost exclusively American. Duke University School of Law, University of
Virginia School of Law, and Yale Law School have each hosted an annual Foreign Relations Law
Roundtable for similar purposes, but all participants to date appear to have been American. See, e.g., YaleDuke Foreign Relations Law Roundtable: Congresss Authority Over Foreign Affairs (Sept. 28, 2018),
https://law.yale.edu/center-global-legal-challenges/events/yale-duke-foreign-relations-law-roundtable
(listing participants). That said, there is some evidence that foreign official interaction with American
experts on foreign relations law may be increasing. See generally THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 11 (including chapters by officials from the
governments of Germany, Japan, and Switzerland).
197. See Joris Larik, EU Foreign Relations Law as a Field of Scholarship, 111 AJIL UNBOUND
321, 324 (2017) (discussing the general absence of foreign relations scholarship outside the United States
and Europe); Campbell McLachlan, Five Conceptions of the Functions of Foreign Relations Law, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 11, at 21 (explaining that
foreign relations law is not a category of the law with wide acceptance across national legal systems).
198. See Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo & Lawrence Friedman, Latin Legal Cultures in the Age of
Globalization, in LEGAL CULTURE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 5 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Rogelio
Pérez-Perdomo eds., 2003) (observing that globalization has not eliminated cross-national differences in
legal culture).
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misunderstanding exists alongside indicia of foreign sophistication. Megan
Donaldson has suggested that the difficulty of distinguishing [U.S.] treaties
from mere diplomatic correspondence became more acute after World War II
due to a massive increase in the volume of communications between the United
States and foreign governments.199 One result was that while State Department
officials were well-versed in diplomatic wording that conveyed distinctions
between executive agreements and lesser texts, Congressional committees did
not necessarily grasp these nuances, and nor did foreign governments.200 In
2017, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan repeatedly pressured the Trump
administration to end a federal criminal trial against Turkish nationals who had
been charged with conspiring to violate U.S. sanctions on Iran.201 In doing so,
Erdogan seems to have betrayed ignorance about DOJs tradition of
independence from politics in criminal matters, which sharply limits the utility
of external political pressure for or against any particular prosecution.202 And in
reference to FARA, one agent recently reported that there is a significantly
greater likelihood that someone will propose to you something thats illegal
while working for foreign clients versus domestic ones, the reason being that
these clientsincluding governmentsdont understand U.S. law or know
what theyre doing, . . . dont care, and are happy to find a consultant who feels
the same.203
FARA reports lend credence to these examples by indicating that some
foreign governments procure U.S. legal analysis far less frequently than others.
Figure 2 identifies the twenty-five governments associated with the highest
number of legal-service registrations in the reports.204 The clear leader is Japan,
which appeared in over 300 registrations, followed by Canada (180), the United
Kingdom (129), China (114), Mexico (110), Israel (100), Saudi Arabia (86),
France (72), and South Korea (63) to round out the top ten. In contrast, the reports
show zero registrations since 1942 in connection with nearly forty governments,
including Albania, Botswana, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Niger, North Korea,
Serbia, Slovakia, and Tanzania.205 Those same reports suggest that Iran has not
procured a covered form of legal service since the severance of diplomatic

199. Megan Donaldson, The Survival of the Secret Treaty: Publicity, Secrecy, and Legality in the
International Order, 111 AM. J. INTL L. 575, 617-18 (2017).
200. Id.
201. Benjamin Weiser, Erdogan Helped Turks Evade Iran Sanctions, Reza Zerrab Says, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/30/world/europe/erdogan-turkey-iransanctions.html.
202. See generally Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can the President Control the
Department of Justice?, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2018) (arguing that from a historical perspective the
Department of Justice is independent of the President, and its decisions in individual cases and
investigations are largely immune from his interference or direction).
203. Megan R. Wilson, Foreign Lobbying Law Open to Exploitation, THE HILL (Nov. 28, 2017),
https://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/362042-foreign-lobbying-law-open-to-exploitation.
204. For a description of the data-collection and a link to the underlying data, see supra note 165.
205. The other states on which DOJ has not reported any legal-service registrations since 1942
are Andorra, Armenia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Comoros, Gambia, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati,
Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Moldova, Monaco, Namibia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Samoa,
Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Sudan, St. Lucia, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.
See Scoville, FARA Data, supra note 165 (reporting aggregate registration numbers over time).
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relations in 1980,206 and that Cuba has not done so since the 1960s.207 It is a
reasonable inference that these states have comparatively limited knowledge of
U.S. law, as their governments are likely to have consulted with and obtained
customized analyses from fewer American legal experts.
Figure 2: FARA Registrations for the Provision of a Covered Legal Service to
a Foreign Government Since 1942*

To be sure, it is premature to draw firm conclusions about foreign
knowledge based on FARA patterns alone. Some governments might have fewer
registrations because their officials independently understand relevant U.S. law
and thus see no need to procure legal services that require registration. Other
governments might have many FARA registrations due to frequent consultation
with American lawyers on discrete issues, but lack sophisticated knowledge of
U.S. law beyond the scope of such consultations. Yet this uncertainty merely
underscores the enigmatic condition of foreign knowledge. Given that foreign
governments vary markedly in terms of FARA registrations, that they have
varied in this way across time, and that the epistemic implications of registration
are uncertain, it is unsafe for U.S. legal actors to make broad assumptions about
the state of foreign knowledge around the world. As a general matter, analysts
can confidently say only that governments appear to vary in ways that seem
likely to create significant cross-national variation in sophistication with respect
to U.S. law.
206. See Historical List of All Foreign Principals (Active and Terminated), U.S. DEPT OF
JUSTICE, https://efile.fara.gov/ords/fara/f?p=1381:136:15971270938171::NO::P136_CNTRY:IR (last
visited Oct. 26, 2021) (reporting registered agents for Iran).
207. See id. (reporting registered agents for Cuba).
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***
In sum, the condition of foreign knowledge of U.S. foreign relations law is
both nonobvious and quite plausibly variable, rather than categorically present
or absent as U.S. law often assumes.208 There is preliminary evidence of both
sophistication and ignorance, along with changes over time. We can imagine,
moreover, that foreign knowledge might vary in any number of ways. It might
vary in terms of its breadth and depth, how timely and accurate it is, how it is
obtained, and how accessible it is for relevant decisionmakers. It might vary by
where it is locatedin some states, relevant knowledge might be concentrated
within a foreign ministry, while in others it might reside primarily in academia
or be widely dispersed throughout society. And it might vary over time by what
motivates its acquisition and in the degree to which it is utilized by government
decisionmakers. At one extreme, a foreign government may be highly
sophisticated about U.S. foreign relations law and perceive it as a reliable and
even necessary guide. At the other extreme, a government may have no
knowledge of the law, completely misunderstand it, or dismiss it as
epiphenomenal. The plausibility of such variation suggests a need for rigorous
empirical investigation in place of bare assumptions.
III. A CASE STUDY: JAPAN
Having established that meta-knowledge is needed, this Part begins to
provide it by offering an immersive case study on Japan. Japan is an intriguing
target for inquiry because it exhibits some well-known characteristics that
suggest sophistication and others that suggest precisely the opposite. On the one
hand, the countrys high level of education and extensive security and economic
ties to the United States indicate ample capacity and a strong motive to learn U.S.
foreign relations law.209 From this perspective, it seems likely that the Japanese
government is relatively sophisticated on pertinent legal questions. On the other
hand, Japan has its own language and legal culture, along with a civil law rather
than a common law tradition. It also has a different form of government than the
United States. Rather than a federal system that vertically divides political
authority between one national and many subnational jurisdictions, Japan has a
unitary system in which subnational jurisdictions generally depend on the
national government for administrative guidance and financial support.210 Rather
than a presidential system that separates the executive and legislative branches,
Japan has a parliamentary system in which the legislature (the parliament)
designates the chief executive (the prime minister) from among its own
members.211 And rather than entrust all executive functions to a single individual

208. See supra pp. 3-5 (discussing examples).
209. See Japan, CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/japan/
#military-and-security (last visited Jan. 2021) (providing background information on Japans economy,
society, and military).
210. Local Government, in JAPAN: A COUNTRY STUDY 319 (Ronald E. Dolan & Robert L.
Worden eds., 1994).
211. Fundamental Structure of the Government of Japan, ADMIN. MGMT. BUREAU, MINISTRY
OF INTERNAL AFFS. & COMMCNS (2007), http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_
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who is both the head of government and the head of state, Japan divides those
functions between its prime minister and its emperor.212 Because these
conditions could easily render U.S. law inaccessible or unfamiliar, the nature and
extent of Japanese knowledge are uncertain at first glance.213
To reduce this uncertainty, I traveled to Tokyo and the Kansai region in the
fall of 2018 to conduct several months of field research. While there, I collected
scholarly publications on U.S. foreign relations law at the National Diet Library,
examined newspaper archives, requested records under Japans freedom-ofinformation act, and conducted semi-structured interviews with nearly fifty
scholars and government officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
and the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI). Along with
American secondary sources, the resulting evidence sheds light on the extent to
which Japans legal academy, popular media, and official bureaucratic structures
and practices have fostered or inhibited knowledge of U.S. foreign relations law
within the Japanese government in recent decades. The case study thus facilitates
more nuanced conclusions about the nature and extent of foreign knowledge in
the context of one specific bilateral relationship and offers insights on the
potential global determinants of foreign sophistication and ignorance. It also
serves as a model for future case studies on other governments.
A. Legal Academia
The practices of Japanese academia seem likely to shape official
knowledge in several ways. The quality and volume of Japanese scholarship on
any given issue in U.S. foreign relations law will substantially determine whether
officials have access to in-depth analysis in a format that is linguistically
convenient and generally reflective of Japans national interests. The presence
or absence of university courses on U.S. foreign relations law will largely dictate
whether future bureaucrats can study the law in a formal setting. And an
abundance or scarcity of native academic specialists will affect the ability of
government officials to seek out expert advice. This section thus examines the
extent to which Japanese academia has fostered the study of U.S. foreign
relations law in recent decades.
In stark contrast to prewar Japan, where academic research into American
law was extremely inactive214 and publications on U.S. foreign relations law
of_japan/fundamental_e.html (summarizing the structure of the national government).
212. Id.
213. See KENNETH B. PYLE, JAPAN RISING: THE RESURGENCE OF JAPANESE POWER AND
PURPOSE 14 (2007) (suggesting that no two societies are more different in their fundamental mores than
the United States and Japan and that the U.S.-Japan alliance often has lacked genuine understanding
as a result); John O. Haley, Luck, Law, Culture and Trade: The Intractability of United States-Japan
Trade Conflict, 22 CORNELL INTL L.J. 403, 416-18 (1989) (discussing differences in U.S. and Japanese
legal cultures and the effect of those differences on trade relations).
214. TANAKA HIDEO, EIBEIHŌ SŌRON 652 (1980) (translation mine). This inactivity reflected
both the practical irrelevance of the common law in a fledgling civil-law jurisdiction and the international
and domestic political climate of the day. With the rise of fascism and the Japanese militarys growing
influence over national politics, research on topics such as judicial review was widely regarded as
anachronistic. Id. at 653 (translation mine). Indeed, many scholars viewed U.S. law as rubbish
undeserving of academic inquiry. ITŌ MASAMI, AMERIKAHŌ NYŪMON 4 (1961) (translation mine).
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were virtually nonexistent,215 postwar Japan featured a craze for American
legal studies.216 With the occupation, U.S. authorities imposed a liberal
constitution and major legal reforms in areas ranging from criminal procedure to
land ownership, labor unions, education, and industrial organization, all in the
name of reordering Japanese society to embrace democracy.217 These reforms
laid a thick stratum of American legal principles on top of the preexisting
foundation218 and raised questions about the nature of American law among
scholars trying to make sense of the changes that had occurred.219 In response,
many began to travel to the United States for research,220 universities expanded
instruction on U.S. law,221 and the volume of scholarship grew far beyond
anything produced up to that point.222 In various respects, American civil society
helped to facilitate these developments.223
To be sure, the immediate result was not a vast expansion in Japanese
knowledge. Much of the initial research was extremely superficial and paid no
attention to the social and historical context in which the law operated.224 One
commentator lamented that the initial fruits of the craze were so limited that
Japans understanding of even the most foundational aspects of American law

215. I found only five such publications from the advent of Japanese legal academia in the 1870s
through World War II. See MATSUSHITA MASATOSHI, BEIKOKU SENSŌ KENRON (1940) (analyzing the
separation of war powers under the U.S. Constitution); KIYOSAWA KIYOSHI, AMERIKA WA NIHON TO
TATAKAWAZU 240-58 (1932) (same); Takayanagi Kenzō, Beikoku Sansen to Daitōryō no Kengen, 23
KAIZŌ 32 (1941) (discussing the Presidents constitutional authority in wartime); Inui Seimatsu, Beikoku
Daitōryō no Gaikō Kengen, 99 GAIKŌ JIHŌ 9 (1941) (explaining the Presidents constitutional authority
to conduct diplomacy); Tawara Shizuo, Beikoku ni Okeru Jōyaku Teiketsuken Mondai, 54 KOKUMIN
KEIZAI ZASSHI 429 (1933) (summarizing John C. Cooper, Jr., The Panamerican Convention on
Commercial Aviation and the Treaty-Making Power, 19 ABA J. 22 1933, which discusses whether the
U.S. Constitution renders treaties supreme over state law). At nearly five-hundred pages in length,
Matsushitas Beikoku Sensō Kenron is easily the most substantial of these works and is recognized today
as the first scholarly treatment of U.S. war powers in Japanese. See, e.g., MIYAWAKI MINEO, GENDAI
AMERIKA NO GAIKŌ TO SEIGUN KANKEI 42-43 n.3 (2004) (describing the book in this way).
216. Kenzo Takayanagi, Contact of the Common Law with the Civil Law of Japan, 4 AM. J.
COMP. L. 60, 69 (1955).
217. AOKI HITOSHI, O-OKA SABAKI NO HŌISHIKI: SEIYŌHŌ TO NIHONJIN 89-90 (2005); see
also JENNIFER M. MILLER, COLD WAR DEMOCRACY: THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 39-51 (2019)
(discussing the reforms).
218. AOKI, supra note 217, at 90 (translation mine).
219. See Tokyo University Receives Gift of American Law Books, 39 ABA J. 897, 899 (1953)
(quoting Odaka Tomō, Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Tokyo, as saying that American
legal studies became necessary after the war to find out the appropriate way of interpretation and
application of the postwar legal order).
220. Id. at 898.
221. Id. at 899.
222. See Tanaka Hideo, Amerikahō, in GAIKOKUHŌ TO NIHONHŌ 300 (Itō Masami ed., 1966)
(explaining that the volume of new scholarship on U.S. law from 1945 to 1966 was roughly six times
larger than the volume produced throughout Japanese history prior to 1945).
223. For example, the Ford Foundation funded exchanges for students and faculty at leading
Japanese and American law schools from 1954 to 1961. Takayanagi, supra note 216, at 69; see also MICH.
STATE UNIV. INST. OF RSCH. ON OVERSEAS PROGRAMS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS OF AMERICAN
UNIVERSITIES 144-45 (1958) (explaining that the exchanges involved the law schools at Chūō, Keiō,
Tōkyō, Waseda, Harvard, Michigan, and Stanford). Likewise, the West Publishing Company made a gift
of roughly 800 volumes of the National Reporter System to the University of Tokyo in 1953. Tokyo
University Receives Gift of American Law Books, supra note 219, at 897.
224. TANAKA, supra note 214, at 654 (translation mine).
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remained rickety into the 1960s.225 Moreover, the craze ebbed somewhat after
the occupation.226
Nevertheless, the legal academy became an increasingly reliable source of
expertise over the long run. The quality of the research improved as scholars
began to examine U.S. law in context.227 The research became more specialized,
and foundational works appeared in subfields such as U.S. constitutional law,
administrative law, antitrust law, civil and criminal procedure, labor law, and
contract law.228 Joint projects with Americans became more common.229 Experts
formed organizations such as the Japanese American Society for Legal Studies
(Nichibei Hōgakkai),230 which now claims roughly six hundred members,231
holds annual meetings232 and case-law review sessions,233 and publishes Amerika
Hōthe first journal dedicated exclusively to U.S. legal studies.234 Resources
emerged to facilitate awareness of and access to the new literature.235 Moreover,
instruction expanded to the point where a clear supermajority of both
undergraduate and graduate law faculties now offer at least one course on the

225. ITŌ, supra note 214, at 11-12.
226. Id. at 11.
227. Higuchi Norio, Hō, in AMERIKA KENKYŪ ANNAI 149 (Abe Hitoshi ed., 1998).
228. Id. at 152-53.
229. Id. at 156.
230. See JAPANESE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR LEGAL STUDIES, http://www.kichi.j.utokyo.ac.jp/nichibei.html (last visited June 9, 2020) (providing information about the society). Smaller
groups of this type have also emerged. One is the Kansai Society for the Study of American Public Law
(Kansai Amerika Kōhō Gakkai). Interview with Yokoyama Maki, Lecturer of Constitutional Law,
Dōshisha Univ., in Kyōto, Japan (Nov. 7, 2018). Another is the American Constitutional Law Study Group
(Amerika Kenpō Kenkyūkai). Interview with Itamochi Kengo, Assoc. Professor, Kōbe Univ. Sch. of Law.,
in Tokyo, Japan (Nov. 17, 2018).
231. JAPANESE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 231.
232. See, e.g., Nichibei Hōgakkai Sōkai Puroguramu (Sept. 10, 2005), http://www.kichi.j.utokyo.ac.jp/2005meeting.html (describing the program for the Societys 2005 annual meeting, which
featured presentations on U.S. law and the war on terrorism).
233. See, e.g., Nichibei Hōgakkai Hanrei Kenkyūkai (Dec. 1, 2018), http://www.kichi.j.utokyo.ac.jp/2018hanrei.html (summarizing a case-law study group meeting at which the participants
discussed, among other decisions, Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816 (2018), which
interpreted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
234. Amerika Hō published its first issue in 1965 and features original research, symposia, and
summaries of Supreme Court cases, along with reviews of American law review articles and books. On
occasion, this content addresses U.S. foreign relations law. See, e.g., Tsuchiya Takatsugu, Daitōryō no
Gaikō Seisaku Ketteiken, AMERIKA HŌ 388 (No. 2, 2003) (reviewing H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE
PRESIDENTS AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS: AN ESSAY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
(2002)). Following the establishment of Amerika Hō, older journals such as Jurisuto and Hōgaku Seminā
also began to publish a steady stream of academic articles on American law. Uemura Taizo, Hōgaku Eigo
no Rekishi to Genzai ni Kansuru Ichikōsatsu, NIHON EIGO KYŌIKUSHI KENKYŪ 143, 145 (No. 10, 1995).
235. One resource was EIBEIHŌ BUNKENMOKUROKU (Tanaka Hideo & Horibe Masao eds.,
1966), which provided the first meticulous bibliography of Japanese works on American law. Prior to its
publication, researchers had found it remarkably inconvenient to search for relevant books and articles,
the effect of which was to inhibit Japans knowledge of its own literature. Id. at 2 (translation mine). Later
in time, the rise of the internet is surely an even bigger development. See, e.g., CiNii Articles, NATL INST.
OF INFORMATICS, https://ci.nii.ac.jp/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2020) (open-access database of academic
articles from Japanese journals).
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common law,236 which tends to mean U.S. law.237
The study of U.S. foreign relations law has advanced considerably in this
setting. In recent decades, Japanese legal scholars have produced numerous
articles on many aspects of the field,238 including war powers,239 treaty
implementation,240 the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,241 the Alien Tort
Statute,242 the extraterritoriality of federal statutes,243 the Trade Promotion
Authority,244 and Supreme Court cases such as Zivotofsky v. Kerry.245 Scholars
have also published translations of the War Powers Resolution,246 an American
textbook on U.S. trade law,247 and parts of the Restatement (Third) on the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States.248 They have held symposia on

236. See Eibeihō Kyōiku Genkyō Chōsa, AMERIKAHŌ 342 (2008) (reporting that among sixtythree graduate schools of law that responded to a curricular survey, fifty-three had at least one course on
the common law, and that among the ninety undergraduate faculties of law that responded to the survey,
seventy-one had at least one course on the common law).
237. Interview with Kamiya Masako, Professor of Law, Gakushūin Univ., in Tokyo, Japan (Oct.
22, 2018) (suggesting that a majority of professors of Anglo-American law focus on American law
because they tend to be more familiar with it).
238. For a list of over 200 academic publications on U.S. war powers, the Alien Tort Statute, and
U.S. treaty-making, along with translations of the titles of those publications, see Ryan M. Scoville,
Japanese Bibliography on U.S. Foreign Relations Law, https://ryanscoville.files.wordpress.
com/2021/01/academic-publications-1.xlsx (uploaded Jan. 27, 2021). The broader literature on U.S. law
also grew to massive proportions: An unannotated list of publications from 1976 to 1995 exceeds 1000
pages in length. See generally EIBEIHŌ KENKYŪ BUNKEN MOKUROKU, 1976-1995 (1998).
239. See, e.g., Anami Haruya, Datsukokka Terorizumu no Jidai no Daitōryō Sensō Kengen,
AICHI KENRITSU DAIGAKU GAIKOKUGOGAKUBU KIYŌ 1 (No. 45, 2013) (discussing the war powers of
the President in the context of the war on terrorism).
240. See, e.g., Matsuyama Yūhei, Amerika Gasshūkoku ni Okeru Jidōjisshi Jōyaku ni Kansuru
Joronteki Kenkyū, 48 FUKUOKA DAIGAKU DAIGAKUIN RONSHŪ 79 (2016) (examining the doctrine of
treaty non-self-execution under U.S. law).
241. See, e.g., Nishitateno Sonoko, Beikoku Shuken Menjohō ni yoru Jūgun Ianfu Soshō, SEKAI
JINKEN MONDAI SENTĀ KENKYŪ KIYŌ 161 (No. 11, 2006) (explaining the role of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act in litigation over the Japanese governments responsibility for the use of comfort
women during World War II).
242. See, e.g., Iwasawa Yūji, Amerika Saibansho ni Okeru Kokusai Jinken Soshō no Tenkai
(Ichi), 87 KOKUSAIHŌ GAIKŌ ZASSHI 160 (1988) (analyzing the use of international law in human rights
litigation under the Alien Tort Statute).
243. See, e.g., Kutsuzawa Takehiko, Shōken Torihikihō no Ikigai Tekiyō, 3 HONGO HŌSEI KIYŌ
75 (1994) (discussing the extraterritoriality of the Securities Exchange Act).
244. See, e.g., Takii Mitsuo, Beikoku no Bōeki Kōshō to Bōeki Sokushin Kengen, 3 ŌBIRIN
RONKŌ 1 (2012) (explaining Trade Promotion Authority and its use in recent decades).
245. See, e.g., Tomii Yukio, Amerika Kenpō ni Okeru Kokka Shōnin Kengen no Shozai, 56
HŌGAKKAI ZASSHI 295 (2015) (explaining the Zivotofsky decision).
246. Sensō Kengenhō, 13 GAIKOKU NO RIPPŌ 113 (Miyawaki Mineo trans., 1974).
247. MATSUSHITA MITSUO, AMERIKA TSŪSHŌHŌ NO KAISETSU (1989) (translating THOMAS
V. VAKERICS, DAVID I. WILSON & KENNETH G. WEIGEL, ANTIDUMPING, COUNTERVAILING DUTY, AND
OTHER TRADE ACTIONS (1987)).
248. See Kokusai Keizai Kankeihō: Amerika Taigaikankeihō Risuteitomento Saado Yori, 19
KOKUSAI SHŌJI HŌMU 420 (1991) (introducing a translation of Part VIII of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
which addresses the law of international economic relations); Amerika Taigai Kankeihō Daisan
Risuteitomento (Ichi), 88 KOKUSAIHŌ GAIKŌ ZASSHI 69 (1989) (introducing a translation of Part IV of
the RESTATEMENT (THIRD), which addresses topics such as extraterritorial jurisdiction, the act-of-state
doctrine, and foreign sovereign immunity); see also Nomura Yoshiaki, Amerika Kokusai Kankeihō
Risuteitomento no Kaitei ni Tsuite, 85 KOKUSAIHŌ GAIKŌ ZASSHI 70 (1987) (explaining changes made
from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) to the RESTATEMENT (THIRD)); Matsushita Mitsuo, Notes:
Restatement (Second), Foreign Relations Law of the United States, AMERIKAHŌ 267 (No. 2, 1967)
(summarizing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)).
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topics such as the Supreme Courts use of foreign and international law.249 And
they have written books on war powers250 and the relationship between domestic
and international law in the United States.251 This work comprises a shadow
literature that American scholars have not engaged with or recognized.
To provide a sense of the evolution and volume of this literature, I collected
all Japanese legal academic books, book chapters, and journal articles that were
published through 2018 and are at least primarily about either of two topics that
tend to garner a lot of attention from American scholars of U.S. foreign relations
law: (1) the separation of powers with respect to the use of military force and (2)
the separation of powers with respect to the adoption, implementation, and
termination of international agreements.252 For a point of comparison, I also
collected all American legal academic publications that are at least primarily
about Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution,253 which provides in part that the
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the
threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.254 Figure 3
reports the total number of new publications on each of these topics by decade
since the advent of Japanese legal academia in the 1870s.255

249. See Amerika Saikōsai ni yoru Gaikokuhō Kokusaihō no Sanshō to Enyō, 71 HIKAKUHŌ
KENKYŪ 109 (2009) (featuring essays by Katsuta Takuya, Aizawa Hisashi, Murakami Masanao, and
Miyagawa Shigeo).
250. See MIYAWAKI MINEO, GENDAI AMERIKA NO GAIKŌ TO SEIGUN KANKEI (2004); HAMAYA
HIDEHIRO, BEIKOKU SENSŌ KENGENHŌ NO KENKYŪ (1990); MIYAWAKI MINEO, AMERIKA
GASSHŪKOKU DAITŌRYŌ NO SENSŌKENGEN (1980).
251. See UNEMURA SHIGERU, EIBEI NI OKERU KOKUSAIHŌ TO KOKUNAIHŌ NO KANKEI (1967).
252. I defined the first category to include any scholarly publication focused at least primarily on
the horizontal allocation of constitutional or statutory authority to approve, initiate, regulate, or terminate
the use of military force by the United States in international affairs. Similarly, I defined the second
category to include any publication focused at least primarily on the horizontal allocation of constitutional
or statutory authority to enter into, implement, terminate, or withdraw the United States from an
international agreement. The qualifier that a publication must be at least primarily focused on one of
these topics is significant because the literature contains numerous books and articles that discuss U.S.
foreign relations law in passing or as part of a larger analysis. See, e.g., Kyōtzuka Sakutarō, Jōyaku no
Kokunai Jisshi Oyobi Tekiyō wo Meguru Jakkan no Mondai, 56 KOKUSAIHŌ GAIKŌ ZASSHI 1 (1957)
(analyzing the domestic implementation of treaties in England, the United States, and France). The
numbers reported in Figure 3 would be much higher if I had defined the categories to include publications
of this kind. With these definitions in mind, I used a number of strategies to find qualifying publications.
First, I performed keyword searches of the National Diet Librarys online catalog, using terms such as 
戦争権限法 (War Powers Resolution), 宣戦条項 (Declare War Clause), 最高司令官条項
(Commander-in-Chief Clause), 条約条項 (Treaty Clause), and 議会が承認した行政協定
(congressional-executive agreement). See NDL ONLINE, https://ndlonline.ndl.go.jp. Second, I read the
footnotes of relevant books and articles to find references to other relevant publications. Finally, I searched
EIBEIHŌ KENKYŪ BUNKEN MOKUROKU, 1976-1995 (1998) and EIBEIHŌ KENKYŪ BUNKEN MOKUROKU,
1867-1975 (Tanaka Hideo & Horibe Masao eds., rev. ed. 1977), which provide extensive bibliographies
of scholarship on U.S. law.
253. In addition to collecting three books on Article 9, I used HeinOnlines Law Journal Library
to search for all articles, comments, notes, and reviews that were published in the United States through
2018 and contain the words Article 9, Constitution, and Japan or Japanese within forty words of
one another. That search yielded 176 hits. In reviewing them, I determined that forty-two were at least
primarily about Article 9.
254. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [Constitution], May 3, 1947, art. 9 (Japan).
255. See Scoville, Japanese Bibliography on U.S. Foreign Relations Law, supra note 238
(providing a link to the underlying data and a list of citations to the Japanese publications).
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Figure 3: New Scholarship on Foreign Relations Law by Decade

Several conditions are apparent from these data. First, the volume of
Japanese scholarship on U.S. war powers and U.S. agreements grew significantly
in the decades following World War II. From a low of nearly zero throughout
the pre-war period, the number of relevant books and articles rose to a combined
high of approximately four per year in the 2000s. This is certainly not an
overwhelming number, but it is consistent with the substantial increase in the
overall volume of Japanese scholarship on U.S. law over the same period,256 and
it suggests that Japans legal academy has become a more plentiful source of
knowledge. Second, political events appear to have played a role in shaping the
interests of Japanese researchers. For example, U.S. treaty-making became a
relatively popular topic in the 1950s and 1960s, which is when the United States
and Japan ratified a set of important bilateral security treaties,257 and war powers
gained attention alongside international controversy over the Vietnam War in the
1960s and 1970s.258 Third, Japanese scholarship on U.S. war powers and treatymaking has been more voluminous than American scholarship on Article 9
throughout most of the postwar period. This raises the possibility that Japanese
256. See Tanaka, supra note 222, at 300 (explaining that the volume of new scholarship on U.S.
law from 1945 to 1966 was roughly six times larger than the volume produced throughout Japanese history
prior to 1945).
257. See Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States, Jan.
19, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 1632; Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T.
3329. For an example of scholarship that responded to this development, see Irie Keishirō, Gyōsei Kyōtei
to Anzen Hoshō Jōyaku, 24 HŌRITSU JIHŌ 52 (1952) (discussing the use of an executive agreement rather
than an Article II treaty to provide for the stationing of American troops in Japan).
258. See THOMAS R.H. HAVENS, FIRE ACROSS THE SEA: THE VIETNAM WAR AND JAPAN 19651975, at 192-212 (1987) (discussing protests against the Vietnam War in Japan in the late 1960s). For an
example of scholarship on U.S. war powers and the Vietnam War, see Morone Sadao, Betonamu Sensō
to Saibansho, 18 WASEDA DAIGAKU DAIGKUIN HŌKEN RONSHŪ 195 (1978) (discussing the use of the
political question doctrine in federal litigation over the wars constitutionality).
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scholars have generally been more knowledgeable about U.S. foreign relations
law than American scholars have been about comparable aspects of Japanese
law.259
In terms of substance, the Japanese scholarship exhibits a number of
characteristics. It is less empirical or interdisciplinary and more doctrinal than a
lot of legal scholarship in the United States today.260 It cites extensively to
American primary and secondary sources.261 And it generally aims not to
encourage American legal reforms, but rather to foster greater Japanese
knowledge of U.S. law, either as a means of understanding or predicting the
actions of the U.S. government or generating insights for potential reforms to
Japanese law.262
As an example, consider a recent book titled Gurōbaruka to Kenpō
[Globalization and the Constitution], by Yamada Satoshi.263 Yamada begins the
book by observing that although the interconnectedness of states has given rise
259. A small group of individuals stand out as the first significant contributors to Japans postwar
literature. One is Unemura Shigeru, a former professor at Kōnan University who wrote a collection of
analyses on the relationship between domestic and international law in the United States and England in
the 1960s. See, e.g., UNEMURA, supra note 251. Another is Miyawaki Mineo, a former researcher at the
National Diet Library who began publishing on U.S. war powers in the late 1970s, produced more
scholarship on U.S. foreign relations law than anyone before or since, and garnered recognition as Japans
leading expert on the separation of powers under the U.S. Constitution prior to his retirement in 2010. See
Miyawaki Mineo Kyōju Ryakureki  Shuyō Gyōseki, 9 RYŪKEIHŌGAKU 7, 7-12 (2010) (listing Miyawakis
professional accomplishments and major publications); Scoville, Japanese Bibliography on U.S. Foreign
Relations Law, supra note 238 (providing a list of citations to Miyawakis work, along with translations
of the titles); Ootsuka Toshiyasu, Miyawaki Sensei wo Omou, 9 RYŪKEIHŌGAKU 13, 14 (2010) (describing
Miyawaki as Japans leading expert on the separation of powers under the U.S. Constitution). A third
significant contributor is Hamaya Hidehiro, a former professor at what is now Mie Chūkyō University,
who wrote about U.S. war powers in the 1980s and 1990s. See, e.g., HAMAYA, supra note 250 (analyzing
the contours and significance of the War Powers Resolution).
A new generation of scholars now follows their lead. This group includes Tomii Yukio, a professor
at Tokyo Metropolitan University whose writing tends to focus on war powers and other national-securityrelated aspects of U.S. law; Miyagawa Shigeo, a professor at Waseda Law School who has published a
number of articles on the Alien Tort Statute and the implementation of human rights treaties in the United
States; Tsuchiya Takatsugu, a professor at Kindai University who has examined the processes by which
the United States enters into international agreements; and Matsuyama Yūhei, a scholar who specializes
in treaty implementation in U.S. courts. See Tomii Yukio, TOKYO METRO. UNIV.,
https://www.tmu.ac.jp/stafflist/data/ta/642.html (last visited June 11, 2020); Miyagawa Shigeo, WASEDA
UNIV., https://researchers.waseda.jp/profile/ja.d04c5d988facfaeb3786a4b497188e95.html (last visited
June 11, 2020); Tsuchiya Takatsugu, KINDAI UNIV., https://www.kindai.ac.jp/law/research-and-education
/teachers/introduce/tsuchiya-takatsugu-7c0.html (last visited June 16, 2020); Matsuyama Yūhei,
RESEARCHMAP, https://researchmap.jp/ymatsu01 (last visited June 16, 2020). Most of these experts
studied law in the United States at one point or another.
260. See, e.g., Matsuyama Yūhei, Amerika Gasshūkoku ni Okeru Gyōsei Kyōtei no Shoruikei to
Kokunaiteki Kōryoku, 52 FUKUOKA DAIGAKU DAIGAKUIN RONSHŪ 49 (2020) (examining the various
forms of executive agreements in the United States, along with their domestic effects).
261. See, e.g., id. (citing a large volume of American scholarship and historical sources on
executive agreements).
262. Cf., e.g., Interview with Tomii Yukio, Professor of Law, Tokyo Metro. Univ., in Tokyo,
Japan (Nov. 1, 2018) (explaining that he studies U.S. foreign relations law because he thinks that there
are lessons to be learned and, in some cases, wants Japan to adopt reforms patterned after American law);
Interview with Kubo Fumiaki, Professor of American Government and History, Univ. of Tokyo, in Tokyo,
Japan (Oct. 4, 2018) (suggesting that knowledge of U.S. law makes it easier to predict U.S. actions in
foreign affairs); Interview with Takahata Eiichirō, Professor of Law, Nihon Univ. Coll. of Law, in Tokyo,
Japan (Oct. 31, 2018) (explaining that knowledge of U.S. constitutional law is necessary to understand
the Japanese Constitution).
263. YAMADA SATOSHI, GURŌBARUKA TO KENPŌ (2017).
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to a wide variety of international legal norms, those norms suffer from a
democracy deficit insofar as they have emerged without adequate involvement
from national legislative bodies.264 As he sees it, this is a problem for Japan as
much as elsewhere, but it is also one that has received insufficient attention from
Japanese commentators,265 so he turns to the law and legal scholarship of
Germany and the United States in search of solutions. In a lengthy chapter on the
U.S. Congress, Yamada discusses the distinctions between Article II treaties, ex
ante and ex post congressional-executive agreements, and sole executive
agreements under U.S. law;266 draws upon research by Oona Hathaway to
explain that congressional involvement in the making of international
agreements is generally quite limited;267 and explains the legal foundations of
reforms that Hathaway has advocated to restore congressional involvement in
the making of international law in the United States, including the use of fast
track and notice and comment procedures in connection with the adoption of
international agreements.268 Yamada then concludes that Japan should
strengthen the Diets involvement in the formation of international norms by
adopting similar reforms.269 Throughout the analysis, he demonstrates a
knowledge of U.S. law and legal scholarship that is qualitatively
indistinguishable from that of many American commentators.
Notwithstanding work of this kind, a number of current conditions are
likely to limit the legal academys contribution to official understanding. First,
scholars have not necessarily been effective at depicting operational realities.
Perhaps most notably, the literature on war powers has paid more attention to
Congress than it has to the executive branch: There are multiple books and
dozens of articles on the War Powers Resolution270 but only two articlesboth
recentthat even mention the use-of-force opinions of the Justice Departments
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC).271 Some of the literature has even focused on
judicial precedent more than on law emanating from the executive branch. The
discussion on war powers in a popular textbook on the U.S. Constitution thus
covers the War Powers Resolution, Korematsu v. United States,272 Woods v.

264. Id. at 1-2.
265. Id. at 2.
266. Id. at 101-04.
267. See id. at 104-18 (citing principally to Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power Over
International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE L.J. 140 (2009)).
268. See id. at 120-76 (discussing Hathaway, supra note 267, at 239-66).
269. Id. at 185-86.
270. See Scoville, Japanese Bibliography on U.S. Foreign Relations Law, supra note 238 (listing
publications).
271. See Yokodaidō Satoshi, Amerika Gasshūkoku ni Okeru Seifu no Kenpō Kaishaku,
REFERANSU 81 (No. 818, 2019) (discussing constitutional interpretation in the executive branch, including
in OLC opinions regarding the use of force); Yokodaidō Satoshi, Amerika no Tero tono Sensō to OLC
no Yakuwari, 45 KAGOSHIMA DAIGAKU HŌGAKU RONSHŪ 85 (2011) (discussing OLC opinions
pertaining to the war on terrorism).
272. 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the constitutionality of Japanese internment during World
War II).
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Cloyd W. Miller Co.,273 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,274 The
Prize Cases,275 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,276 Rasul v. Bush,277 and Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld,278 but does not mention OLC.279 In contrast, an influential view in the
United States holds that OLC has developed most of the U.S. domestic law on
the use of force.280 Those who read only the Japanese publications are unlikely
to appreciate that point.
Second, as in the United States, academic knowledge appears to be lumpy.
On the one hand, there is considerable research on the horizontal separation of
powers with respect to international agreements and the use of force,281 and there
is evidence that many scholars are knowledgeable about U.S. doctrines on the
extraterritoriality of federal statutes.282 On the other hand, only a handful of
publications focus on U.S. law at the intersection of foreign affairs and
federalism,283 and the academic community seems relatively unfamiliar with the
underlying authorities.284 Indeed, one scholar explained that many in Japan find
it mystifying that states such as California can take their own positions on matters
implicating foreign affairs, including by enacting laws on issues such as
comfort women and forced labor from World War II.285
Third, virtually all of the scholars I interviewed held the impression that
the study of American law has become less popular in recent years, as measured
by both course enrollment and the number of academic chairs devoted to the
273. 333 U.S. 138 (1948) (upholding Title II of the Housing and Rent Act of 1947 as a valid
exercise of congressional war power).
274. 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (upholding a statute that empowered the President to prohibit certain
arms sales as a lawful delegation of legislative power to the President in the field of foreign affairs).
275. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862) (upholding the Presidents naval blockade of the Confederacy
during the U.S. Civil War).
276. 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion) (holding that U.S. citizens detained as enemy
combatants must be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for their detention before
a neutral decisionmaker).
277. 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that noncitizens in military custody in Guantanamo Bay may
petition for review of the legality of their detention in federal court).
278. 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (invalidating the use of military commissions convened in violation of
U.S. and international law).
279. See HIGUCHI NORIO, AMERIKA KENPŌ 77-79, 101-05 (2011).
280. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, The Soleimani Strike: One Person Decides, LAWFARE (Jan. 3,
2020, 5:45 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/soleimani-strike-one-person-decides ([W]ith the
exception of the 1973 War Powers Resolution, which has always been a very weak constraint, practically
all of the law in this area has been developed by executive branch lawyers justifying unilateral presidential
uses of force.).
281. See Scoville, Japanese Bibliography on U.S. Foreign Relations Law, supra note 238 (listing
publications).
282. See, e.g., Interview with Aoki Setsuko, Professor of Law, Keio Univ., in Tokyo, Japan (Oct.
11, 2018) (explaining that many international lawyers in Japan have been interested in U.S. law on
extraterritoriality); Interview with Murase Shinya, Professor of Law Emeritus, Sophia Univ., in Tokyo,
Japan (Sept. 4, 2018) (explaining that there are many Japanese experts on the extraterritorial application
of U.S. antitrust law).
283. See Scoville, Japanese Bibliography on U.S. Foreign Relations Law, supra note 238 (listing
publications).
284. See, e.g., Interview with Tamaruya Masayuki, Professor of Law, Rikkyō Univ. Fac. of L.,
in Tokyo, Japan (Oct. 3, 2018) (suggesting that federalism can be a challenging topic because it is
unfamiliar); Interview with Kamiya, supra note 237 (same); Interview with Kimpara Kyōko, Professor of
Law, Chiba Univ., in Tokyo, Japan (Oct. 17, 2018) (same); Interview with Aoki, supra note 282 (same).
285. Interview with Kubo, supra note 262.
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field.286 The stated reasons were multiple, including a perception that U.S.-Japan
relations are less important than they used to be;287 the Japanese governments
decision to lower the passage rate on the bar exam after a brief period of
liberalization in the mid-2000s;288 a resurgence of German influence in the study
of constitutional law;289 an erosion in students ability to understand written
English;290 and the extreme socioeconomic inequality that manifests in the
United States, which makes American social and legal models unattractive to
many Japanese scholars.291 These impressions may very well indicate a reduction
in the academic contribution to official knowledge going forward.292
Fourth, university courses on American law or Anglo-American law are
common but generally provide little if any insight on foreign relations law. With
some courses covering both English and American law, there is a tendency for
maximum generality that makes it difficult for instructors to cultivate deep
knowledge on any particular topic.293 Lectures tend to be heavily case-centric
and thus marginalize authorities that loom large in foreign relations law, such as
historical practice, statutes, and the regulations, orders, and legal opinions that
emanate from the executive branch.294 Enrollment is elective and limited295 and,
at the undergraduate level, attendance is sporadic.296 Many of the instructors,
moreover, are not dedicated specialists in American law, especially outside of
the top schools.297 The lectures and reading materials might discuss aspects of

286. See, e.g., Interview with Nomura Yoshiaki, Professor Emeritus, Osaka Univ., in Osaka,
Japan (Nov. 5, 2018) (suggesting that the number of people studying Anglo-American law has declined);
Interview with Kimpara, supra note 284 (same).
287. Interview with Murata Kōji, Professor of Political Science, Dōshisha Univ., in Tokyo, Japan
(Nov. 28, 2018).
288. Interview with Dan Rosen, Professor of Law, Chūō Univ., in Tokyo, Japan (Oct. 2, 2018)
(explaining that the low passage rate incentivizes students to focus their studies on areas covered by the
exam, which do not include American law); see also Shigenori Matsui, The Future of Law Schools in
Japan, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (2012) (discussing the initial reforms and subsequent retrenchment).
289. See, e.g., Interview with Itamochi, supra note 230 (explaining that German constitutional
law is more influential than it used to be); Interview with Agawa Naoyuki, Professor of Law, Dōshisha
Univ., in Kyōto, Japan (Nov. 7, 2018) (same).
290. Interview with Kamiya, supra note 237.
291. Interview with Kubo, supra note 262.
292. A separate but potentially related development is that the overall number of Japanese
students studying at American universities has fallen by more than sixty percent over the past two decades,
from nearly 46,000 students in the 2000/2001 academic year to roughly 18,000 in 2018/2019. INSTITUTE
OF INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION, INTERNATIONAL STUDENT TOTALS BY PLACE OF ORIGIN, OPEN DOORS
REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE (2019). In combination, these developments
indicate a marked decrease in the transmission of academic knowledge from and about the United States
to Japan.
293. Interview with Rosen, supra note 288. As a representative example, the introductory course
on Anglo-American law at one university covers American contract law, case-law research methods,
American tort law, the history of Anglo-American law, juries, the U.S. Constitution, the English
Constitution, the English judicial system, and English private law. Itamochi Kengo, Syllabus for Eibeihō
A, Kōbe Univ., Feb. 28, 2018 (on file with author).
294. Interview with Tamaruya, supra note 284.
295. Interview with Tomii, supra note 262.
296. See Interview with Satō Chiaki, Assoc. Professor, Faculty of Law, Aoyama Gakuin Univ.,
in Tokyo, Japan (Oct. 28, 2018) (reporting that eighty to ninety percent of undergraduate students do not
regularly attend lectures and that some schools have adopted policies mandating attendance at a minimum
of one-third of the lectures in any given course as a precondition for taking a final exam).
297. Interview with Tamaruya, supra note 284; Interview with Kamiya, supra note 237;
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U.S. foreign relations law, but only occasionally and briefly.298 Given these
conditions, it seems highly unlikely that college and law school students graduate
with significant knowledge of the field.
Finally, the academy organizes legal knowledge in ways that do not
promote pertinent forms of sophistication. Most fundamentally, there is simply
no concept of foreign relations law, including with respect to the United
States.299 This is reflected both in the absence of a settled term for the field in the
Japanese language300 and in the uncertainty, if not confusion, that conversational
references to foreign relations law are likely to generate.301 Unsurprisingly, there
appear to be no courses on U.S. foreign relations law.302 Nor is there a selfidentifying community of specialists who collaborate or regularly consult with
one another in their research.303
Rather than embrace U.S. foreign relations law as a coherent domain of
American law, Japans legal academy has thoroughly balkanized it.304
International lawyers have written on the Alien Tort Statute,305 specialists in
Japanese constitutional law have examined the relationship between U.S. treaties
Interview with Kimpara, supra note 284. By one estimate, there are no more than approximately fifteen
to twenty scholars nationwide who specialize exclusively in American law. Interview with Kinami Atushi,
Professor of Law, Kyōto Univ., in Kyōto, Japan (Nov. 7, 2018). Others who teach the course tend to be
specialists in Japanese law who draw upon selected features of American law as points of comparison.
Interview with Kamiya, supra note 237.
298. Interview with Tomii, supra note 262; Interview with Rosen, supra note 288.
299. Interview with Yokoyama, supra note 230; Interview with Matsuda Hiromichi, Assistant
Professor, Intl Christian Univ., in Tokyo, Japan (Nov. 15, 2018). This is not because Japan lacks law that
American scholars would view as foreign relations law. See, e.g., Cabinet B.No. 72, 189th Diet Sess.
(May 15, 2015); Cabinet B. No. 73, 189th Diet Sess (May 15, 2015) (expanding the authority of Japanese
forces to participate in foreign conflicts). Nor is it due to the absence of associated research. See, e.g.,
IWASAWA YŪJI, JŌYAKU NO KOKUNAI TEKIYŌ KANŌSEI (1985) (discussing the domestic application of
treaties in Japan); TAKANO YŪICHI, KENPŌ TO JŌYAKU (1960) (analyzing the conclusion, effect, and
implementation of treaties under the Japanese Constitution). One scholar surmised that the explanation
instead lies with the government: Japan is not a federal state, the bureaucracy drives much of the
lawmaking, and judicial review is uncommon, so there are fewer domestic legal complexities to the
conduct of foreign relations and less need for an independent field to study them. Interview with Nishii
Masahiro, Professor Emeritus, Kyōto Univ., in Kyōto, Japan (Nov. 7, 2018).
300. Compare Hazeyama Shigeki, Jōyaku no Jidōshikkōsei to Kenryokubunritsuron, 20
KUMAMOTO GAKUEN DAIGAKU KEIZAI RONSHŪ 41, 41 (2014) (referring to foreign relations law as 国
際関係法 (kokusai kankeihō), which translates as international relations law) with Amerika Taigai
Kankeihō Daisan Risuteitomento (Ichi), 88 KOKUSAIHŌ GAIKŌ ZASSHI 69, 69 (1989) (referring to foreign
relations law as 対外関係法 (taigai kankeihō), which translates as foreign relations law) and Satō
Tetsuo, Beikoku ni Okeru Shōgaiteki Kankeihō, 14 HIROBA 4 (1961) (referring to foreign relations law as
渉外的関係法, which translates as external relations law).
301. See, e.g., Interview with Yamada Satoshi, Associate Professor of Law, Okayama Univ., in
Tokyo, Japan (Dec. 8, 2018) (suggesting that scholars of Japanese constitutional law are unfamiliar with
the term foreign relations law); Interview with Agawa, supra note 289 (explaining that U.S. foreign
relations law is not well known even among Japanese experts in U.S. law).
302. It is difficult to prove a negative, but over the course of dozens of interviews, I did not
encounter a single person who had ever heard of such a course.
303. See, e.g., Interview with Tomii, supra note 262 (referring to himself as a lone wolf in his
focus on U.S. foreign relations and national security law).
304. See Interview with Yokoyama, supra note 230 (explaining that the issues that Americans
view as comprising U.S. foreign relations law are dealt with piecemeal by scholars from a variety of
fields).
305. See generally, e.g., Etō Junichi, Jinken to Kanshū Kokusaihō, 31 TŌYŌ HŌGAKU 341 (1988)
(discussing the recognition and proof of customary international law in ATS cases such as Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)).
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and state law,306 and experts in Japanese labor law have written about the
extraterritoriality of federal statutes,307 to name just a few examples. The result
is that much of the scholarship on U.S. foreign relations law over the postwar
period has come from individuals whose primary expertise lies somewhere other
than American law, with expertise in international law and Japanese
constitutional law being particularly common.308 This condition reflects Japans
ubiquitous comparativism, which calls on nearly every kind of legal scholar to
understand English, French, or German and to conduct research that accounts for
the law of at least one developed country where one of those languages
predominates.309 Today, aside from professors Tomii and Miyagawa,310
specialists in American law who focus on U.S. foreign relations law are
essentially nonexistent.311
Although it is entirely understandable that few Japanese scholars would
specialize in a relatively narrow field of the law of a single foreign jurisdiction,
the result could inhibit academic understanding in two respects. First, it could
limit understanding of gestalt or field-level developmentssuch as the arguable
shift toward the normalization of U.S. foreign relations law in modern
Supreme Court cases312 and the complex multitude of legal dynamics that
comprise the overall balance of authority pertaining to foreign affairs313by
encouraging researchers to learn about only the component parts of the field that
are relevant to another domain of legal knowledge. Second, it could limit
understanding of the situation sense of U.S. foreign relations law by
downplaying the importance of legal-cultural immersion and system-level
expertise.314 Either effect is likely, in turn, to diminish the Japanese legal
academys ability to contribute to official knowledge within Japan.
B. News Media
Government officials in Japan have historically relied in part on Japanese

306. See generally, e.g., Nakahara Seiichi, Beikoku ni Okeru Shūhō to Jōyaku no Kankei, MEIJI
DAIGAKU TANKI DAIGKU KIYŌ 55 (No. 7, 1963) (analyzing this issue).
307. See generally, e.g., Yamakawa Ryūichi, Amerkia Rōdōhō no Ikigai Tekiyō to Zaigai Shiten
 Kogaisha, 23 TSUKUBA HŌSEI 29 (1997) (discussing inter alia recent developments in the
extraterritoriality of U.S. labor law).
308. See Scoville, Japanese Bibliography on U.S. Foreign Relations Law, supra note 238 (listing
areas of specialization for many authors).
309. See, e.g., Interview with Itamochi, supra note 230 (explaining that legal scholarship that
does not reference foreign law is generally viewed as inferior in Japan).
310. See supra note 259 (discussing the work of Tomii and Miyagawa).
311. See, e.g., Interview with Kawase Tsuyoshi, Professor of Law, Sophia Univ., in Tokyo, Japan
(Dec. 7, 2018) (explaining that Japanese scholars of American law tend to focus on topics that are
generally unrelated to foreign affairs, such as juries, torts, contracts, and the Uniform Commercial Code,
among others).
312. See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 37, at 1901 (arguing that the Supreme Court has in
recent decades treated foreign relations issues as if they were run-of-the-mill domestic policy issues,
suitable for judicial review and governed by ordinary separation of powers and statutory interpretation
principles).
313. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 70, at 83-148 (summarizing key features of the separation of
powers with respect to foreign affairs).
314. LLEWELLYN, supra note 191, at 59-61, 121-57.

48

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 47: 1

news media as a material source of foreign intelligence.315 Given this connection,
it is plausible that the quality and quantity of any native reporting on U.S. foreign
relations law will influence the extent to which these officials are aware of and
understand pertinent legal developments. This Section thus examines public
reporting on U.S. foreign relations law in Japan in recent decades.
Japanese news media have served as a robust source of information on the
United States since at least the end of World War II.316 Research from the 1990s,
for example, finds that stories about the United States loom[] extraordinarily
large in Japans television news programs,317 comprising one-third of all foreign
coverage and totaling roughly ten times the share of international reporting that
American television news devoted to Japan within the same period.318 Major
Japanese newspapers, which have historically enjoyed circulation far in excess
of even the most widely read American newspapers,319 have also reported
extensively on the United States320 and in doing so contributed to a constant
barrage of fact and detail about actions of the U.S. government and industry as
related to Japan.321 Together these sources have shaped official
understandings322 and kept the Japanese public remarkably well informed
about developments across the Pacific.323
To evaluate Japanese news coverage of U.S. foreign relations law in
particular, I searched the archives of the Asahi Shimbun324one of Japans
leading newspapers325for all articles mentioning either (1) the War Powers

315. See, e.g., Ken Kotani, A Reconstruction of Japanese Intelligence: Issues and Prospects, in
INTELLIGENCE ELSEWHERE: SPIES AND ESPIONAGE OUTSIDE THE ANGLOSPHERE 181, 196 (Philip H.J.
Davies & Kristian C. Gustafson eds., 2013) (explaining that Japanese policymakers prefer to get
information from newspapers rather than the governments intelligence services); Andrew L. Oros,
Japans Growing Intelligence Capability, 15 INTL J. INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 1, 5, 13
(2002) (discussing the Japanese intelligence communitys extensive use of domestic news organizations
as intelligence sources).
316. Tadokoro Masayuki, The Media in U.S.-Japan Relations: National Media in Transnational
Relations, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS 175, 190 (Gerry Curtis ed., 2000).
317. Ellis S. Krauss, Media Coverage of U.S.-Japanese Relations, in MEDIA AND POLITICS IN
JAPAN 243, 249 (Susan J. Pharr & Ellis S. Krauss eds., 1996).
318. Stanley Budner et al., American and Japanese Television News Coverage of Each Others
Country: Study Goals and Methods, in CREATING IMAGES: AMERICAN AND JAPANESE TELEVISION NEWS
COVERAGE OF THE OTHER 9, 18-19 (Mansfield Center for Pacific Affairs ed., 1997) [hereinafter:
CREATING IMAGES].
319. Tadokoro, supra note 316, at 184; Krauss, supra note 317, at 245 (explaining that newspaper
circulation in Japan is more than double that of the United States and greater than that of any other
industrialized country). But see Shimbun Hakkō Busū to Fukyūdo, NIHON SHIMBUN KYŌKAI,
https://www.pressnet.or.jp/data/circulation/circulation05.php (last visited Jan. 25, 2021) (reporting that
the number of copies printed fell by over forty percent from 2000 to 2020).
320. Stanley Budner, Coverage in Context: Newspapers, Television, the Other Country, and the
World, in CREATING IMAGES, supra note 318, at 170.
321. Krauss, supra note 317, at 266.
322. See supra note 315 (citing Kotani and Oros, both of whom substantiate this point).
323. Krauss, supra note 317, at 266.
324. To access the archives, I used the online database Kikuzo II Visual, which contains all
articles published in the Asahi Shimbun and its magazine (AERA) from 1879 to present. See About Kikuzo
II Visual, https://database.asahi.com/help/eng/about_e.html (last visited July 1, 2020).
325. See Jōi Sanshi Chōkan Hanbai Busū  Setai Fukyūritsu, YOMIURI SHIMBUN MEDIA DATA
(2020),
https://adv.yomiuri.co.jp/download/PDF/mediakit/general/mediadata2020/prefectures.pdf
(reporting subscription data by prefecture).
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Resolution,326 which seeks to regulate the Presidents ability to use military force
in international affairs, or (2) Trade Promotion Authority,327 which establishes
procedures to govern the negotiation and adoption of certain types of trade
agreements between the United States and foreign partners. As a point of
comparison, I also searched for all articles mentioning the WPR or TPA in the
archives of the New York Times328 and then tallied the annual number of
qualifying articles in each of the sources up through 2018.329
The results, which are likely to be representative of the coverage that
appears in other major Japanese newspapers,330 support a number of conclusions.
First, as indicated below in Figures 4 and 5, the New York Times has reported on
the WPR and TPA much more frequently than the Asahi Shimbun. From the
WPRs enactment in 1973 through 2018, the Times published an average of 17.8
articles per year that mentioned the WPR, while Asahi published an average of
only 1.2 articles per year. Similarly, from the enactment of the earliest iteration
of TPAfast trackin 1974331 through 2018, the Times published an average
of 15.4 articles per year that mentioned TPA, while Asahi published only 6.4
articles per year. The data thus show that Asahis coverage of the WPR and TPA
has been comparatively limited. In doing so, the data suggest that a regular reader
of the Times is more likely to have acquired familiarity with these authorities, as
one might expect. Given that the WPR and TPA are relatively salient aspects of
U.S. foreign relations law, it seems likely that others have received even less
attention in the Japanese press.
Second, the two newspapers have exhibited different tendencies in terms
of topical emphasis. The WPR and TPA are roughly equivalent in the extent of
the attention they have received from the Times, with an average of 17.8 and 15.4
articles per year, respectively. Yet articles referencing TPA have been over five
times more common than those referencing the WPR in Asahi, with averages of
6.4 and 1.2 articles per year, respectively. The uneven character of this coverage
suggests that regular readers of Asahi have been more familiar with TPA than
with the WPR. It also recalls the lumpiness of Japanese scholarship on U.S.
foreign relations law and underscores the possibility of substantial, topic-based
326. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973). I used 戦争権限法 (War Powers Act) and 戦
争権限決議 (War Powers Resolution) as keywords to find articles mentioning the War Powers
Resolution.
327. Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 11426, Title I, 129 Stat. 320. To find articles mentioning TPA, I used 貿易促進権限 (Trade Promotion
Authority), ファスト・トラック (Fast ・Track), ファストトラック (Fast Track), 通商交渉権限
 (Trade Negotiating Authority), and 貿易交渉権限 (Trade Negotiating Authority) as keywords.
328. See New York Times Article Archive, https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/ref/
membercenter/nytarchive.html (last visited July 1, 2020). As search terms, I used War Powers
Resolution, War Powers Act, Trade Negotiating Authority, Fast-track negotiating authority, Fasttrack authority, Fast-track trade, and Trade Promotion Authority.
329. For access to the underlying data, see Ryan M. Scoville, Newspaper Archives,
https://ryanscoville.files.wordpress.com/2021/01/newspaper-archives-1.xlsx (uploaded Jan. 27, 2021).
330. See Stanley Budner & Ellis S. Krauss, Newspaper Coverage of U.S.-Japan Frictions:
Balance and Objectivity, 35 ASIAN SURVEY 336, 349 (1995) (explaining that major Japanese newspapers
are basically homogeneous and similar in style and policy because they all strive to appeal to the same
national market).
331. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978; see FERGUSSON & DAVIS, supra note
14, at 3 (explaining that TPA was originally known as fast track under the Trade Act of 1974).
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variations in foreign knowledge.332
Figure 4: Newspaper Articles Mentioning the War Powers Resolution (WPR)

Finally, the data show that Asahis coverage has been episodic and event
driven. WPR reporting peaked in 1973, when Asahi featured several articles on
the laws enactment,333 and in 1990, during the leadup to Persian Gulf War.334
Similarly, articles referencing TPA spiked in 2015 in the midst of international
negotiations over the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).335 This is no surprise, but
it is noteworthy that the events that seem to have driven U.S. media interest in
U.S. foreign relations law are not necessarily the same as those that have driven
Japanese media interest. On the one hand, TPA received comparably voluminous
coverage in the Times and Asahi during negotiations over the TPP, which was
important to both countries. On the other hand, the WPR received much greater
attention from the Times in 1983, when the United States invaded Lebanon and

332. See supra p. 44 (discussing evidence that academic knowledge of some areas of U.S. foreign
relations law is greater than others in Japan).
333. See, e.g., Bei Sensō Kengenhō, ASAHI SHIMBUN, Nov. 8, 1973, at 1 (reporting Congresss
override of President Nixons veto of the WPR).
334. See, e.g., Beidaitōryō, Gikai ni Guntai no Sauji Haken wo Tsūhō, ASAHI SHIMBUN, Aug.
11, 1990, at 7 (reporting that President Bush had, pursuant to the War Powers Resolution, formally notified
Congress of his deployment of troops to Saudi Arabia, and discussing the content of the notice).
335. See, e.g., Bei, TPP Shōnin Tetsutzuki Kaishi Gikai Shingi Nankō mo Daitōryō Shomei
Tsūkoku, ASAHI SHIMBUN, Nov. 7, 2015, at 6 (reporting President Obamas intention to sign the TransPacific Partnership and submit it to Congress for approval in the spring of 2016, but also noting concerns
that congressional approval may be delayed until after the 2016 election).
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Grenada.336 This variation seems to reflect U.S. laws conditional relevance
abroad: only some developments in U.S. foreign relations law have implicated
Japans national interests enough to warrant attention from major Japanese news
media.
Figure 5: Newspaper Articles Mentioning Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)

As for substance, Asahis coverage has been almost entirely descriptive.
Take the WPR stories as an example. Some provided updates on procedural
developments leading to the laws enactment,337 while others reported on
subsequent proposals to amend it338 or its invocation in relation to U.S.
involvement in a specific foreign conflict.339 References to the statute have
typically been quite brief, but a significant number of articles provided details
about at least some of its provisions. One of the most extensive descriptions
336. See, e.g., Steven V. Roberts, House Votes Bill Applying War Law to Grenada Move, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 1983, at A1 (reporting that the House of Representatives had approved legislation that
would apply the WPR to the U.S. intervention in Grenada); Steven V. Roberts, Senate Democrats Set to
Force Issue Over War Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1983, at A1 (discussing efforts by Senate Democrats
to require President Reagan to obtain authorization under the WPR to keep U.S. Marines in Lebanon).
337. See, e.g., Beigikai wo Tsūka: Sensō Kengenhōan, ASAHI SHIMBUN, Oct. 13, 1973, at 2
(reporting that the WPR had passed in both houses of Congress but that President Nixon would almost
certainly veto it and that Congress was unlikely to override the veto).
338. See Daitōryō no Kainyū Seigen, ASAHI SHIMBUN, Aug. 9, 1984, at 7 (reporting on a proposal
to amend the WPR to require prior legislative approval for the deployment of U.S. forces).
339. See, e.g., Sensō Kengenhō Tekiyō wo Tsūkoku, ASAHI SHIMBUN, Oct. 26, 1983, at 1
(reporting that the Reagan Administration had, pursuant to the WPR, formally notified Congress of the
deployment of U.S. forces to Grenada).

52

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 47: 1

appeared in a short piece from 1975, which stated that the WPR limits acts of
war to circumstances in which there is (1) a declaration of war, (2) approval by
treaty or otherwise, or (3) a national emergency occasioned by an attack on U.S.
territory or property.340 This piece further explained that in the event of a
national emergency the statute confers on the president the authority to dispatch
military forces without congressional approval for up to sixty days.341 Likewise,
an article from 1989 included a terminology section that defined the WPR as
a law that aims to restrict the presidents ability to start and expand war de facto
without congressional approval through significant, long-term deployments of
U.S. armed forces.342 The article then proceeded to summarize the WPRs key
provisions.343
American specialists would likely take issue with some of this reporting.
Continuing with the example of WPR coverage, the statute does not endorse the
idea that a treaty can independently authorize the use of force,344 but rather states
explicitly that presidential [a]uthority . . . shall not be inferred . . . from any
treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such treaty is implemented by
legislation specifically authorizing the introduction of United States Armed
Forces into hostilities.345 Likewise, the WPR does not purport to confer
authority on the President to introduce U.S. forces into hostilities in the event of
an attack on the United States.346 Instead, the law merely recognizes the
Presidents preexisting constitutional authority to act without Congress in those
circumstances.347 And despite publishing numerous articles that reference the
WPR, Asahi has not published any articles referencing OLC analyses on the use
of force.348 These kinds of deficiencies suggest that although Asahi may have
helped to foster awareness of basic issues in U.S. foreign relations law, the
newspaper has been less effective at cultivating accurate, much less nuanced,
understandings of the field.
More generally, there is evidence that the Japanese press underreports on
some topics and omits others altogether. U.S. Supreme Court opinions on foreign
relations law have garnered little if any coverage.349 Stories on the Alien Tort
340. Kotoba: Sensō Kengenhō, ASAHI SHIMBUN, Apr. 16, 1975, at 5 (translation mine).
341. Id. (translation mine).
342. Sensō Kengenhō <Yōgo>, ASAHI SHIMBUN, Dec. 12, 1989, at 7 (translation mine).
343. See id. (summarizing Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the WPR, which address consultation, reporting,
and congressional action, respectively).
344. Cf. Kotoba: Sensō Kengenhō, supra note 340, at 5 (suggesting that the WPR permits the
President to commit acts of war without congressional approval when authorized by treaty).
345. Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 8(a)(2), 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (emphasis added).
346. Cf. Kotoba: Sensō Kengenhō, supra note 340, at 5 (translation mine) (suggesting that the
WPR confers authority on the President).
347. See Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 2(a), 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (It is the purpose of this joint resolution
to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States . . . .); id. at § 2(c) (The
constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces
into hostilities . . . are exercised . . . pursuant to . . . a national emergency created by attack upon the United
States).
348. This omission is reminiscent of the virtual absence of research on OLC in Japanese
scholarship. See Scoville, Japanese Bibliography on U.S. Foreign Relations Law, supra note 238 (citing
publications).
349. For example, October 14, 2020 searches on the Japanese-language version of Google News
returned zero hits on the terms Zivotofsky and its Japanese equivalent (ジヴォトフスキー),
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Statutea popular topic among American commentatorsare nonexistent.350
And notwithstanding the data on the WPR and TPA, there is some evidence that
the media tend to focus too much on the actions of the President and not enough
on Congress, thereby creating the impression that the President is almighty.351
These tendencies are consistent with the observationarticulated by a number
of legal academicsthat Japanese news media are not a particularly good source
of information on U.S. law.352
C. Government
Within the Japanese government, a significant portion of the responsibility
for the conduct of Japan-U.S. relations lies with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MOFA) and the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI). In MOFA,
the key unit is the North American Affairs Bureau, which has a staff of fifty to
sixty officials353 who work on the formulation and execution of Japans foreign
policy toward the United States and Canada354 and take[] charge of the
collection of information on those countries.355 To carry out these functions,
the Bureau organizes its personnel into a First Division that tracks U.S. and
Canadian domestic politics and coordinates Japans overall foreign policy
toward the United States and Canada, 356 a Second Division that specializes in
suggesting that major media outlets in Japan did not report on the Supreme Courts decision in Zivotofsky
v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1 (2015).
350. October 3, 2020 searches on the Japanese-language version of Google News returned zero
hits on Alien Tort Statute and its Japanese translation外国人不法行為法. In contrast, searches
using the Japanese translations of War Powers Resolution and Trade Promotion Authority returned
twenty-three and one-hundred hits, respectively.
351. Interview with Kubo, supra note 262; see also Interview with Machidori Satoshi, Professor
of American Politics, Kyōto Univ., in Kyōto, Japan (Nov. 7, 2018) (explaining that Japanese news media
assign correspondents to the U.S. executive branch but often lack the human resources to do likewise with
Congress, and arguing that this disparity has led to underreporting on and a general lack of public
knowledge about Congress).
352. See Interview with David G. Litt, Professor of Law, Keio Univ. Law Sch., in Tokyo, Japan
(Sept. 20, 2018) (explaining that descriptions of U.S. law in the Japanese press are not always accurate
and suggesting that errors may occur in part because reporters have a tendency to approach American law
professors in Japan as all-purpose experts on U.S. law); Interview with Kamiya, supra note 237
(explaining that Japanese reporting generally does not delve into technical legal issues); Interview with
Kubo, supra note 262 (stating that it is rare for newspaper reports on U.S. law to provide much detail).
353. Interview with MOFA Official #4, in Tokyo, Japan (Sept. 30, 2018).
354. About Us: Organization, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. OF JAPAN (Oct. 17, 2019),
https://www.mofa.go.jp/about/hq/org.html. A separate bureau handles Japans relations with Mexico and
Central America, in addition to South America. Chunanbei Kyoku, Latin American and Caribbean Affairs
Bureau, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS., https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/sosiki/chunan.html.
355. About Us: Organization, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. OF JAPAN, supra note 354. The
Fourth Division of MOFAs Intelligence and Analysis Service (IAS) operates as an in-house intelligence
organization focused on Europe, the Americas, the Middle East and Africa, but collection and analysis
of foreign intelligence within the Ministry primarily take place in day-to-day work in other regional and
functional bureaus that remain in close contact with overseas embassies and consulates. YUKI TATSUMI,
JAPANS NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY INFRASTRUCTURE: CAN TOKYO MEET WASHINGTONS
EXPECTATIONS? 111-12 (2008); see also Kotani, supra note 315, at 184 (explaining that IAS has long
been regarded as a backwater in the ministry). From this perspective, the North American Affairs Bureau
is likely to play a bigger role than IAS in the collection of information about U.S. foreign relations law.
356. Gaimushō Soshikirei [Organizational Ordinance of the Foreign Ministry], Cabinet Order
No. 249, art. 47 (2000) (last updated July 31, 2020), https://elaws.e-gov.go.jp/search/elawsSearch/
elaws_search/lsg0500/detail/412CO0000000249_20160401_428CO0000000103
/0?revIndex=2&lawId=412CO0000000249&openerCode=1#411.
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economic affairs in Japans relations with the United States and Canada,357 a
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division that works on mutual security and defense
issues under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty of 1960,358 and a Japan-U.S. Status
of Forces Agreement (SOFA) Office that handles matters connected to the
presence of U.S. military forces in Japan.359 The First Division is the largest of
these,360 and its Director holds authority to settle policy disagreements that arise
among them.361 For insights on the latest developments in Japan-U.S. relations
and information that is not available in open sources, units within the Bureau
communicate regularly with the Japanese embassy in Washington, D.C.,362
which has more than one hundred diplomatic personnel.363
As for METI, responsibility for the conduct of Japans trade relations with
the United States lies primarily with the Trade Policy Bureau.364 One component
of the Bureauthe Americas Divisionhas a staff of approximately fifteen
officials365 who work on bilateral trade relations between Japan and the various
countries of North and South America, including the United States.366 These
officials monitor the implementation of trade agreements, manage day-to-day
communications with U.S. trade envoys, and collect intelligence on U.S. trade
and economic policies.367 Another unitthe Economic Partnership Division
has a staff of more than forty officials368 who negotiate bilateral and plurilateral
economic agreements with the United States and other countries.369 Finally, the
Bureaus Multilateral Trade System Department has a staff of approximately
thirty officials370 who attend to Japans relations with multilateral trade
institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO).371 Due to its close ties
with Japanese industry, METI is often able to persuade MOFA to adopt its
position in the event of inter-ministerial disagreement over trade matters.372
Some evidence suggests that officials in these units are capable of
misunderstanding U.S. foreign relations law. To name one historical example, in
the early 1970s officials acquiesced to an import-control plan that Japanese
357. Id., art. 48.
358. Id., art. 49.
359. Hokubeikyoku, Gaimushō, Nov. 21, 2013, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/
sosiki/hokubei.html.
360. See Interview with MOFA Official #3, in Tokyo, Japan (Oct. 15, 2018) (explaining that the
First Division has a staff of approximately thirty).
361. Id.
362. Interview with MOFA Official #1, in Tokyo, Japan (Oct. 4, 2018); Interview with MOFA
Official #7, in Tokyo, Japan (Oct. 4, 2018).
363. Interview with MOFA Official #3, supra note 360.
364. Interview with METI Official #4, in Tokyo, Japan (Dec. 21, 2018).
365. Interview with METI Official #1, in Tokyo, Japan (Oct. 5, 2018).
366. Keizaisangyōshō Soshikirei [Organizational Ordinance of METI], Cabinet Order No. 254,
art. 39 (2000) (last updated July 31, 2020), https://elaws.e-gov.go.jp/search/elawsSearch/elaws_search/
lsg0500/detail?lawId=412CO0000000254.
367. Id.
368. Interview with METI Official #3, in Tokyo, Japan (Dec. 20, 2018).
369. Keizaisangyōshō Soshikirei [Organizational Ordinance of METI], art. 38; Interview with
METI Official #4, supra note 364.
370. Id.
371. Keizaisangyōshō Soshikirei [Organizational Ordinance of METI], art. 5(2).
372. Interview with METI Official #4, supra note 364.
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industry leaders had negotiated with a member of the U.S. Congress on the
assumption that the congressman spoke for President Richard Nixon, only to find
later that Nixon opposed the deal.373 In that case, the officials appeared to
miscalculate due to a misunderstanding of the separation of powers, which
allocates power over diplomatic negotiations to the President rather than
Congress and thus diminishes the prospects for presidential approval of a
congressionally negotiated agreement.374 Likewise, there is evidence that
knowledge is not equally advanced in all areas. Two officials separately
suggested that MOFAs understanding of the separation of war powers under
U.S. law is more limited than its understanding of U.S. trade law, either because
there is no day-to-day need to understand war powers375 or because the
Japanese and American legal systems exhibit particularly disparate approaches
to the use of force in international relations.376 A number of officials also
expressed surprise at the notion that the U.S. Constitution ever permits the fifty
states to enter into agreements with foreign governments.377
Certain conditions likely contribute to the potential for misunderstanding.
First, intensive training on U.S. foreign relations law is unavailable, not only
among the university law faculties from which many officials obtained their
degrees,378 but also within the ministries themselves. MOFAs Foreign Service
Training Institute (FSTI) delivers lectures on Japan-U.S. relations and on
international law to new diplomats, but none of those lectures focus on topics in
U.S. foreign relations law.379 Nor is such training available prior to an
assignment to the Japanese embassy in Washington.380 Instead, officials learn on
the job, as the need arises381 or in ad hoc research sessions involving relevant
personnel.382 Similar patterns appear in METI.383 Multiple officials justified this
practice on the ground that there is generally no need for expertise on U.S.
foreign relations law.384 As one explained, it is the U.S. sides responsibility
not Tokyosto make sure an action or agreement accords with U.S. law.385
Second, personnel management systems in MOFA and METI often inhibit
specialization. Most diplomats at MOFA rotate throughout the Ministry and its

373. I.M. DESTLER ET AL., MANAGING AN ALLIANCE: THE POLITICS OF U.S.-JAPANESE
RELATIONS 95 (1976).
374. Id. at 95-96.
375. Interview with MOFA Official #4, supra note 353.
376. Interview with MOFA Official #7, supra note 362.
377. See, e.g., Interview with MOFA Official #4, supra note 353.
378. See supra Part III.A (discussing conditions within Japanese law faculties).
379. Interview with MOFA Official #6, in Sagamihara, Japan (Nov. 14, 2018).
380. Interview with MOFA Official #9, in Tokyo, Japan (Oct. 16, 2018).
381. Interview with MOFA Official #5, in Tokyo, Japan (Oct. 25, 2018).
382. See, e.g., Interview with MOFA Official #7, supra note 362 (explaining that MOFAs
Economic Affairs Bureau has held research sessions on the North American Free Trade Agreement).
383. See, e.g., Interview with METI Official #1, supra note 365 (explaining that although the
Multilateral Trade System Department in METIs Trade Policy Bureau holds training sessions on the
WTO, the Americas Division does not hold similar sessions on U.S. trade law).
384. See, e.g., Interview with MOFA Official #7, supra note 362; Interview with MOFA Official
#9, supra note 380.
385. Interview with MOFA Official #7, supra note 362.
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numerous foreign postings every two to three years.386 Similarly, career
bureaucrats in METI generally rotate into a new position every two years.387
Assignments are not always random,388 but it is not uncommon for officials in
MOFAs North American Affairs Bureau and METIs Trade Policy Bureau to
have previously worked exclusively on matters that are unrelated to the United
States, and to move on to another unrelated assignment at the next rotation.389
Officials have weaker incentives and fewer opportunities to develop expertise on
the United States and its legal system in this context.
Third, licensed lawyers occupy a marginal position in MOFA and METI.
While undergraduate law degrees from Japanese universities are common,
practicing attorneys are rare among the ranks of career officials in both
ministries,390 which tend to rely upon a small number of professional lawyers
who work under term-limited employment contracts391 and on a rotating group
of permanent employees who are not licensed lawyers392 to perform legal work.
For example, the staff of MOFAs Bureau of International Legal Affairs includes
fifty or sixty nonlawyer diplomats who are assigned to the Bureau on rotation
and a revolving group of ten to twenty practicing attorneys who work under
contract with MOFA.393 Similarly, all of the licensed attorneys in METIs
Multilateral Trade System Department work under term-limited contracts.394
The use of these contracts has enabled the ministries to attract talent that would
otherwise be unavailable,395 but it has also inhibited the development of legal
expertise, as the attorneys often leave for comparatively lucrative opportunities
in the private sector once their terms expire.396

386. Interview with MOFA Official #1, supra note 362; Interview with MOFA Official #3, supra
note 360.
387. Interview with METI Official #3, supra note 368.
388. Interview with METI Official #2, in Tokyo, Japan (Oct. 26, 2018) (explaining that some
officials develop expertise in one or two issue areas, such as the United States, over the course of their
career); Interview with MOFA Official #1, supra note 362 (explaining that MOFA always makes sure
that at least some of the personnel assigned to the Economic Affairs Bureau are knowledgeable about U.S.
law).
389. Interview with METI Official #2, supra note 388; Interview with MOFA Official #4, supra
note 353.
390. See, e.g., Interview with METI Official #4, supra note 364 (explaining that there are no fulltime trade lawyers on the permanent staff at METI); Interview with MOFA Official #5, supra note 381
(explaining that practicing lawyers at MOFA work under term-limited contracts).
391. See Interview with METI Official #3, supra note 368 (explaining that the initial contract for
each attorney provides for a two-year term of employment, after which the attorney may receive an
opportunity to renew for an additional five-year term); Interview with MOFA Official #5, supra note 381
(suggesting that MOFA usually contracts with attorneys for one to three years) (translation mine).
392. See, e.g., Interview with MOFA Official #8, in Tokyo, Japan (Nov. 19, 2018) (explaining
that many of the international law practitioners in MOFA are nonlawyers) (translation mine).
393. Interview with MOFA Official #5, supra note 381.
394. Interview with METI Official #3, supra note 368.
395. METI had a program for hiring licensed attorneys on a permanent basis as late as the mid1990s, but the program failed to attract sufficient talent. Interview with METI Official #3, supra note 368.
To address this problem, METI adopted the practice of hiring attorneys under term-limited contracts with
higher pay in the late 1990s. Id.
396. See, e.g., Interview with METI Official #3, supra note 368 (suggesting that it is difficult to
persuade attorneys to renew their contracts and stay in the Multilateral Trade System Department for long
and that this problem inhibits the development of institutional memory); Interview with MOFA Official
#4, supra note 353 (suggesting that MOFAs reliance on contract lawyers inhibits the development of
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Finally, academic sources suggest that the Japanese governments
intelligence capabilities have generally been lackluster since the end of World
War II.397 As Richard Samuels explains, Japans intelligence community was an
undersized, compromised, and . . . organizationally handicapped operation
throughout the Cold War.398 The Cabinet Research Chambernow the Cabinet
Intelligence Research Office (CIRO)was created in 1952 to collate and
analyze intelligence collected by other government agencies,399 but it was
barely functional for decades and roughly the equivalent of a nursery school
in comparison to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.400 Even decades later in
2013, CIRO had an estimated budget of approximately $20 million and a staff of
only 170 officials401a majority of whom were secondees from other
agencies,402 and many of whom had no background in intelligence.403 By
comparison, the CIAs budget was 735 times larger and its staff 126 times larger
around the same time.404 Although recent reforms have reportedly improved
Japans ability to collect and analyze intelligence, deficiencies remain.405 These
conditions likely challenge the Japanese governments ability to incorporate
accurate information about U.S. foreign relations law, among other topics, into
decision-making processes.
All that said, the structure and staffing of MOFAs North American Affairs
Bureau suggest that it is far from indifferent to the identification and resolution
of legal questions affecting bilateral relations. In addition to the Treaty Division
and SOFA Offices work on the implementation of specific agreements,406 the
First Division contains a nonstatutory but virtually permanent subdivision that
focuses on legal matters such as extradition and mutual legal assistance.407
According to one official, this subdivision is the only one of its kind in MOFAs
regional bureaus and exists because legal questions arise with unparalleled
frequency in Japans relations with the United States.408 Moreover, the Second
Divisions staff in recent years has included a judge who works on secondment
from the Ministry of Justice.409
legal expertise within the Ministry and that MOFA need[s] more lawyers).
397. See, e.g., Andrew L. Oros, Japans Growing Intelligence Capability, 15 INTL J. INTELL. &
COUNTERINTELL. 1, 4 (2002) (suggesting that the Japanese state has far less intelligence power . . .
than states more often examined, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and even Israel).
398. RICHARD J. SAMUELS, SPECIAL DUTY: A HISTORY OF THE JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY 79 (2019).
399. Id. at 92.
400. Id. at 94.
401. Taro Kono, Sumio Mabuchi & Koichi Yamauchi, Nihon-gata Supai Soshiki no
Tsukurikata, 128 CHŪŌ KŌRON 94 (Nov. 5, 2013).
402. See Kotani, supra note 315, at 183 (explaining that 100 of the 170 staff members are on
loan from other ministries and agencies).
403. SAMUELS, supra note 398, at 178.
404. See The Black Budget, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2013 (reporting a CIA budget of $14.7 billion
and a staff of 21,459 full-time employees).
405. See, e.g., SAMUELS, supra note 398, at 252-55 (discussing recent reforms and lingering
problems of coordination within the Japanese intelligence community).
406. Hokubeikyoku, supra note 359.
407. Interview with MOFA Official #8, supra note 392 (translation mine).
408. Id.
409. Interview with MOFA Official #7, supra note 362.
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METIs Trade Policy Bureau has undertaken similar efforts. The Americas
Division temporarily added a Japanese attorney to its staff in recent years to
assist with negotiations over the Trans-Pacific Partnership.410 The Economic
Partnership Division employed an attorney on a term-limited basis to work on
international investment disputes.411 The Multilateral Trade System Department
contains a Dispute Settlement Office, the staff of which includes five attorneys
who work under term-limited contracts to handle legal disputes before the
WTO.412 In 2008, the Bureau created an International Legal Affairs Office with
a collection of personnel from the Dispute Settlement Office and the Economic
Partnership Division in order to further empower legal perspectives.413 And in
2017, the Bureau created the position of General Counsel for International Legal
Affairs, in part to collaborate with the U.S. Department of Commerce and the
[U.S. Trade Representatives] General Counsel Office to jointly promote
cooperation in the enforcement of trade rules.414
Officials in these units manage to obtain information about U.S. foreign
relations law from a variety of external sources. One of the most important is
American law firms. Working through the Japanese embassy in Washington and
consulates elsewhere in the United States, MOFA has retained these firms
hundreds of times since the early 1950s and continues to consult with them on a
regular basis.415 Through this practice, Japanese diplomats have secured expert
analysis on topics such as the extraterritoriality of U.S. law,416 diplomatic
immunity issues,417 World War II-related litigation in federal court,418 U.S. tax
treaties,419 and even pertinent areas of state law.420 Reports from the Justice
Department suggest that MOFA has retained the firms most frequently to acquire
legal insights on U.S. trade law and economic law, such as the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979421 and Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.422 In contrast, those
same reports indicate that MOFA has hired American attorneys to obtain analysis

410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Interview with METI Official #4, supra note 364.
414. TRADE POLICY BUREAU, 2017 Report on Compliance by Major Trading Partners with
Trade Agreements  WTO, EPA/FTA, and IIA- and METI Priorities Based on the 2017 Report,
MINISTRY OF ECON., TRADE & INDUSTRY 4 (May 2017), https://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/data/
2017WTO/pdf/0623_01a.pdf; Interview with METI Official #3, supra note 368; Interview with METI
Official #2, supra note 388.
415. Interview with MOFA Official #1, supra note 362. The suggestion that MOFA has sought
counsel hundreds of times is based on my review of the Justice Departments annual FARA reports to
Congress. See Scoville, FARA Data, supra note 165 (linking to the data compilation).
416. FARA REPORT FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1983, at 309.
417. FARA REPORT FOR THE CALENDAR YEARS 1988, 1989, 1990 AND 1991, at 663.
418. FARA REPORT FOR THE SIX MONTHS ENDING JUNE 30, 2001, at 158.
419. FARA REPORT FOR THE SIX MONTHS ENDING JUNE 30, 2002, at 139.
420. FARA REPORT FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1997, at 193 (reporting the provision of legal
counsel to the Japanese consulate in connection with difficulties . . . obtaining California drivers licenses
for Japanese nationals under California Vehicle Code § 12801.5, which requires an applicant for a license
to submit satisfactory proof that the applicants presence in the United States is authorized under federal
law).
421. FARA REPORT FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1979, at 266.
422. FARA REPORT FOR THE CALENDAR YEARS 1988, 1989, 1990 AND 1991, at 685.
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on U.S. war powers only twice.423 For their part, officials in METIs Trade Policy
Bureau report that they frequently seek counsel on U.S. law from American law
firms424 and have done so more often in recent years due to significant
developments in U.S. trade law under the Trump administration.425 Indeed,
METIs reliance on these firms, for matters pertaining to the United States and
otherwise, has become so routine that the Bureaus Multilateral Trade System
Department maintains a separate budget to pay for legal counsel.426 In the view
of one official, this practice renders unlikely any misunderstanding of U.S. law
within the Bureau.427
American law schools are another source of knowledge. In MOFA, junior
officers take a multiyear sabbatical to study at a foreign university.428 The
primary purpose is language training,429 but officers are free to choose the course
of study through which they will learn a foreign language,430 and according to
one official, law is one of the more popular fields.431 Similarly, in METI, junior
officials train abroad for one or two years by studying subjects of their choosing
at foreign graduate schools under a program administered by the National
Personnel Authority (Jinjiin).432 Although it is unclear how many study law in
particular, the overall number of government officials who commence study in
the United States each year with Jinjiin funding has increased from
approximately twenty in the late 1980s to nearly one hundred in 2018.433
Moreover, six of the seven attorneys in METIs Trade Policy Bureau obtained
both an LLM and a law license in the United States prior to entering government
service.434 As a result, officials who have received formal training on U.S. law,
including foreign relations law, currently occupy a number of influential
positions in Japans foreign policy bureaucracy.435

423. See FARA REPORT FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1981, at 267 (discussing counsels
preparation of a report concerning political factors that would influence U.S. foreign policy decisions
affecting U.S. obligations under the U.S./Japanese Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960,
and the War Powers Resolution of 1973); FARA REPORT FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1980, at 247
(reporting that a law firm initiated work on Phase II of the War Powers Resolution Opinion on United
States  Japan Mutual Defense Agreement).
424. Interview with METI Official #4, supra note 364; see also Interview with METI Official
#1, supra note 365 (explaining that the Americas Division contacts American law firms once or twice a
month).
425. Interview with METI Official #3, supra note 368.
426. Interview with METI Official #2, supra note 388.
427. Interview with METI Official #3, supra note 368.
428. Interview with MOFA Official #5, supra note 381.
429. Interview with MOFA Official #3, supra note 360.
430. Interview with MOFA Official #1, supra note 362.
431. Interview with MOFA Official #9, supra note 380 (translation mine).
432. Interview with METI Official #2, supra note 388.
433. These numbers reflect all ministries other than MOFA, whose officials do not study abroad
under the Jinjiin program. I compiled the underlying data from annual reports published by Japans
National Personnel Authority from 1988 to present. See JINJIIN, Hakusho Detabesu Shisutemu,
https://www.jinji.go.jp/hakusho/index.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2020) (providing links to the reports);
Ryan M. Scoville, Jinjiin Data, https://ryanscoville.files.wordpress.com/2021/01/jinjiin.xlsx (compiling
the data).
434. Interview with METI Official #4, supra note 364.
435. See, e.g., Interview with MOFA Official #5, supra note 381 (explaining that they obtained
an L.L.M. from Harvard Law School, where they studied topics such as war powers and Trade Promotion
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Other sources also play an important role. Officials consult at times with
think tanks and American or Japanese legal academics,436 along with
publications such as law review articles.437 The advancement of Japanese
scholarship on U.S. foreign relations law in recent decades has likely facilitated
this practice.438 Although access appears to vary across organizational units,
some officials use subscription services such as Westlaw439 and monitor U.S.
and Japanese news media.440 The reporting tendencies of newspapers such as the
Asahi Shimbun suggest that this practice provides officials with basic
information on some of the significant developments in U.S. foreign relations
law.441 Embassy personnel in Washington ask legal questions directly to
members of the U.S. executive branch and congressional staff.442 In addition,
officials confer with counterparts from other ministries,443 MOFAs Bureau of
International Legal Affairs,444 and even friendly third-party governments.
Several officials explained that those who need to understand U.S. law will tap
one or more of these sources on an ad hoc basis, depending on the circumstances
and the issue at hand.445
The cumulative result is reasonably pervasive knowledge of the basic
features of pertinent areas of U.S. foreign relations law among MOFA and METI
officials who work on Japan-U.S. relations, particularly in the area of trade.
Authority); Interview with Ministry of Defense (MOD) Official #2 (explaining that they took a course on
U.S. foreign relations law while completing an L.L.M. at George Washington University Law School);
Interview with MOFA Official #1, supra note 362 (explaining that they completed a course on U.S. trade
law at Tufts University); Interview with METI Official #3, supra note 368 (explaining that they completed
a course on U.S. constitutional law at the University of Michigan Law School); Interview with METI
Official #1, supra note 365 (explaining that they completed a course on U.S. trade law at Georgetown
University).
436. Interview with MOFA Official #7, supra note 362 (explaining that the Consulate General
in Detroit had regular contact with the late John Jackson, who taught courses on U.S. foreign relations
law and international trade law, among other topics, at the University of Michigan over the latter half of
the twentieth century); Interview with METI Official #1, supra note 365 (explaining that METI officials
have conferred with a Japanese scholar on U.S. Trade Promotion Authority).
437. Interview with MOFA Official #7, supra note 362.
438. See supra Part III.A.
439. Compare Interview with MOFA Official #7, supra note 362 (explaining that MOFAs First
North America Division has access to subscription services such as Westlaw and that these services are
used often, including to research U.S. law), with Interview with METI Official #1, supra note 365
(explaining that METIs Americas Division does not use Westlaw or Lexis but relies on sources such as
Inside U.S. Trade).
440. Interview with METI Official #1, supra note 365.
441. See supra Part III.B.
442. Interview with MOFA Official #1, supra note 362; Interview with MOFA Official #9, supra
note 380; Interview with METI Official #2, supra note 388.
443. Interview with MOFA Official #1, supra note 362; Interview with METI Official #2, supra
note 388; Interview with MOFA Official #7, supra note 362.
444. See Interview with MOFA Official #9, supra note 380 (suggesting that this happens on
occasion). Two factors seem to limit the role of the Bureau of International Legal Affairs in the resolution
of questions about U.S. law. First, the Bureau is not an office of general counsel, so MOFA does not
funnel legal questions from the regional bureaus into the Bureau of International Legal Affairs as a matter
of course. See Interview with METI Official #3, supra note 368 (suggesting that METI is the only ministry
with an office of general counsel). Second, the Bureau specializes in international law rather than the law
of foreign states, so its role in the resolution of questions about U.S. law is limited. Interview with MOFA
Official #8, supra note 392.
445. Interview with MOFA Official #3, supra note 360; Interview with METI Official #1, supra
note 365.
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Illustrating as much, a number of officials expressed confidence in their
understanding of salient aspects of U.S. trade law, including the Trade Promotion
Authority,446 debates over the Presidents authority to withdraw from treaties
such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),447 and Section
301 of the Trade Act of 1974.448 One MOFA official surmised that, in general,
relevant units in the Japanese bureaucracy are well informed,449 while another
suggested that they are perfectly knowledgeable of relevant laws.450 Still
another explained that, in at least one case where the Japanese governments
policy preferences on a labor issue aligned with those of Congress but not the
U.S. executive branch, Tokyo used its knowledge of TPA as a source of leverage
in negotiations.451 Similarly, one official from METI stated that senior leadership
in the ministry understands very well the essence of U.S. trade law and are
aware of its complexities.452 Some of these officials also demonstrated their
own knowledge of the law by correctly describing certain parts of it.453 Others
attributed institutional knowledge to factors such as the longstanding nature of
the Japan-U.S alliance454 and the transparency of American law.455 Some also
indicated that knowledge is not limited to U.S. trade law but rather extends to
areas such as the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act456 and the different
processes by which the United States enters international agreements.457
Records obtained under Japans freedom-of-information-act458 corroborate
these statements by showing that MOFA officials have studied the War Powers
Resolution on a number of occasions.459 One document, a three-page
memorandum titled U.S. Policy Toward Iraq (Joint Resolution Authorizing the
Use of Force Against Iraq from the Perspective of the War Powers Resolution),
shows that officials in the North American Affairs Bureaus First Division

446. Interview with MOFA Official #9, supra note 380.
447. Interview with METI Official #1, supra note 365.
448. Interview with MOFA Official #1, supra note 362; see also Interview with METI Official
#3, supra note 368 (explaining that relevant METI officials are knowledgeable about Section 301, as well
as Section 232 of the Trade Expansion of 1962).
449. Interview with MOFA Official #1, supra note 362 (translation mine).
450. Interview with MOFA Official #2, in Tokyo, Japan (Nov. 22, 2018) (translation mine).
451. Interview with MOFA Official #5, supra note 381.
452. Interview with METI Official #3, supra note 368 (translation mine).
453. See, e.g., id. (correctly describing the major procedural differences between Article II
treaties and congressional-executive agreements under U.S. law).
454. Interview with MOFA Official #3, supra note 360.
455. Interview with MOFA Official #1, supra note 362 (explaining that U.S. law is relatively
easy to access because of the open nature of American society and the U.S. governments tendency to
publish legal authorities online).
456. See Interview with MOFA Official #8, supra note 392 (explaining that officials in MOFAs
International Legal Affairs Bureau have knowledge of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
457. See, e.g., Interview with MOFA Official #4, supra note 353 (stating that it is common
knowledge in MOFAs International Legal Affairs Bureau that the United States enters into international
agreements by different processes, such as those pertaining to Article II treaties and congressionalexecutive agreements).
458. Gyōseikikan no Hoyūsuru Jōhō no Kōkai ni Kansuru Hōritsu, Act. No. 42 of 1999.
459. I obtained the records by requesting any documents concerning the interpretation,
significance, or meaning of the American War Powers Resolution (アメリカの戦争権限法の解釈や
意義又は定義に関する文書).
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analyzed the WPR at length in October 2002,460 in the midst of U.S.
congressional deliberations over various drafts of what became the 2002 AUMF
on Iraq.461 The memorandum begins with background information. It identifies
the Declare War Clause and the Commander in Chief Clause as the war powers
provisions of the U.S. Constitution,462 notes that the United States has declared
war only five times in its history,463 explains that the WPR restricts the
presidents ability to rely on the Commander in Chief Clause as an independent
source of authority to use force in the absence of a war declaration,464 and
summarizes the statutes major features.465
The memorandum then offers a number of detailed observations regarding
the WPRs historical application. It describes official practice under Section 3 of
the statute,466 part of which states that the President in every possible instance
shall consult with Congress before introducing U.S. forces into hostilities.467
The memorandum explains that in recent decades the executive branch has
refused to acknowledge this requirement as binding and has thus provided
reports consistent with rather than pursuant to it.468 The memorandum also
highlights problems with Section 5, which requires the President to terminate the
use of force in a variety of circumstances.469 In particular, there are no examples
of the withdrawal of U.S. forces pursuant to Section 5,470 U.S. forces were
engaged in hostilities in Kosovo in contravention of the limitations set forth in
that provision,471 the executive branch has called into question its
constitutionality,472 and the Supreme Courts decision in INS v. Chadha suggests
that the legislative veto set forth in Section 5(c) may be unconstitutional.473
The memorandum concludes by providing a side-by-side comparison of
three draft authorizations for the use of force against Iraq: (1) S.J. Res. 45, which
the memorandum describes as enjoying the support of the executive branch; (2)
a bill supported by House leadership; and (3) a Biden-Lugar bill in the Senate.474
In each case, the memorandum highlights the drafts relationship to the WPR,
the stated purposes for which it would authorize force, and its relationship to
pertinent resolutions of the U.N. Security Council.475 For example, whereas S.J.

460. Beikoku no Tai-Iraku Seisaku (Sensō Kengenhō no Kanten Kara Mita Tai-Iraku Gunji Kōdō
Shōnin Gikai Gōdō Ketsugi), Hokubei Dai-ichi-ka, at 1 (Oct. 2002) (on file with author).
461. See H.R.J. Res. 114, 107th Cong. (2002).
462. Beikoku no Tai-Iraku Seisaku, supra note 460, at 1 (translation mine).
463. Id.
464. Id. (translation mine).
465. Id.
466. Id. at 2.
467. War Powers Resolution, § 3, Pub. L. No. 93-148, Nov. 7, 1973, 87 Stat. 555.
468. Beikoku no Tai-Iraku Seisaku, supra note 460, at 2 (translation mine).
469. War Powers Resolution, supra note 467, § 5(b).
470. Beikoku no Tai-Iraku Seisaku, supra note 460, at 2 (translation mine).
471. Id.
472. Id. (citing statements from former State Department Legal Adviser Abraham Sofaer and
former White House Press Secretary Mike McCurry).
473. Id.
474. Id. at 3.
475. Id.
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Res. 45 contained no explicit language476 indicating that it constitutes specific
statutory authorization for purposes of WPR Section 5,477 the other two bills
did.478 The memorandum concludes without further discussion, but its
anonymous author(s) clearly viewed the WPR as an appropriate lens through
which to evaluate the legal and practical implications of each draft. Other records
obtained under Japans freedom-of-information actan undated, one-page
outline of the WPR and an undated, one-page summary of the statutes main
pointsshow that MOFAs interest in the WPR has been recurring.479
***
In sum, there is reason to believe that MOFA and METI officials who work
on Japan-U.S. relations are not experts in U.S. foreign relations law but are,
nevertheless, reasonably well-informed about its basic features in pertinent
areas, particularly trade. Japanese academias contribution to official knowledge
has not been overwhelming, but the scholarship on U.S. foreign relations law has
improved in quality and volume since the end of World War II, providing
officials with ready access to in-depth analysis in their native language on a
variety of topics. It is not uncommon for major Japanese news media to supply
basic information on major developments in the field. And despite employment
policies that appear to marginalize the perspectives of licensed attorneys,
personnel practices that often inhibit the development of country expertise, the
absence of intensive training on U.S. foreign relations law, and the governments
comparatively limited intelligence capabilities overall, relevant officials manage
to tap a variety of sourcesfrom U.S. law firms to congressional staff to
navigate the legal dimensions of Japan-U.S. relations. In other words, the case
study provides new meta-knowledge that on balance favors moving U.S. foreign
relations law from the unknown-known dyad and into the known-known dyad in
the context of U.S.-Japan relations as a general matter.
Given the theory presented in Part I, this finding is likely to carry
significant implications for relations between Washington and Tokyo, at least in
the short term. We can conclude that many relevant officials within the Japanese
government currently understand the basic features of U.S. laws that purport to
impose obligations on Japan. We can conclude that Tokyo today is reasonably
likely to share U.S. views on aspects of international law that incorporate U.S.
foreign relations law, and to understand both law-based signals of U.S. intentions
and the extent to which the United States fulfills or violates its international legal
obligations via municipal legal mechanisms. We can also conclude with

476. Id.
477. War Powers Resolution, supra note 467, § 5(b)-(c).
478. Id.
479. See [Sankō] Sensō Kengenhō War Powers Resolution of 1973 (Gaiyō), Japanese Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (on file with author); Sensō Kengenhō (War Powers Resolution of 1973) (Shuyō na
Pointo), Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (on file with author). Although undated, the first document
was clearly created in recent years, as it explains that President Trump used force against Syria without
congressional authorization in 2017. Id.
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reasonable confidence that Tokyo is generally able to make use of U.S. foreign
relations law to interpret and predict U.S. action in international affairs.
Although additional, updated assessments of Japans epistemic conditions may
be necessary in the long run, this meta-knowledge should, for the foreseeable
future, aid U.S. efforts to ensure Japans compliance with pertinent aspects of
U.S. foreign relations law, to anticipate Japanese views on the content of
international law, to predict the reputational consequences of U.S. compliance
or noncompliance with international law in the context of U.S.-Japan relations,
to use law to send signals to Japan, and to forecast Japanese expectations
regarding future U.S. action.
IV. AN OUTSIDE-IN AGENDA
Of course, even with meta-knowledge pertaining to Japan, many questions
remain. What kinds of epistemic conditions prevail in other countries? What
factors predict the acquisition of foreign knowledge?480 What does sensitivity to
foreign knowledge mean for American legal actors going forward? This Part
helps to answer these questions by laying out an agenda for the implementation
of the outside-in approach. The agenda consists of new academic research and
official policies to cultivate meta-knowledge; a reevaluation of foreign relations
laws functional merits in light of outside-in dynamics; and legal, policy, and
academic reforms to calibrate the transmission of legal information based on
national interests. Because the implications of the outside-in approach are wideranging, much of the analysis here is merely illustrative, leaving to others most
of the task of evaluating the outside-in dimensions of U.S. foreign relations laws
myriad forms and case-specific applications.
A. Advance Meta-Knowledge
Most obviously, implementing the outside-in approach will require
additional work to develop meta-knowledge. In particular, scholars should
conduct new empirical research on foreign epistemic conditions. One line of
inquiry might use case studies to illuminate conditions in countries other than
Japan, thereby generating further insights on the predictors of foreign knowledge
and ignorance. A particularly intriguing strategy would examine official
knowledge in countries that are highly dissimilar to Japan in terms of economic
development, form of government, relations with the United States, and legal
tradition, among other factors, and then compare findings to draw inferences
about the determinants of foreign sophistication. Another line of inquiry might

480. A significant number of studies have examined influences on the global diffusion of legal
models. See, e.g., Holger Spamann, Contemporary Legal Transplants: Legal Families and the Diffusion
of (Corporate) Law, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1813 (finding that legal norms are more likely to spread among
states that share a legal tradition). But while a foreign governments adoption of a U.S. legal model
requires at least a degree of foreign knowledge about the model itself, it is possible for a foreign
government to know U.S. law without adopting it. See, e.g., supra p. 2 (discussing British and Dutch
critiques of the ATS, which lacks an equivalent in British and Dutch law). In other words, diffusion studies
provide insufficient insight on the condition of foreign knowledge because the determinants of modeldiffusion and of knowledge-diffusion are not necessarily the same.
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use quantitative methods to test on a global scale for correlations between foreign
knowledge and independent variables such as national wealth, language, and
similarity to the United States with FARA data, foreign news content, and
foreign scholarship serving as potential proxies for the dependent variable of
official knowledge. Collaborations among U.S. legal scholars, political
scientists, and foreign scholars would be valuable in these endeavors.
Implementing the outside-in approach will also require the U.S.
government to cultivate meta-knowledge and disseminate it to appropriate
actors. The CIA, to name one obvious example, might adopt frameworks to
incorporate assessments of foreign knowledge of U.S. foreign relations law into
intelligence products for policymakers who hope to gauge the prospects of
foreign compliance with U.S. law, assess foreign perceptions of international
law, anticipate the reputational consequences of U.S. compliance or
noncompliance with international law, use law to signal U.S. intentions, or
evaluate the risk of law-based misperception in bilateral relations.481 To the
extent that meta-knowledge is acquired and relevant, the executive branch might
also work to ensure its availability to Congress and the federal judiciary on
pertinent matters through mechanisms such as congressional committee hearings
and amicus briefs.482 Given that the executive branch already possesses the
capability to ascertain foreign knowledge of U.S. law,483 these measures are
unlikely to require new investments in intelligence-collection capabilities.
B. Reevaluate Functional Merits
In addition, implementing the outside-in approach will require U.S. legal
actors to reevaluate foreign relations laws practical merits in light of foreign
epistemic conditions. In drawing attention simultaneously to the significance of
those conditions and to foreign relations laws general failure to take them
481. Cf. Telephone Interview with Gartin, supra note 13 (explaining that this does not occur at
present).
482. Zivotofsky v. Kerry illustrates how the executive branch has missed opportunities to share
meta-knowledge with courts to date. In that case, the government argued in part that the need to speak
with one voice on the recognition of foreign borders favors locating the recognition power exclusively
with the President, but the government did little to inform the court about the external conditions that
might render one voice necessary. See Brief for the Respondent, Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1 (2015),
No. 13-628, 2014 WL 4726506, at *24-25. In other words, the executive branch did not reveal whether
foreign governments properly understood the statute that was under review, or whether they had sufficient
foreign relations law knowledge to follow other developments in U.S. recognition policy in the presence
of multiple voices. Id. This may have occurred because relevant actors in the executive branch did not
possess such information. It also may have occurred because those actors generally view the hoarding of
meta-knowledge as optimal for the executive branch itself. One conceivable rationale for such a view is
that hoarding avoids the risk of diplomatic friction in cases where a candid briefing before a federal judge
would require executive branch lawyers to depict a foreign government as unsophisticated or deficient in
U.S. legal knowledge. Another conceivable rationale is that hoarding meta-knowledge encourages judicial
deference by preserving the informational advantage that the executive tends to enjoy over courts in cases
that implicate foreign relations. Whether such a practice is optimal for the United States is a separate
question. Cf., e.g., MARTIN S. FLAHERTY, RESTORING THE GLOBAL JUDICIARY: WHY THE SUPREME
COURT SHOULD RULE IN U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2019) (arguing in part that the nature of modern
international relations disfavors judicial deference to the executive in many cases involving foreign
relations).
483. See Telephone Interview with Gartin, supra note 13 (explaining that the intelligence
community is capable of providing this kind of information to policymakers, should they ask for it).
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seriously, the outside-in approach exposes traditional arguments about the
functional merits of many legal arrangements as incompleteas analytic halfloaves that neglect an important determinant of the laws ability to advance
national interests. In doing so, the approach encourages caution and modesty,
rather than certitude, on the part of those who invoke practicalities to support or
critique the law: We currently know very little about how the separation of war
powers is understood abroad, but many suspect that executive primacy is optimal
in this area, given the Presidents unique ability to act quickly in times of
crisis.484 Foreign knowledge of the constitutional power to recognize foreign
borders is largely opaque, but many presume that executive exclusivity is the
best arrangement, given that the President is better positioned to speak with one
voice.485 And although we have never examined foreign knowledge of American
federalism, most sense that federal control over foreign affairs is advantageous
due to factors such as federal unity, expertise, and access to information.486 With
a material element of the cost-benefit analysis largely unknown, the best an
analyst can do at present is to make an educated guess on the overall merits of
U.S. foreign relations law in many areas.
Reevaluating longstanding functionalist assessments from an outside-in
perspective will help to correct this deficiency. Ideally, this reevaluation will
cover all aspects of the field and recur as meta-knowledge improves and foreign
knowledge evolves, thereby establishing outside-in analysis as a standard form
of functionalism.487 In some cases, interpretive modalities, institutional
arrangements, and legal doctrines may remain compelling or become even more
so as analysts supplement traditional perspectives with outside-in insights. In
other cases, legal positions may lose some of their force or even cease to
persuade altogether, such that reform is in order. Two examples illustrate the
point.
Executive Primacy. The Supreme Court observed decades ago that the
President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions
which prevail in foreign countries.488 This opportunity has several sources,
including the numerous U.S. embassies and consulates that enable American
diplomats to interface directly with officials from virtually every foreign
government, as well as the U.S. intelligence communitys robust capacity to
synthesize and evaluate information from abroad. Congress, of course, has its
484. See, e.g., Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 7 (2011) (explaining
that the President holds the implicit advantage . . . over the legislature under our constitutional scheme
in situations calling for immediate action, given that imminent national security threats and rapidly
evolving military and diplomatic circumstances may require a swift response by the United States without
the opportunity for congressional deliberation and action).
485. See Zivotofsky, 576 U.S. at 14 (2015) (holding that the Presidents power to recognize
foreign borders is exclusive, in part because only the Executive has the characteristic of unity at all
times).
486. See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The Original
Understanding of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341, 372-73 (1999) (identifying
these arguments).
487. Cf. Curtis A. Bradley, The Irrepressible Functionalism in U.S. Foreign Relations Law, in
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 4-5 (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2019) (discussing common functionalist
considerations, such as speed of decision and unity of message).
488. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
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own tools for gathering information, including committee hearings, member
travel, and subpoenas, but few of these enable direct access to foreign officials
or other foreign sources of information on external conditions.489 In addition, the
financial and human resources with which Congress might attempt to collect and
assess evidence of foreign knowledge pale in comparison to the resources that
are available to the executive branch.490 The President could thus bolster the
practical case for centralizing power in the executive rather than Congress by
directing some of those resources toward the collection and analysis of
intelligence on foreign knowledge,491 as an executive branch well-equipped with
meta-knowledge would be uniquely positioned within the federal government to
promote the effective enforcement of U.S. foreign relations law, harmonize U.S.
and foreign perspectives regarding the content of international law, evaluate the
reputational consequences of U.S. compliance with international law, ascertain
the prospects for using law to signal national intentions in specific cases, and
identify strategic risks in U.S. bilateral relations.492 For the same reason, and for
better or worse, the cultivation of meta-knowledge within the executive branch
would also strengthen the practical argument for judicial deference to the
President493 and for judicial restraint in foreign relations cases more generally.494
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS). The ATS provides that the district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.495
Since 1980, this statute has attracted significant attention from American
commentators as a vehicle for promoting internationally recognized human
rights,496 and in some cases, courts have relied on it to adjudicate claims against
foreign governments and foreign officials.497 The Supreme Court, however, has
greatly restricted its availability in recent years.498 Some commentators have
489. See, e.g., Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (Aliens who are
inhabitants of a foreign country cannot be compelled to respond to a subpoena. They owe no allegiance
to the United States.); Gary E. Davidson, Congressional Extraterritorial Investigative Powers: Real or
Illusory?, 8 EMORY INTL L. REV. 99, 104-05 (1994) (discussing limits on the ability of Congress to
subpoena aliens residing overseas).
490. Compare, e.g., The Black Budget, WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2013) (reporting that the CIA
one of seventeen agencies in the U.S. intelligence communityhad a staff of 21,459 full-time employees
and a budget of $14.7 billion in 2013) with VITAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS, ch. 5 (2021),
https://www.brookings.edu/multi-chapter-report/vital-statistics-on-congress (reporting that Congress and
its support agencies had 19,571 staff members and a budget under $4.1 billion in 2013).
491. Cf. Telephone Interview with Gartin, supra note 13 (explaining that the U.S. intelligence
community is capable of collecting and analyzing this kind of information).
492. See Part I (discussing the benefits of meta-knowledge).
493. Cf. Jama v. Imm. & Customs Enft, 543 U.S. 335, 336 (2005) (discussing the Courts
customary policy of deference to the President in foreign affairs).
494. Cf. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 213 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Constitution delegates foreign affairs powers primarily to the political branches, in part because
decision-making in this area often rests upon information readily available to the Executive Branch and
to the intelligence committees of Congress, but not readily available to the courts).
495. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
496. See Stephen P. Mulligan, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44947, THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE: A
PRIMER 1 (2018) (explaining that the ATS has been the subject of intense interest in recent decades).
497. Ryan M. Scoville, Finding Customary International Law, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1893, 1907
(2016).
498. See supra note 56 (citing sources).
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supported this development,499 while others have lamented it.500 But whatever
the other merits of those reactions, the outside-in approach suggests that they are
premature from a practical perspective: Foreign official knowledge of the ATS
is critical to its success as an instrument of rights promotion, and yet the nature
and extent of that knowledge have never been entirely clear.501 To the extent that
officials have been unaware of the ATS, it is unlikely to have deterred human
rights violations502 or held value as a normative signal in international society,
and the slow death of the ATS at the hands of the Supreme Court is largely
inconsequential, particularly given that few plaintiffs have succeeded at
recovering money damages.503 But insofar as foreign officials have been
knowledgeable about the ATS, it may very well have helped to deter human
rights violations and held value as a normative signal, and the Courts approach
to the statute comes at a material cost to the advancement of international human
rights. Meta-knowledge would thus help U.S. legal actors to decide whether it is
worthwhile to try to revive the ATS,504 in addition to suggesting means of
improving its deterrent and signaling effects.
C. Optimize Foreign Knowledge
Finally, the outside-in approach encourages U.S. efforts to optimize the
nature and extent of foreign knowledge rather than accept prevailing conditions
as given. In some cases, foreign understanding is likely to serve U.S. interests.
Foreign comprehension of TPA, for example, is necessary for TPA to achieve
its avowed purpose of reassuring trading partners that Congress will not tamper
with presidentially negotiated trade agreements.505 But in other cases, foreign
understanding may prove counterproductive. The TVPA, for instance, is less
likely to deter torture if foreign officials are aware that plaintiffs rarely prevail.506
Optimizing foreign knowledge will thus require U.S. legal actors to adopt
strategies of clarity and obfuscation that are tailored to the nature of the issue at
499. See, e.g., Eric Posner, The United States Cant Be the Worlds Courthouse, SLATE (Apr. 24,
2013), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2013/04/the-supreme-court-and-the-alien-tort-statute-endinghuman-rights-suits.html (applauding the Courts decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum as curtailing
an example of thuggish American exceptionalism).
500. See, e.g., Beth Van Schaack, Nestlé & Cargill v. Doe: Whats Not in the Supreme Courts
Opinions, JUST SECURITY (June 30, 2021), https://www.justsecurity.org/77120/nestle-cargill-v-doewhats-not-in-the-supreme-courts-opinions (describing the majority opinion in Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe as
flawed in its logic, historical analysis, and interpretation of Supreme Court precedent).
501. Argentina, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom have displayed knowledge
of the ATS by filing amicus briefs on it with the Supreme Court. See supra note 154 (citing those briefs).
Yet most ATS claims have not involved officials from those countries. See Scoville, supra note 497, at
1906 (finding that federal judicial assessments of customary international law, most of which have
occurred in the context of ATS litigation, have typically concerned the legality of acts that occurred at
least partly in the developing world). For a discussion on the dearth of empirical studies on the ATS, see
Robert Knowles, A Realist Defense of the Alien Tort Statute, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1154-61 (2011).
502. Cf. Robinson & Darley, supra note 60, at 174-76 (identifying legal knowledge as a
precondition to deterrence).
503. Kenney, supra note 63, at 1067-85.
504. Cf. Van Schaack, supra note 500 (arguing that Congress should amend the ATS to clarify
that it applies to torts committed anywhere in violation of international law).
505. Cf. Putnam, supra note 17, at 448 (explaining TPAs rationale).
506. See supra p. 13 (discussing this issue).
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hand, the foreign states that are implicated, and U.S. national interests. A variety
of reforms could help to achieve the desired results.
International Legal Reforms. One set of reforms would seek to optimize
foreign knowledge by means of international law. Multilateral treaties such as
the European Convention on Information on Foreign Law (the London
Convention) provide a model for how this might work.507 Under the Convention,
contracting parties undertake to supply one another . . . with information on
their law and procedure in civil and commercial fields as well as on their judicial
organization.508 To implement this commitment, each party must establish a
national liaison body to receive and take action on requests for information from
other parties, and to transmit requests for information from its own judicial
authorities.509 Upon receipt of a request, the liaison body may either draw up
the reply itself or transmit the request to another State or official body to draw
up the reply,510 transmit the request to a private body or to a qualified lawyer
to draw up the reply,511 or refuse to take action . . . if its interests are affected
by the case giving rise to the request or if it considers that the reply might
prejudice its sovereignty or security.512 Where a party elects to reply, the object
shall be to give information in an objective and impartial manner on the law of
the requested State to the judicial authority from which the request emanated.513
It is conceivable that the United States would benefit from the adoption of
similar agreements on foreign relations law. These agreements could help to
establish official channels for the transmission of information from the executive
branch to foreign judicial authorities, administrative agencies, and parliaments,
in addition to facilitating U.S. access to expertise on the foreign relations law of
foreign states. In doing so, the agreements might make it easier for the U.S.
executive branch to selectively transmit pertinent information in light of national
interests on a case-by-case basis.
Nonlegal Reforms. Another set of reforms would seek to optimize foreign
knowledge by means of policy and other nonlegal measures. For example,
subject to standard restrictions on justiciability, the Supreme Court might
reasonably adopt a general policy in favor of granting certiorari to decide cases
on foreign relations law where foreign knowledge would be advantageous.514 In
doing so, the Court could facilitate understanding by fostering a greater degree
of national uniformity in the field and raising the global salience of emerging

507. See, e.g., Inter-American Convention on Proof of and Information on Foreign Law, 1439
U.N.T.S. 110 (1979); European Convention on Information on Foreign Law, 720 U.N.T.S. 147 (1968).
The United States is not a party to these agreements.
508. European Convention on Information on Foreign Law, supra note 507, art. 1.
509. Id. art. 2.
510. Id. art. 6(1).
511. Id. art. 6(2).
512. Id. art. 11.
513. Id. art. 7.
514. Cf. Rule 10: Considerations Governing Review on Certiorari, Rules of the Supreme Court
of the United States (2019) (providing that a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling
reasons and identifying factors that the Court considers in deciding whether to grant writ, such as the
existence of a circuit split).
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doctrines.515 Similarly, the executive branch might exert greater efforts to
conduct embassy programming and other diplomatic activities with an eye
toward the optimization of foreign knowledge.516 Finally, to the extent that
foreign knowledge is beneficial, legal scholars could also play a role in its
promotion, including by publishing important works such as the Restatement and
major casebooks in foreign languages, and by inviting more foreign scholars to
participate in relevant academic conferences and research initiatives.517
Reforms to Foreign Relations Law. A final set of reforms would optimize
foreign knowledge by means of foreign relations law itself. Certain features of
the law are likely to aid or complicate foreign governments ability to ascertain
associated rules of decision.518 Lawmakers might thus add or remove those
features depending on whether foreign knowledge is optimal.
Some of the features are terminological. Various aspects of foreign
relations law explicitly incorporate international law by reference and thus
render the meaning of U.S. law dependent upon a body of rules that are familiar
around the globe. Among other places,519 such rules appear in the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, which provides in part that foreign states lack
immunity from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts in certain cases in which rights in
property taken in violation of international law are in issue.520 This kind of
language is likely to facilitate foreign understanding insofar as it enables foreign
governments to draw upon their knowledge of shared norms of international law
to ascertain U.S. law.521 In contrast, other areas of foreign relations law employ
idiosyncratic terminology that is disconnected from international law. The WPR,
for instance, refers to the existence or imminence of hostilities in provisions
515. There is anecdotal evidence that opinions from the U.S. Supreme Court garner more
attention within foreign communities of legal analysts than do opinions from lower federal courts. See
Nichibei Hōgakkai Hanrei Kenkyūkai, supra note 233 (discussing a group of Japanese scholars who
gather periodically to study and discuss U.S. judicial opinions, most of which are opinions from the U.S.
Supreme Court).
516. See, e.g., Kokumushō Shuppan Butsu, Beikoku no Tōchi no Shikumi  Renpō Seifu, AM.
CTR. JAPAN, U.S. DEPT OF STATE, https://americancenterjapan.com/aboutusa/translations/3162/ (last
visited Dec. 29, 2020) (explaining the U.S. system of government in Japanese). One former Foreign
Service officer suggested that although embassy personnel often seek to improve foreign understanding
of the basics of American government, such efforts typically are not directed, formal, or managed.
Telephone Interview with Dan Spokojny, Former Foreign Service Officer (Jan. 22, 2021).
517. Cf. supra note 196 (noting the general absence of foreign scholars at relevant conferences
in recent years).
518. Cf. Dan-Cohen, supra note 12 (suggesting that domestic criminal law selectively transmits
information about itself to members of the general public, resulting in issue-based variations in the extent
of public knowledge about criminal law).
519. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9118(a) (The Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard
is operating shall, subject to recognized principles of international law, prescribe by regulation and
enforce procedures with respect to any ocean thermal energy conversion facility or plantship licensed
under this chapter . . . .); 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as
defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be
imprisoned for life.).
520. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(iii) (requiring federal courts
to hear certain claims involving allegations of state-sponsored terrorism if, among other things, the
claimant has afforded the foreign state a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate . . . in accordance with the
accepted international rules of arbitration).
521. See, e.g., Fed. Republic of Ger. v. Philipp, 141 U.S. 703, 710 (2021) (interpreting the statute
to incorporate the domestic takings rule, which has deep roots . . . in international law).
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on reporting and the automatic withdrawal of U.S. forces.522 This term also
appears in international law,523 but U.S. officials do not borrow its international
law definition when applying the WPR.524 Partly for this reason, the meaning of
the WPR is uncertain even in the eyes of many American observers.525
Other features concern the determinacy of foreign relations law. Some
aspects of the law change infrequently, exhibit clear and simple doctrinal
architectures, and appear in authoritative sources. Consider the rule that the
President holds exclusive power under the Constitution to recognize foreign
borders.526 The contours of this rule are relatively straightforward, highly
unlikely to change, and identifiable by reference to a single Supreme Court
opinion that is unquestionably authoritative.527 These features should help to
limit foreign confusion about U.S. law on foreign state recognition. Other aspects
of the law, however, present significant challenges. Nonjusticiable features of
the separation of powers illustrate the point. Due to the general absence of
judicial guidance and the Constitutions frequent textual indeterminacy,
domestic actors often attempt to ascertain these rules by examining evidence of
original meaning or historical practice,528 at times with help from legal
scholars.529 Yet for many foreign observers, this task is almost certainly difficult.
Original historical research requires fluency in English and an ability to navigate
522. See, e.g., War Powers Resolution, supra note 467, § 4 (providing that, absent a declaration
of war, the President must report to Congress in any case in which U.S. forces are introduced into
hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances).
523. See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1) art. 51(3), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 (providing that civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military
operations . . . unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities).
524. Compare Commentary of 1987, art. 51(3) ¶ 1944, Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I) (explaining that direct participation in hostilities entails acts of war which by
their nature or purpose are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the enemy armed
forces), with Libya and War Powers, Testimony Before the S. Foreign Rels. Comm., 112th Cong. 6-12
(2011) [hereinafter Libya War Powers Testimony] (statement of Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S.
Department of State), https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/167250.htm (suggesting that
hostilities in the WPR is definable in a meaningful way only in the context of an actual set of facts
and that the U.S. role in the invasion of Libya did not qualify as hostilities because the mission, exposure
of U.S. forces, risk of escalation, and military means were limited).
525. Oona A. Hathaway, How to Revive Congress War Powers, TEX. NATL SEC. REV. POLY
ROUNDTABLE 41, 43-46 (2019), https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-the-war-powersresolution/#essay4.
526. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 7-32 (2015).
527. See id. (explaining the rule).
528. See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 417-24 (2012) (discussing the prevalence of historical-gloss arguments
about the separation of powers).
529. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Atty Gen., and Robert J. Delahunty, Special
Couns., Memorandum for John Bellinger, III, Senior Assoc. Couns. to the President and Legal Adviser to
the Natl Sec. Council Re: Authority of the President to Suspend Certain Provisions of the ABM Treaty
20
(Nov.
15,
2001),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2009/08/24/
memoabmtreaty11152001.pdf (citing Robert A. Friedlander, Separating the Powers: Constitutional
Principles and the Treaty Process, 16 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 257, 260-61 (1991), in support of the
proposition that longstanding constitutional practice makes it clear that not every substantial
modification of the United States treaty rights and obligations counts as an amendment that has to be
referred to the Senate for approval).

72

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 47: 1

sources that are numerous, scattered, and to varying degrees inscrutable without
background knowledge of U.S. history.530 Reliance on American scholars is
complicated by the fact that the influence of legal scholarship varies widely, not
least because of political dynamics and hierarchies of institutional affiliation.531
Foreign governments that are unfamiliar with these circumstances may have a
difficult time distinguishing scholarship that is influential from that which is not.
These governments might assume that salient practices from the recent past are
indicative of legal mandates, but recent practice is a reliable guide only insofar
as it reflects an interbranch settlement that is stable, which cannot be taken for
granted.532
Still other features affect the laws transparency. The U.S. government
ranks as one of the most open in the world in terms of public access to
information about its laws and policies,533 and this likely facilitates foreign
knowledge as a general matter.534 Indeed, if one knows where to look, the vast
majority of U.S. foreign relations law is readily available online. Some elements
of the law, however, are completely opaque because they are secret. In the early
2000s, DOJs Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) issued opinions titled The
Constitutional Separation of Powers Over Foreign Affairs and National
Security and The Presidents Authority to Provide Military Equipment and
Training to Allied Forces and Resistance Forces in Foreign Countries, but
neither is available to the public.535 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(FISC) has issued a number of secret opinions on surveillance.536 And Congress
has in recent decades enacted a growing body of secret law in the form of
classified addenda to Intelligence Authorization Acts, National Defense
Authorization Acts, and Defense Appropriations Acts.537 Such secrecy operates
as a robust barrier to foreign knowledge.

530. Cf. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269 (2017) (discussing
methods for ascertaining the original public meaning of the Constitution); Shalev Roisman, The
Originalist Presidency in Practice?, LAWFARE (Jan. 12, 2021, 2:01 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
originalist-presidency-practice (arguing that it is unrealistic to expect lawyers in the U.S. executive branch
to undertake rigorous inquiries into the Constitutions original meaning).
531. Cf. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal Scholars, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 409, 419-26 (2000)
(discussing the institutional affiliations and other characteristics of the most-cited scholars).
532. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 TEX. L. REV. 773,
788-820 (2014) (describing a twentieth-century shift in practice whereby the President acquired power to
terminate treaties without congressional approval).
533. See Transparency of Government Policymaking, Index, WORLD BANK (2017),
https://tcdata360.worldbank.org/indicators/h7da6e31a?indicator=687&viz=choropleth&years=2017
(reporting that the United States ranks among the top ten percent of countries in terms of transparency in
government policymaking).
534. See THE INTERAGENCY OPSEC SUPPORT STAFF, OPERATIONS SECURITY INTELLIGENCE
THREAT HANDBOOK § 2 (1996), https://fas.org/irp/nsa/ioss/threat96/part02.htm (Open-source
intelligence is successful in targeting the United States because of the openness of American society.).
535. Daniel Van Schooten, Titles of 13 New Secret Laws Revealed, PROJECT ON GOVT
OVERSIGHT (POGO) (May 30, 2019), https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2019/05/titles-of-13-new-secretlaws-revealed/.
536. See Greg Margolis, Free the FISC Opinions, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. (Apr. 16, 2018),
https://knightcolumbia.org/news/free-fisc-opinions (discussing the secrecy of FISC opinions and efforts
by advocacy groups to improve transparency).
537. Dakota S. Rudesill, Coming to Terms with Secret Law, 7 HARV. NATL SEC. J. 241, 259-75
(2015).
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Finally, some features of the law affect foreign access to U.S. legal counsel.
As the FARA data demonstrate, the expertise of American attorneys is generally
available to foreign governments on a wide range of topics in foreign relations
law and otherwise.538 Yet access to counsel is not guaranteed. The Treasury
Departments Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, for example,
require attorneys to obtain a specific license to provide Iran with any legal
services other than those enumerated in a short list that includes advice and
counseling on the requirements of and compliance with U.S. law and
representation in U.S. legal and administrative proceedings.539 By implication,
this regulation appears to preclude the provision of legal advice to Iran on topics
such as war powers.540 Similar regulations apply to North Korea,541 Cuba,542 and
Syria,543 thereby reducing the flow of legal knowledge from American lawyers
to those governments on certain topics.544
A key challenge going forward is to determine whether the current
manifestations of idiosyncratic terminology, indeterminacy, secrecy, and
restricted access to counsel are optimal in light of U.S. national interests, and to
pursue reforms that reduce or expand the presence of those features depending,
at least in part, on whether foreign knowledge is beneficial. The need for such
an effort stems from the fact that only some of the selective transmission under
current law occurs by design. In the cases of secret addenda to federal statutes545
and regulations that restrict access to counsel,546 the law clearly aims to limit
foreign understanding of itself. Yet in many other cases, selective transmission
appears as an accidental byproduct of legal-design choices grounded in unrelated
rationales. For example, U.S. officials appear to have embraced an idiosyncratic
definition of the word hostilities in the WPR not because they hoped to limit
foreign understanding of U.S. war powers, but rather as a domestic political
compromise.547 Similarly, the Supreme Court held in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
that ATS jurisdiction permits federal courts to create common-law causes of
action for violations of modern norms of customary international law (CIL) that
are accepted by the civilized world and defined with adequate specificity.548
This doctrine is likely to produce foreign confusion with regard to the kinds of
conduct that are actionable, as it is largely untethered from the globally shared
538. See supra pp. 27-29.
539. Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 560.525 (2012).
540. See id. § 560.525(a) (enumerating categories of authorized legal services that do not include
consultation on strategic questions in U.S.-Iran relations).
541. See North Korea Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 510.507 (2018).
542. See Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.512 (2015).
543. See Syrian Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 542.507 (2014).
544. Cf. supra p. 34 (discussing the absence of legal-service registrations under FARA for Cuba
and Iran in recent decades).
545. See Rudesill, supra note 537, at 259-75 (discussing the rise of these addenda in recent years).
546. See supra notes 539-43 (citing examples of these regulations).
547. See Libya War Powers Testimony, supra note 524, at 5 (Because the War Powers
Resolution represented a broad compromise between competing views on the proper division of
constitutional authorities, the question whether a particular set of facts constitutes hostilities for purposes
of the Resolution has been determined more by interbranch practice than by a narrow parsing of dictionary
definitions.).
548. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
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rule of recognition for CIL.549 The Court, however, did not consider that effect,
much less justify the Sosa test as a tool of selective transmission.550
The outside-in approach thus encourages U.S. officials to better account
for foreign epistemic effects when choosing whether to add, remove, or retain
idiosyncratic terminology, indeterminacy, secrecy, and restrictions on access to
counsel. In treaty-making and other areas that seek to facilitate global
cooperation or standardization, foreign ignorance may generally prove
problematic as a source of confusion and cross-national differentiation. In these
areas, appropriate reforms might replace idiosyncratic terminology with the
lexicon of international law, combat indeterminacy by reducing judicial
invocation of the political question doctrine, promote transparency through
publicity, and encourage access to American legal expertise. In contrast, with
respect to war powers and other areas that implicate the interests of hostile states,
foreign ignorance could prove beneficial as a means of limiting the predictability
of U.S. action. In those areas, the appropriate approach may very well include
greater use of idiosyncratic terminology, enhancements in indeterminacy, more
secrecy, and greater restrictions on access to American legal expertise.
CONCLUSION
For the most part, the field of U.S. foreign relations law has operated in
analytical isolation from the external environment that it so clearly implicates.
The laws inputs have been primarily domestic in origin, with considerations of
text, original meaning, judicial precedent, historical practice, and institutional
competencies dominating the analysis in both official sources and scholarship.
This inside-out orientation serves important purposes, but it is incomplete, as
foreign governmental knowledge of U.S. foreign relations law influences not
only the likelihood of foreign compliance with pertinent elements of the law, but
also global perceptions of the content of international law, global perceptions of
U.S. compliance with international law, foreign relations laws ability to transmit
signals that shape foreign perceptions of U.S. intentions, and the risk of
miscalculation in U.S. bilateral relations. Analysts should therefore supplement
traditional considerations with a novel paradigman outside-in approachthat
advances meta-knowledge of U.S. foreign relations law, reevaluates the laws
operational merits in light of foreign epistemic conditions, and seeks to optimize
foreign sophistication by strategically deploying legal and policy tools to
calibrate the selective transmission of legal information. A foreign relations law
that embraces such an approach will be better positioned to advance national
interests.

549. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 36, § 102(2) (explaining that CIL arises from a general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation).
550. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725-33 (justifying the test primarily by reference to early historical
understandings, along with concerns about the separation of powers).

